Defending a simple theory of conditionals

This paper extends the defense of a simple theory of indicative conditionals previously proposed by the author, in which the truth conditions are material, and Grice-style assertability conditions are given to explain the paradoxes of material implication. The paper discusses various apparent counter-examples to the material account in which conditionals are not asserted, and so the original theory cannot be applied; it is argued that, nevertheless, the material theory can be defended

Defending a simple theory of conditionals

This paper extends the defense of a simple theory of indicative conditionals previously proposed by the author, in which the truth conditions are material, and Grice-style assertability conditions are given to explain the paradoxes of material implication. The paper discusses various apparent counter-examples to the material account in which conditionals are not asserted, and so the original theory cannot be applied; it is argued that, nevertheless, the material theory can be defended

Wierenga on theism and counterpossibles

Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argument in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give an example of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for which it fails

Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception

Laws designed to affect the flow of information take many forms: rules against misrepresentation, disclosure requirements, secrecy requirements, rules governing the formatting or packaging of information, and interpretive rules designed to give people new reasons to share information. Together these and similar rules constitute the law of deception: laws that aim to prevent or cure deception. One encounters similar problems of design, function and justification throughout the law of deception. Yet very little has been written about the category as a whole. This article begins to sketch a general theory. It identifies three regulatory approaches. Interpretive laws, such as common law fraud, prohibit the making of untrue statements. These laws work by giving legal effect to commonly understood extralegal norms of interpretation and truth telling, in order to achieve specifically legal ends. Purpose-based laws, such as the tort of concealment, target acts done with a bad intent. Rather than employing an objective standard of behavior, they define the object of regulation by an actor\u27s wrongful state of mind. Finally, causal-predictive laws employ everyday folk-psychology, empirical studies or cognitive theory to predict the informational effects of narrowly described behaviors. Much consumer protection law is of the causal-predictive sort. These regulatory approaches reach different types of informationally significant behavior, are suited to different regulatory ends, and require different institutional competencies. After describing the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, the article applies the theory to the Lanham Act\u27s false advertising provisions. In deciding Lanham Act cases, courts have arrived at a complex set of rules that include all three approaches. A critical analysis of those rules illustrates the theory\u27s ability both to explain the law of deception and to recommend improvements in it

Necessity, a Leibnizian Thesis, and a Dialogical Semantics

In this paper, an interpretation of "necessity", inspired by a Leibnizian idea and based on the method of dialogical logic, is introduced. The semantic rules corresponding to such an account of necessity are developed, and then some peculiarities, and some potential advantages, of the introduced dialogical explanation, in comparison with the customary explanation offered by the possible worlds semantics, are briefly discussed

Reasoning, Science, and the Ghost Hunt

This paper details how ghost hunting, as a set of learning activities, can be used to enhance critical thinking and philosophy of science classes. We describe in some detail our own work with ghost hunting, and reflect on both intended and unintended consequences of this pedagogical choice. This choice was partly motivated by students’ lack of familiarity with science and philosophic questions about it. We offer reflections on our three different implementations of the ghost hunting activities. In addition, we discuss the practical nuances of implementing these activities, as well the relation of ghost hunting to our course content, including informal fallacies and some models for scientific inference. We conclude that employing ghost hunting along-side traditional activities and content of critical thinking and philosophy of science offers a number of benefits, including being fun, increasing student attendance, enhancing student learning, and providing a platform for campus wide dialogues about philosophy

A Mind for Language: How Language Shapes Our Reality

To write of language is an unusual activity, for it is to describe something by, through, and with itself. This thesis not only defends the view advanced by Sapir and Whorf of linguistic relativism, but extends their thesis with an application of Heidegger, and conflates the terms of language and self. Ultimately, I believe this endeavor is one which is not successful, but which also yields significant implications for further thought on the philosophical relevance of linguistic relativism. Section two presents some initial thoughts on language and self; the third section describes the terms of language, whereas the fourth one describes those of the self. A fifth section then deals with the general interactions and observations of the interrelatedness between these terms, with a conclusion which highlights the main insights of the inquiry. (A brief appendix with some remarks on poetry follows this thesis.

Substance or Mere Technique? A Precis on Good Faith Performance in England, France and Germany

This paper attempts to offer a concise discussion of good faith performance and other functionally equivalent doctrines in the laws of England, Germany and France. The study’s goal is that of appraising the consistency of existing differences. More specifically, of whether they relate merely to technique - not being paralleled by diverging final outcomes - or whether the rift is deeper and goes to the very substance of the approach to the solution of similar practical problems. For this purpose, the work first shows the close connection between good faith performance (of contractual obligations) and good faith enforcement (of contractual rights), which – it is contended – are simply different perspectives to bear on substantially identical legal questions. The work then proceeds to examine instances in which either of these perspectives is used to solve disputes, and offers an overview of the most frequent approaches, doctrines and provisions used under the three chosen national laws. At the end of the legal analysis, it is concluded that all three systems recognise similar instances as deserving some degree of legal intervention, performed either under the aegis of good faith or through other legal constructs. It is, however, precisely the difference in the nature and breadth of the legal constructs used across jurisdictions that ends up casting uncertainties as to the precise level of agreement of the three systems: differences in technique may indeed translate in divergent substantial outcomes, albeit only in limited cases