9,876 research outputs found
A strongly polynomial algorithm for linear exchange markets
We present a strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with linear utilities. Our algorithm is based on a variant of the weakly-polynomial Duan–Mehlhorn (DM) algorithm. We use the DM algorithm as a subroutine to identify revealed edges, i.e. pairs of agents and goods that must correspond to best bang-per-buck transactions in every equilibrium solution. Every time a new revealed edge is found, we use another subroutine that decides if there is an optimal solution using the current set of revealed edges, or if none exists, finds the solution that approximately minimizes the violation of the demand and supply constraints. This task can be reduced to solving a linear program (LP). Even though we are unable to solve this LP in strongly polynomial time, we show that it can be approximated by a simpler LP with two variables per inequality that is solvable in strongly polynomial time
A strongly polynomial algorithm for linear exchange markets
We present a strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with linear utilities. Our algorithm is based on a variant of the weakly-polynomial Duan–Mehlhorn (DM) algorithm. We use the DM algorithm as a subroutine to identify revealed edges, i.e. pairs of agents and goods that must correspond to best bang-per-buck transactions in every equilibrium solution. Every time a new revealed edge is found, we use another subroutine that decides if there is an optimal solution using the current set of revealed edges, or if none exists, finds the solution that approximately minimizes the violation of the demand and supply constraints. This task can be reduced to solving a linear program (LP). Even though we are unable to solve this LP in strongly polynomial time, we show that it can be approximated by a simpler LP with two variables per inequality that is solvable in strongly polynomial time
On Computability of Equilibria in Markets with Production
Although production is an integral part of the Arrow-Debreu market model,
most of the work in theoretical computer science has so far concentrated on
markets without production, i.e., the exchange economy. This paper takes a
significant step towards understanding computational aspects of markets with
production.
We first define the notion of separable, piecewise-linear concave (SPLC)
production by analogy with SPLC utility functions. We then obtain a linear
complementarity problem (LCP) formulation that captures exactly the set of
equilibria for Arrow-Debreu markets with SPLC utilities and SPLC production,
and we give a complementary pivot algorithm for finding an equilibrium. This
settles a question asked by Eaves in 1975 of extending his complementary pivot
algorithm to markets with production.
Since this is a path-following algorithm, we obtain a proof of membership of
this problem in PPAD, using Todd, 1976. We also obtain an elementary proof of
existence of equilibrium (i.e., without using a fixed point theorem),
rationality, and oddness of the number of equilibria. We further give a proof
of PPAD-hardness for this problem and also for its restriction to markets with
linear utilities and SPLC production. Experiments show that our algorithm runs
fast on randomly chosen examples, and unlike previous approaches, it does not
suffer from issues of numerical instability. Additionally, it is strongly
polynomial when the number of goods or the number of agents and firms is
constant. This extends the result of Devanur and Kannan (2008) to markets with
production.
Finally, we show that an LCP-based approach cannot be extended to PLC
(non-separable) production, by constructing an example which has only
irrational equilibria.Comment: An extended abstract will appear in SODA 201
Ascending-Price Algorithms for Unknown Markets
We design a simple ascending-price algorithm to compute a
-approximate equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with
weak gross substitute (WGS) property, which runs in time polynomial in market
parameters and . This is the first polynomial-time
algorithm for most of the known tractable classes of Arrow-Debreu markets,
which is easy to implement and avoids heavy machinery such as the ellipsoid
method. In addition, our algorithm can be applied in unknown market setting
without exact knowledge about the number of agents, their individual utilities
and endowments. Instead, our algorithm only relies on queries to a global
demand oracle by posting prices and receiving aggregate demand for goods as
feedback. When demands are real-valued functions of prices, the oracles can
only return values of bounded precision based on real utility functions. Due to
this more realistic assumption, precision and representation of prices and
demands become a major technical challenge, and we develop new tools and
insights that may be of independent interest. Furthermore, our approach also
gives the first polynomial-time algorithm to compute an exact equilibrium for
markets with spending constraint utilities, a piecewise linear concave
generalization of linear utilities. This resolves an open problem posed by Duan
and Mehlhorn (2015).Comment: 33 page
The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies
We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange
economies, and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining
outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded)
by coalitions of small size and show that these allocations must be approximate
Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is
approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for
which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.Comment: 26 page
A Combinatorial Polynomial Algorithm for the Linear Arrow-Debreu Market
We present the first combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for computing
the equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu market model with linear utilities.Comment: Preliminary version in ICALP 201
The Complexity of Non-Monotone Markets
We introduce the notion of non-monotone utilities, which covers a wide
variety of utility functions in economic theory. We then prove that it is
PPAD-hard to compute an approximate Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium in markets
with linear and non-monotone utilities. Building on this result, we settle the
long-standing open problem regarding the computation of an approximate
Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium in markets with CES utility functions, by
proving that it is PPAD-complete when the Constant Elasticity of Substitution
parameter \rho is any constant less than -1
Strongly polynomial algorithm for a class of minimum-cost flow problems with separable convex objectives
A well-studied nonlinear extension of the minimum-cost flow problem is to
minimize the objective over feasible flows ,
where on every arc of the network, is a convex function. We give
a strongly polynomial algorithm for the case when all 's are convex
quadratic functions, settling an open problem raised e.g. by Hochbaum [1994].
We also give strongly polynomial algorithms for computing market equilibria in
Fisher markets with linear utilities and with spending constraint utilities,
that can be formulated in this framework (see Shmyrev [2009], Devanur et al.
[2011]). For the latter class this resolves an open question raised by Vazirani
[2010]. The running time is for quadratic costs,
for Fisher's markets with linear utilities and
for spending constraint utilities.
All these algorithms are presented in a common framework that addresses the
general problem setting. Whereas it is impossible to give a strongly polynomial
algorithm for the general problem even in an approximate sense (see Hochbaum
[1994]), we show that assuming the existence of certain black-box oracles, one
can give an algorithm using a strongly polynomial number of arithmetic
operations and oracle calls only. The particular algorithms can be derived by
implementing these oracles in the respective settings
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