Ethics and OR: Operationalising Discourse Ethics

Operational researchers help managers decide what they ought to do and yet this is generally evaluated in terms of efficiency or effectiveness, not ethicality. However, the combination of the tremendous power of global corporations and the financial markets, and the problems the world faces in terms of economic and environmental sustainability, has led to a revival of interest in ethical approaches. This paper explores a relatively recent and innovative process called discourse ethics. This is very different from traditional ethical systems in taking ethical decisions away from individuals or committees and putting them in the hands of the actual people who are involved and affected through processes of debate and deliberation. The paper demonstrates that discourse ethics has strong connections to OR, especially in the areas of soft and critical systems, and that OR can actually contribute to the practical operationalisation of discourse ethics. At the same time, discourse ethics can provide a rigorous discursive framework for “ethics beyond the model"

Fiduciary Legal Ethics, Zeal, and Moral Activism

The recent turn to fiduciary theory among private lawyer scholars suggests that lawyer as fiduciary may provide a fresh justification for legal ethics distinct from moral and political accounts propounded by theorists in recent decades. This Article examines the justification and limits of fiduciary legal ethics. In the course of the investigation, it argues that the fiduciary relation of lawyer to client as defined in the ethics codes does not align perfectly with fiduciary principles in other legal domains, such as agency, trust, or corporate law. Lawyers are fiduciaries of their clients. Does that mean lawyers can never throttle back on partisan zeal for moral reasons? So it might seem, and so some scholars have argued. Ethics rules permit lawyers to withdraw from representations they find morally repugnant, but not to represent clients with diminished zeal. And yet there are cases, such as peeking at metadata inadvertently transmitted in documents sent by an adversary, or exploiting scrivener\u27s errors, where many lawyers understandably back off from the sternest implications of partisan zeal. Such cases call into question whether lawyer as fiduciary tells the whole story. An adequate theory of the lawyer-client fiduciary relationship must define the limits to fiduciary zeal as well as justify the fiduciary relationship itself. Otherwise, invoking the word fiduciary merely relabels the moral problem of partisan zeal rather than resolving it

Theory and practice in the induction of five graduate nurses : a reflexive critique : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Education at Massey University

This thesis investigates the induction of comprehensive nurses into a professional culture during their polytechnic nursing education and first year of hospital practice. It combines a critical theory approach with case study method. The ways in which social forces constrain individual and professional action are demonstrated through a critical reflexive analysis of the perceptions of five recently graduated comprehensive nurses. Each graduate was interviewed at regular intervals over a three month period. It is argued that previous studies of professional socialisation of nurses conducted within both empirico-analytic and interpretive epistemologies, have tended to objectify the day-to-day actions that students and new graduates take. While providing descriptions of the socialisation process, previous studies have not explored the reflexivity of understanding and action as well as the structural constraints of nursing education and practice. In this thesis critical social theory provides a framework in which to reveal, through empirical research, the constraining conditions of actions, and, through interpretive forms of enquiry, human perception and understanding. The reflections of the five participants in this study reveal that there are similar structural constraints in education as in hospital based nursing practice. There is, in effect, a continuity of structural constraints and this is contrasted with a disjunction between knowledge and beliefs gained through education and those apparently required in nursing practice. The graduates' perceptions are discussed and interpreted in terms of both the intended and the unintended learning states engendered by their actual experiences in the polytechnic and hospital settings. It is suggested that, at present, nursing education and practice are shaped by forms of technical control which arise from the dominant ideologies already embedded in the education and health care structures. In particular, nursing curricula are dominated by the technical linear paradigm of curri­culum design which contributes to a distorted separation of theory and practice and which obscures the process of reproduction of professional culture. It is argued that a more socially critical approach to the design of nursing curricula might begin to transform some of the structures which presently inhibit and constrain the professional choices and actions of student and graduate nurses

'Education, education, education' : legal, moral and clinical

This article brings together Professor Donald Nicolson's intellectual interest in professional legal ethics and his long-standing involvement with law clinics both as an advisor at the University of Cape Town and Director of the University of Bristol Law Clinic and the University of Strathclyde Law Clinic. In this article he looks at how legal education may help start this process of character development, arguing that the best means is through student involvement in voluntary law clinics. And here he builds upon his recent article which argues for voluntary, community service oriented law clinics over those which emphasise the education of students

