173 research outputs found
Steganographic Timing Channels
This paper describes steganographic timing channels that use cryptographic primitives to hide the presence of covert channels in the timing of network traffic. We have identified two key properties for steganographic timing channels: (1) the parameters of the scheme should be cryptographically keyed, and (2) the distribution of input timings should be indistinguishable from output timings. These properties are necessary (although we make no claim they are sufficient) for the undetectability of a steganographic timing channel. Without them, the contents of the channel can be read and observed by unauthorized persons, and the presence of the channel is trivially exposed by noticing large changes in timing distributions – a previously proposed methodology for covert channel detection. Our steganographic timing scheme meets the secrecy requirement by employing cryptographic keys, and we achieve a restricted form of input/output distribution parity. Under certain distributions, our schemes conforms to a uniformness property; input timings that are uniformly distributed modulo a timing window are indistinguishable from output timings, measured under the same modulo. We also demonstrate that our scheme is practical under real network conditions, and finally present an empirical study of its covertness using the firstorder entropy metric, as suggested by Gianvecchio and Wang [8], which is currently the best published practical detection heuristic for timing channels
Detection and Mitigation of Steganographic Malware
A new attack trend concerns the use of some form of steganography and information hiding to make malware stealthier and able to elude many standard security mechanisms. Therefore, this Thesis addresses the detection and the mitigation of this class of threats. In particular, it considers malware implementing covert communications within network traffic or cloaking malicious payloads within digital images.
The first research contribution of this Thesis is in the detection of network covert channels. Unfortunately, the literature on the topic lacks of real traffic traces or attack samples to perform precise tests or security assessments. Thus, a propaedeutic research activity has been devoted to develop two ad-hoc tools. The first allows to create covert channels targeting the IPv6 protocol by eavesdropping flows, whereas the second allows to embed secret data within arbitrary traffic traces that can be replayed to perform investigations in realistic conditions. This Thesis then starts with a security assessment concerning the impact of hidden network communications in production-quality scenarios. Results have been obtained by considering channels cloaking data in the most popular protocols (e.g., TLS, IPv4/v6, and ICMPv4/v6) and showcased that de-facto standard intrusion detection systems and firewalls (i.e., Snort, Suricata, and Zeek) are unable to spot this class of hazards.
Since malware can conceal information (e.g., commands and configuration files) in almost every protocol, traffic feature or network element, configuring or adapting pre-existent security solutions could be not straightforward. Moreover, inspecting multiple protocols, fields or conversations at the same time could lead to performance issues.
Thus, a major effort has been devoted to develop a suite based on the extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) to gain visibility over different network protocols/components and to efficiently collect various performance indicators or statistics by using a unique technology. This part of research allowed to spot the presence of network covert channels targeting the header of the IPv6 protocol or the inter-packet time of generic network conversations. In addition, the approach based on eBPF turned out to be very flexible and also allowed to reveal hidden data transfers between two processes co-located within the same host. Another important contribution of this part of the Thesis concerns the deployment of the suite in realistic scenarios and its comparison with other similar tools. Specifically, a thorough performance evaluation demonstrated that eBPF can be used to inspect traffic and reveal the presence of covert communications also when in the presence of high loads, e.g., it can sustain rates up to 3 Gbit/s with commodity hardware. To further address the problem of revealing network covert channels in realistic environments, this Thesis also investigates malware targeting traffic generated by Internet of Things devices. In this case, an incremental ensemble of autoencoders has been considered to face the ''unknown'' location of the hidden data generated by a threat covertly exchanging commands towards a remote attacker.
The second research contribution of this Thesis is in the detection of malicious payloads hidden within digital images. In fact, the majority of real-world malware exploits hiding methods based on Least Significant Bit steganography and some of its variants, such as the Invoke-PSImage mechanism. Therefore, a relevant amount of research has been done to detect the presence of hidden data and classify the payload (e.g., malicious PowerShell scripts or PHP fragments). To this aim, mechanisms leveraging Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) proved to be flexible and effective since they can learn by combining raw low-level data and can be updated or retrained to consider unseen payloads or images with different features. To take into account realistic threat models, this Thesis studies malware targeting different types of images (i.e., favicons and icons) and various payloads (e.g., URLs and Ethereum addresses, as well as webshells). Obtained results showcased that DNNs can be considered a valid tool for spotting the presence of hidden contents since their detection accuracy is always above 90% also when facing ''elusion'' mechanisms such as basic obfuscation techniques or alternative encoding schemes.
