A theory of contracts for web services

<p>Contracts are behavioural descriptions of Web services. We devise a theory of contracts that formalises the compatibility of a client to a service, and the safe replacement of a service with another service. The use of contracts statically ensures the successful completion of every possible interaction between compatible clients and services.</p> <p>The technical device that underlies the theory is the definition of filters, which are explicit coercions that prevent some possible behaviours of services and, in doing so, they make services compatible with different usage scenarios. We show that filters can be seen as proofs of a sound and complete subcontracting deduction system which simultaneously refines and extends Hennessy's classical axiomatisation of the must testing preorder. The relation is decidable and the decision algorithm is obtained via a cut-elimination process that proves the coherence of subcontracting as a logical system.</p> <p>Despite the richness of the technical development, the resulting approach is based on simple ideas and basic intuitions. Remarkably, its application is mostly independent of the language used to program the services or the clients. We also outline the possible practical impact of such a work and the perspectives of future research it opens.</p&gt

The state-private interface in public service provision

Political theory sets out a strong case for the state to play a major role in public service provision. Yet services are often provided by a range of state and non-state actors as well as by collaborative partnerships. This paper surveys the literature, seeking to map arrangements in developing countries and to understand the politics of different types of service provision

A Political Economy of Privatization Contracts : The Case of Water and Sanitation in Ghana and Argentina

This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: Hulya Dagdeviren, Simon A. Robertson, 'A Political Economy of Privatization Contracts: The Case of Water and Sanitation in Ghana and Argentina', Competition & Change, Vol. 18 (2): 150-163, April 2014. The final, published version is available online at DOI: https://doi.org/10.1179/1024529414Z.00000000053. Published by SAGE.In general, the process and outcomes of privatization have been studied from the point of view of efficiency. In this article, we consider issues in the course of contract design, implementation, management and enforcement in privatized public services and utilities. The study is based on two case studies, involving several water concessions in Argentina and a management contract in the urban water sector in Ghana. Three key arguments are presented on the basis of these case studies. The first is that an individualistic analytical framework is often utilized by the mainstream economic perspectives, but these are inadequate for a comparative assessment of private versus public provision in public services where there are distinct collective or group interests and hence a wider socio-economic context and representation of different interests becomes highly important. Instead, the article proposes a political economy perspective, which pays due attention to distributional issues, group interests, ideology of states and power relations for the assessment of privatization contracts. Second, the administrative capacity of states and their resources play a key role for the outcomes of privatization. Finally, while some contractual issues could be resolved through resourcing and experience over time, others are inherent to the contractual relations with little prospect of remedy.Peer reviewe

Inter Organizational Relationships Performance in Third Party Logistics: conceptual framework and case study

Supplier relationship management is an important challenge for shippers in logistics outsourcing. This paper attempts to understand the factors which affect inter organizational relationships performance in third party logistics and proposes a conceptual framework specifically for inter organizational relationship performance in third party logistics. We also draw a set of propositions from published research and exploratory inter-views with practitioners to explain inter organizational relationships performance in third party logistic net-works. Five main dimensions of inter organizational relationships are identified which affect performance in third party logistics: commitment, supplier adaptation, conflict resolution, partner fit and communication. In order to assess the validity of our conceptual model we include a case study in this paper. The case study is based on Shell Chemicals Europe and their portfolio of seventeen third party logistic service suppliers

Peeling Back the Student Privacy Pledge

Education software is a multi-billion dollar industry that is rapidly growing. The federal government has encouraged this growth through a series of initiatives that reward schools for tracking and aggregating student data. Amid this increasingly digitized education landscape, parents and educators have begun to raise concerns about the scope and security of student data collection. Industry players, rather than policymakers, have so far led efforts to protect student data. Central to these efforts is the Student Privacy Pledge, a set of standards that providers of digital education services have voluntarily adopted. By many accounts, the Pledge has been a success. Since its introduction in 2014, over 300 companies have signed on, indicating widespread commitment to the Pledge’s seemingly broad protections for student privacy. This industry participation is encouraging, but the Pledge does not contain any meaningful oversight or enforcement provisions. This Article analyzes whether signatory companies are actually complying with the Pledge rather than just paying lip service to its goals. By looking to the privacy policies and terms of service of a sample of the Pledge’s signatories, I conclude that noncompliance may be a significant and prevalent issue. Consumers of education software have some power to hold signatories accountable, but their oversight abilities are limited. This Article argues that the federal government, specifically the Federal Trade Commission, is best positioned to enforce compliance with the Pledge and should hold Pledge signatories to their promises

Peeling Back the Student Privacy Pledge

Education software is a multi-billion dollar industry that is rapidly growing. The federal government has encouraged this growth through a series of initiatives that reward schools for tracking and aggregating student data. Amid this increasingly digitized education landscape, parents and educators have begun to raise concerns about the scope and security of student data collection. Industry players, rather than policymakers, have so far led efforts to protect student data. Central to these efforts is the Student Privacy Pledge, a set of standards that providers of digital education services have voluntarily adopted. By many accounts, the Pledge has been a success. Since its introduction in 2014, over 300 companies have signed on, indicating widespread commitment to the Pledge’s seemingly broad protections for student privacy. This industry participation is encouraging, but the Pledge does not contain any meaningful oversight or enforcement provisions. This Article analyzes whether signatory companies are actually complying with the Pledge rather than just paying lip service to its goals. By looking to the privacy policies and terms of service of a sample of the Pledge’s signatories, I conclude that noncompliance may be a significant and prevalent issue. Consumers of education software have some power to hold signatories accountable, but their oversight abilities are limited. This Article argues that the federal government, specifically the Federal Trade Commission, is best positioned to enforce compliance with the Pledge and should hold Pledge signatories to their promises