A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games

We provide a strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule (Béal et al., 2014). Precisely, we design a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the sequential equal surplus division outcome of a superadditive rooted tree TU-game. This mechanism borrowed from the bidding mechanism designed by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), but takes into account the direction of the edges connecting any two players in the rood tree, which reflects some dominance relation between them

Essays in microeconomic theory

The thesis first provides an axiomatic characterization of the probability-weighted minimal norm solution for Bayesian social choice problems with reference points. Chapter 2 provides a characterization of feasibility conditions for general social choice problems. The examples include voting, auctions with externalities, package auctions and exchanges with complementary objects. Chapter 3 examines the existence of ex post efficient and monotone solutions for a two-person bargaining problem. Chapters 4 and 5 investigate two specific problems of designing trading mechanisms with monetary transfers to achieve certain welfare objectives

Metadata Schema x-econ Repository

Since May 2017, the x-hub project partners OVGU Magdeburg, University of Vienna, and GESIS dispose of a new repository, called x-econ (https://x-econ.org). The service is dedicated to all experimental economics research projects to disseminate user-friendly archiving and provision of experimental economics research data. The repository x-econ contains all necessary core functionalities of a modern repository and is in a continuous optimization process aiming at functionality enhancement and improvement. x-econ is also one pillar of the multidisciplinary repository x-science (https://x-science.org). The present documentation, which is primarily based on the GESIS Technical Reports on datorium 2014|03 and da|ra 4.0, lists and explains the metadata elements, used to describe research information

Cooperation, compensation and transition

Cooperation and compensation are two important and well-linked issues in economics. The central question in cooperation is how to share the joint gains among participating players. Compensation is a specific aspect of surplus sharing problems providing incentives for agents to sacrifice their own direct interests to obtain higher payoffs for the coalition as a whole. This thesis first introduces and analyses a new solution concept, the consensus value, for cooperative games with transferable utility in characteristic function form and generalises it to partition function form games. These ideas and concepts are used to analyse several problems of loss compensation and surplus sharing: the general framework of project-allocation situations and the problem of externality-associated compensations within the new model of primeval games. Finally, transition by compensation is analysed in the framework of transition economies and, in particular, in the reform process of China.

Game-theoretic models of water allocation in transboundary river basins

Onderzoeksvragen zijn hoe samenwerking in waterverdeling kan worden verbeterd, en hoe internationale verdragen zo kunnen worden ontworpen dat ze niet worden verbroken. Onderliggende onderwerpen zijn de aanwezigheid van betwiste eigendomsrechten op water en het ontwerp van aantrekkelijke verdeelregels voor rivierwater. Het doel van dit proefschrift is het analyseren van waterverdeling in grensoverschrijdende rivieren met behulp van speltheoretische modellen. Dit type modellen is geschikt voor het analyseren van strategische interactie tussen landen die een rivier delen, in hun beslissingen omtrent watergebruik

Cooperation, Compensation and Transition.

Cooperation and compensation are two important and well-linked issues in economics. The central question in cooperation is how to share the joint gains among participating players. Compensation is a specific aspect of surplus sharing problems providing incentives for agents to sacrifice their own direct interests to obtain higher payoffs for the coalition as a whole. This thesis first introduces and analyses a new solution concept, the consensus value, for cooperative games with transferable utility in characteristic function form and generalises it to partition function form games. These ideas and concepts are used to analyse several problems of loss compensation and surplus sharing: the general framework of project-allocation situations and the problem of externality-associated compensations within the new model of primeval games. Finally, transition by compensation is analysed in the framework of transition economies and, in particular, in the reform process of China.