Lastly, when detection or classification are not possible (e.g., due to resource constraints), approaches enforcing ''sanitization'' can be applied. Thus, this Thesis also considers autoencoders able to disrupt hidden malicious contents without degrading the quality of the image
Covert Channels Within IRC
The exploration of advanced information hiding techniques is important to understand and defend against illicit data extractions over networks. Many techniques have been developed to covertly transmit data over networks, each differing in their capabilities, methods, and levels of complexity. This research introduces a new class of information hiding techniques for use over Internet Relay Chat (IRC), called the Variable Advanced Network IRC Stealth Handler (VANISH) system. Three methods for concealing information are developed under this framework to suit the needs of an attacker. These methods are referred to as the Throughput, Stealth, and Baseline scenarios. Each is designed for a specific purpose: to maximize channel capacity, minimize shape-based detectability, or provide a baseline for comparison using established techniques applied to IRC. The effectiveness of these scenarios is empirically tested using public IRC servers in Chicago, Illinois and Amsterdam, Netherlands. The Throughput method exfiltrates covert data at nearly 800 bits per second (bps) compared to 18 bps with the Baseline method and 0.13 bps for the Stealth method. The Stealth method uses Reed-Solomon forward error correction to reduce bit errors from 3.1% to nearly 0% with minimal additional overhead. The Stealth method also successfully evades shape-based detection tests but is vulnerable to regularity-based tests
Application of information theory and statistical learning to anomaly detection
In today\u27s highly networked world, computer intrusions and other attacks area constant threat. The detection of such attacks, especially attacks that are new or previously unknown, is important to secure networks and computers. A major focus of current research efforts in this area is on anomaly detection.;In this dissertation, we explore applications of information theory and statistical learning to anomaly detection. Specifically, we look at two difficult detection problems in network and system security, (1) detecting covert channels, and (2) determining if a user is a human or bot. We link both of these problems to entropy, a measure of randomness information content, or complexity, a concept that is central to information theory. The behavior of bots is low in entropy when tasks are rigidly repeated or high in entropy when behavior is pseudo-random. In contrast, human behavior is complex and medium in entropy. Similarly, covert channels either create regularity, resulting in low entropy, or encode extra information, resulting in high entropy. Meanwhile, legitimate traffic is characterized by complex interdependencies and moderate entropy. In addition, we utilize statistical learning algorithms, Bayesian learning, neural networks, and maximum likelihood estimation, in both modeling and detecting of covert channels and bots.;Our results using entropy and statistical learning techniques are excellent. By using entropy to detect covert channels, we detected three different covert timing channels that were not detected by previous detection methods. Then, using entropy and Bayesian learning to detect chat bots, we detected 100% of chat bots with a false positive rate of only 0.05% in over 1400 hours of chat traces. Lastly, using neural networks and the idea of human observational proofs to detect game bots, we detected 99.8% of game bots with no false positives in 95 hours of traces. Our work shows that a combination of entropy measures and statistical learning algorithms is a powerful and highly effective tool for anomaly detection
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TOWARDS RELIABLE CIRCUMVENTION OF INTERNET CENSORSHIP
The Internet plays a crucial role in today\u27s social and political movements by facilitating the free circulation of speech, information, and ideas; democracy and human rights throughout the world critically depend on preserving and bolstering the Internet\u27s openness. Consequently, repressive regimes, totalitarian governments, and corrupt corporations regulate, monitor, and restrict the access to the Internet, which is broadly known as Internet \emph{censorship}. Most countries are improving the internet infrastructures, as a result they can implement more advanced censoring techniques. Also with the advancements in the application of machine learning techniques for network traffic analysis have enabled the more sophisticated Internet censorship. In this thesis, We take a close look at the main pillars of internet censorship, we will introduce new defense and attacks in the internet censorship literature.
Internet censorship techniques investigate users’ communications and they can decide to interrupt a connection to prevent a user from communicating with a specific entity. Traffic analysis is one of the main techniques used to infer information from internet communications. One of the major challenges to traffic analysis mechanisms is scaling the techniques to today\u27s exploding volumes of network traffic, i.e., they impose high storage, communications, and computation overheads. We aim at addressing this scalability issue by introducing a new direction for traffic analysis, which we call \emph{compressive traffic analysis}. Moreover, we show that, unfortunately, traffic analysis attacks can be conducted on Anonymity systems with drastically higher accuracies than before by leveraging emerging learning mechanisms. We particularly design a system, called \deepcorr, that outperforms the state-of-the-art by significant margins in correlating network connections. \deepcorr leverages an advanced deep learning architecture to \emph{learn} a flow correlation function tailored to complex networks. Also to be able to analyze the weakness of such approaches we show that an adversary can defeat deep neural network based traffic analysis techniques by applying statistically undetectable \emph{adversarial perturbations} on the patterns of live network traffic.
