Implementing Session Centered Calculi

Recently, specific attention has been devoted to the development of service oriented process calculi. Besides the foundational aspects, it is also interesting to have prototype implementations for them in order to assess usability and to minimize the gap between theory and practice. Typically, these implementations are done in Java taking advantage of its mechanisms supporting network applications. However, most of the recurrent features of service oriented applications are re-implemented from scratch. In this paper we show how to implement a service oriented calculus, CaSPiS (Calculus of Services with Pipelines and Sessions) using the Java framework IMC, where recurrent mechanisms for network applications are already provided. By using the session oriented and pattern matching communication mechanisms provided by IMC, it is relatively simple to implement in Java all CaSPiS abstractions and thus to easily write the implementation in Java of a CaSPiS process

Deductive and Analogical Reasoning on a Semantically Embedded Knowledge Graph

Representing knowledge as high-dimensional vectors in a continuous semantic vector space can help overcome the brittleness and incompleteness of traditional knowledge bases. We present a method for performing deductive reasoning directly in such a vector space, combining analogy, association, and deduction in a straightforward way at each step in a chain of reasoning, drawing on knowledge from diverse sources and ontologies.Comment: AGI 201

Reasoning About a Service-oriented Programming Paradigm

This paper is about a new way for programming distributed applications: the service-oriented one. It is a concept paper based upon our experience in developing a theory and a language for programming services. Both the theoretical formalization and the language interpreter showed us the evidence that a new programming paradigm exists. In this paper we illustrate the basic features it is characterized by

Constructive Provability Logic

We present constructive provability logic, an intuitionstic modal logic that validates the L\"ob rule of G\"odel and L\"ob's provability logic by permitting logical reflection over provability. Two distinct variants of this logic, CPL and CPL*, are presented in natural deduction and sequent calculus forms which are then shown to be equivalent. In addition, we discuss the use of constructive provability logic to justify stratified negation in logic programming within an intuitionstic and structural proof theory.Comment: Extended version of IMLA 2011 submission of the same titl

On an Intuitionistic Logic for Pragmatics

We reconsider the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic [21] regarded as a logic of assertions and their justications and its relations with classical logic. We recall an extension of this approach to a logic dealing with assertions and obligations, related by a notion of causal implication [14, 45]. We focus on the extension to co-intuitionistic logic, seen as a logic of hypotheses [8, 9, 13] and on polarized bi-intuitionistic logic as a logic of assertions and conjectures: looking at the S4 modal translation, we give a denition of a system AHL of bi-intuitionistic logic that correctly represents the duality between intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic, correcting a mistake in previous work [7, 10]. A computational interpretation of cointuitionism as a distributed calculus of coroutines is then used to give an operational interpretation of subtraction.Work on linear co-intuitionism is then recalled, a linear calculus of co-intuitionistic coroutines is dened and a probabilistic interpretation of linear co-intuitionism is given as in [9]. Also we remark that by extending the language of intuitionistic logic we can express the notion of expectation, an assertion that in all situations the truth of p is possible and that in a logic of expectations the law of double negation holds. Similarly, extending co-intuitionistic logic, we can express the notion of conjecture that p, dened as a hypothesis that in some situation the truth of p is epistemically necessary