Lawyers\u27 Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism

This Article combines contractarian economics and traditional ethical theory to argue for a radical revision of the legal profession\u27s codes of ethics. That revision would end the legal profession as we know it-one profession, regulated by one set of ethical rules that apply to all lawyers regardless of circumstance. It would replace the existing uniform conception of the lawyer\u27s role with a more heterogeneous profession in which lawyers and clients could contractually choose the ethical obligations under which they wanted to operate. This contract model of legal ethics, in which lawyers could opt in and out of various ethical constraints, would lead to greater efficiencies, greater satisfaction for attorneys and clients, and greater vitality for the legal profession

Being Good Lawyers: A Relational Approach to Law Practice

In response to past generations of debates regarding whether law is a business or profession, we advance an alternative approach that rejects the dichotomies of business and profession, or hired gun and wise counselor. Instead, we propose a relational account of law practice. Unlike frameworks grounded in assumptions of atomistic individualism or communitarianism, a relational perspective recognizes that all actors, whether individuals or organizations, have separate identities yet are intrinsically inter-connected and cannot maximize their own good in isolation. Through the lens of relational self-interest, maximizing the good of the individual or business requires consideration of the good of the neighbor, the employee or customer, and of the public. Accordingly, relational lawyers advise and assist clients, colleagues, and themselves to take into account the well-being of others when contemplating and pursuing their own interests. A relational approach to law practice does not require a choice between labeling law a business or a profession, and indeed is consistent with both perspectives. Lawyers can access relational perspectives from a wide range of understandings of the lawyer’s role, with the exception of the particular hired gun ideology that views lawyers as amoral mouthpieces for clients who act as Holmesian bad men and women aggressively pursuing their self-interest with no regard to others. The relational framework offers all lawyers, whether they see themselves as professionals or business persons, a framework for understanding that they can continue to serve as society’s civic teachers in their capacity as intermediaries between the people and the law, integrating relational self-interest into their representation of clients and their community service. By doing so, lawyers as professionals, individuals, and community members will more effectively represent clients, as well as enhance their contribution to the public good and to the quality of their own professional and private lives. They will also surmount the generation-long malaise resulting from the crisis of professionalism

Is There an Ethics for Historians?

How should historians treat one another? More generally, what are the ethical obligations that go with belonging to the profession of history? And more generally still, in what ways and in what sense is history a profession and how are professional ethics manifested in the profession? These are the questions I will canvass in this essay. In his introduction to The Historian’s Conscience, Stuart Macintyre observes that in the recent ‘public dispute over Australian history … there is surprisingly little attention to the ethical dimensions of historical scholarship’. I will suggest that this lack of attention is a problem, and I will try to clarify the nature of the problem

Natural Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller

In Plato\u27s Laws, the Athenian Stranger claims that the gods will smile only on a city where the law is despot over the rulers and the rulers are slaves of the law. This passage is the origin of the slogan the rule of law not of men, an abbreviation of which forms our phrase the rule of law. From Plato and Aristotle, through John Adams and John Marshall, down to us, no idea has proven more central to Western political and legal culture. Yet the slogan turns on a very dubious metaphor. Laws do not rule, and the rule of law not of men is actually a specific form of rule by men (including, nowadays, a few women). These rulers are not slaves to anything. Furthermore, the construction of the slogan -rule of law and not of men-has unfortunate connotations. It suggests that the personal qualities of the human rulers required to secure the rule of law are nothing more than forbearance and disinterestedness-a resolution to stay out of law\u27s way. What if the rule of law is more demanding than this? What if it turns out to be a particularly elaborate and technically ingenious form of the rule of (let me say) men and women? What if the rule of law establishes a moral relationship between those who govern and those whom they govern? Furthermore, what if sustaining this relationship requires certain moral attitudes and virtues on the part of the governors that are not simply disinterested forbearance, and not simply the moral attitudes and virtues required of everyone