Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1

Cast-as-Intended Mechanism with Return Codes Based on PETs

We propose a method providing cast-as-intended verifiability for remote electronic voting. The method is based on plaintext equivalence tests (PETs), used to match the cast ballots against the pre-generated encrypted code tables. Our solution provides an attractive balance of security and functional properties. It is based on well-known cryptographic building blocks and relies on standard cryptographic assumptions, which allows for relatively simple security analysis. Our scheme is designed with a built-in fine-grained distributed trust mechanism based on threshold decryption. It, finally, imposes only very little additional computational burden on the voting platform, which is especially important when voters use devices of restricted computational power such as mobile phones. At the same time, the computational cost on the server side is very reasonable and scales well with the increasing ballot size

HandiVote: simple, anonymous, and auditable electronic voting

We suggest a set of procedures utilising a range of technologies by which a major democratic deficit of modern society can be addressed. The mechanism, whilst it makes limited use of cryptographic techniques in the background, is based around objects and procedures with which voters are currently familiar. We believe that this holds considerable potential for the extension of democratic participation and control

Authentication with Weaker Trust Assumptions for Voting Systems

Some voting systems are reliant on external authentication services. Others use cryptography to implement their own. We combine digital signatures and non-interactive proofs to derive a generic construction for voting systems with their own authentication mechanisms, from systems that rely on external authentication services. We prove that our construction produces systems satisfying ballot secrecy and election verifiability, assuming the underlying voting system does. Moreover, we observe that works based on similar ideas provide neither ballot secrecy nor election verifiability. Finally, we demonstrate applicability of our results by applying our construction to the Helios voting system

What did I really vote for? On the usability of verifiable e-voting schemes

E-voting has been embraced by a number of countries, delivering benefits in terms of efficiency and accessibility. End-to-end verifiable e-voting schemes facilitate verification of the integrity of individual votes during the election process. In particular, methods for cast-as-intended verification enable voters to confirm that their cast votes have not been manipulated by the voting client. A well-known technique for effecting cast-as-intended verification is the Benaloh Challenge. The usability of this challenge is crucial because voters have to be actively engaged in the verification process. In this paper, we report on a usability evaluation of three different approaches of the Benaloh Challenge in the remote e-voting context. We performed a comparative user study with 95 participants. We conclude with a recommendation for which approaches should be provided to afford verification in real-world elections and suggest usability improvements

Secret texts and cipherballots: secret suffrage and remote electronic voting

Una de les principals preocupacions sobre el vot telemàtic és com preservar el sufragi secret. La llista d’estudis que afirmen que el vot per Internet és incompatible amb el secret del vot és força extensa. Si bé estudis posteriors sobre experiències reals han tingut resultats més matisats, les preocupacions sobre el sufragi secret i el vot telemàtic es mantenen. Abordar aquestes preocupacions esdevé una obligació ineludible. En aquest context, la nostra recerca és novadora. En primer lloc, el nostre punt de partida no es basa en definicions legals preexistents que s'accepten com a donades. Partint de l'enfocament universalista del dret constitucional comparat, hem entès que el principi del sufragi secret transcendeix les opinions i convencions lligades a comunitats polítiques concretes. Aquesta concepció comú i bàsica s'ha traduït en tres estàndards: individualitat, confidencialitat i anonimat. Aquests estàndards s’han de satisfer en qualsevol canal de votació. En segon lloc, hem adoptat un enfocament més ampli en l’aplicació d’aquest principi al vot telemàtic. Hem demostrat que el sufragi secret es pot garantir mitjançant la llei, el codi informàtic, les normes i fins i tot el mercat. La normativa actual tendeix a ser limitada perquè recorre a analogies amb els canals de votació en paper i no reconeix les especificitats del vot telemàtic. Per contra, aquí hem examinat el paper que exerceixen (i les limitacions pròpies) del xifrat asimètric, l'anonimització basada en mix-nets o el recompte homomòrfic, i el vot múltiple.Una de las principales preocupaciones sobre el voto telemático es cómo garantizar el secreto del voto. La lista de autores que afirman que el voto por Internet es incompatible con el sufragio secreto es considerable. Aunque las conclusiones de estudios posteriores sobre experiencias reales hayan sido más matizadas, las preocupaciones sobre el sufragio secreto y el voto telemático se mantienen. Abordar estas preocupaciones constituye en una obligación ineludible. En este contexto, nuestra investigación es novedosa. En primer lugar, nuestro punto de partida no se basa en definiciones legales preexistentes que se aceptan como dadas. Partiendo del enfoque universalista del derecho constitucional comparado, hemos entendido que el principio del sufragio secreto trasciende las opiniones y convenciones ligadas a la cultura de comunidades políticas concretas. Esta concepción se ha traducido en tres normas: individualidad, confidencialidad y anonimato. Estas normas deberían aplicarse a cualquier canal de votación. En segundo lugar, hemos adoptado un enfoque más amplio sobre la aplicación de este principio. Hemos demostrado que el sufragio secreto puede garantizarse mediante la ley, el código, las normas e incluso el mercado. La normativa actual tiende a ser limitada porque recurre a analogías con los canales de votación en papel y no reconoce las especificidades del voto telemático.One of the key concerns about remote electronic voting is how to preserve secret suffrage. The list of authors who claim that Internet voting is incompatible with the secrecy of the vote is actually quite long. Even if later studies that analysed the actual implementation of remote electronic voting in public political elections had more nuanced findings, concerns about secret suffrage and remote electronic voting remain. Addressing these concerns becomes an inescapable obligation. In this context, our research is quite novel. First and foremost, our starting point is not based on pre-existing legal definitions that are accepted as given. Drawing from the universalist approach to comparative constitutional law, we have understood that the principle of secret suffrage exists in such a way that it transcends the culture bound opinions and conventions of particular political communities. This core understanding has been translated into three standards: individuality, confidentiality, and anonymity. These standards should apply to any voting channel. Second, we have taken a wider approach at the enforcement of this principle. We have showed that secret suffrage may be enforced through law, code, norms, and even the market. Current regulations tend to be constrained because they resort to analogies with paper-based voting channels and fail to acknowledge the specificities of remote electronic voting. In contrast, we have examined the role played by (and the limitations of) asymmetric encryption, anonymization based on mix-nets or homomorphic tallying, and of multiple voting to enforce secret suffrage

Electronic voting : 6th International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2021, virtual event, October 5-8, 2021

This book constitutes the proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Electronic Voting, E-Vote-ID 2021, held online -due to COVID -19- in Bregenz, Austria, in October 2021. The 14 full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 55 submissions. The conference collected the most relevant debates on the development of Electronic Voting, from aspects relating to security and usability through to practical experiences and applications of voting systems, as well as legal, social or political aspects