We also design techniques to circumvent internet censorship. Decoy routing is an emerging approach for censorship circumvention in which circumvention is implemented with help from a number of volunteer Internet autonomous systems, called decoy ASes. We propose a new architecture for decoy routing that, by design, is significantly stronger to rerouting attacks compared to \emph{all} previous designs. Unlike previous designs, our new architecture operates decoy routers only on the downstream traffic of the censored users; therefore we call it \emph{downstream-only} decoy routing. As we demonstrate through Internet-scale BGP simulations, downstream-only decoy routing offers significantly stronger resistance to rerouting attacks, which is intuitively because a (censoring) ISP has much less control on the downstream BGP routes of its traffic. Then, we propose to use game theoretic approaches to model the arms races between the censors and the censorship circumvention tools. This will allow us to analyze the effect of different parameters or censoring behaviors on the performance of censorship circumvention tools. We apply our methods on two fundamental problems in internet censorship.
Finally, to bring our ideas to practice, we designed a new censorship circumvention tool called \name. \name aims at increasing the collateral damage of censorship by employing a ``mass\u27\u27 of normal Internet users, from both censored and uncensored areas, to serve as circumvention proxies
Secure covert communications over streaming media using dynamic steganography
Streaming technologies such as VoIP are widely embedded into commercial and industrial applications, so it is imperative to address data security issues before the problems get really serious. This thesis describes a theoretical and experimental investigation of secure covert communications over streaming media using dynamic steganography. A covert VoIP communications system was developed in C++ to enable the implementation of the work being carried out.
A new information theoretical model of secure covert communications over streaming media was constructed to depict the security scenarios in streaming media-based steganographic systems with passive attacks. The model involves a stochastic process that models an information source for covert VoIP communications and the theory of hypothesis testing that analyses the adversary‘s detection performance.
The potential of hardware-based true random key generation and chaotic interval selection for innovative applications in covert VoIP communications was explored. Using the read time stamp counter of CPU as an entropy source was designed to generate true random numbers as secret keys for streaming media steganography. A novel interval selection algorithm was devised to choose randomly data embedding locations in VoIP streams using random sequences generated from achaotic process.
A dynamic key updating and transmission based steganographic algorithm that includes a one-way cryptographical accumulator integrated into dynamic key exchange for covert VoIP communications, was devised to provide secure key exchange for covert communications over streaming media. The discrete logarithm problem in mathematics and steganalysis using t-test revealed the algorithm has the advantage of being the most solid method of key distribution over a public channel.
The effectiveness of the new steganographic algorithm for covert communications over streaming media was examined by means of security analysis, steganalysis using non parameter Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon statistical testing, and performance and robustness measurements. The algorithm achieved the average data embedding rate of 800 bps, comparable to other related algorithms. The results indicated that the algorithm has no or little impact on real-time VoIP communications in terms of speech quality (< 5% change in PESQ with hidden data), signal distortion (6% change in SNR after steganography) and imperceptibility, and it is more secure and effective in addressing the security problems than other related algorithms
A critical review of cyber-physical security for building automation systems
Modern Building Automation Systems (BASs), as the brain that enables the
smartness of a smart building, often require increased connectivity both among
system components as well as with outside entities, such as optimized
automation via outsourced cloud analytics and increased building-grid
integrations. However, increased connectivity and accessibility come with
increased cyber security threats. BASs were historically developed as closed
environments with limited cyber-security considerations. As a result, BASs in
many buildings are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that may cause adverse
consequences, such as occupant discomfort, excessive energy usage, and
unexpected equipment downtime. Therefore, there is a strong need to advance the
state-of-the-art in cyber-physical security for BASs and provide practical
solutions for attack mitigation in buildings. However, an inclusive and
systematic review of BAS vulnerabilities, potential cyber-attacks with impact
assessment, detection & defense approaches, and cyber-secure resilient control
strategies is currently lacking in the literature. This review paper fills the
gap by providing a comprehensive up-to-date review of cyber-physical security
for BASs at three levels in commercial buildings: management level, automation
level, and field level. The general BASs vulnerabilities and protocol-specific
vulnerabilities for the four dominant BAS protocols are reviewed, followed by a
discussion on four attack targets and seven potential attack scenarios. The
impact of cyber-attacks on BASs is summarized as signal corruption, signal
delaying, and signal blocking. The typical cyber-attack detection and defense
approaches are identified at the three levels. Cyber-secure resilient control
strategies for BASs under attack are categorized into passive and active
resilient control schemes. Open challenges and future opportunities are finally
discussed.Comment: 38 pages, 7 figures, 6 tables, submitted to Annual Reviews in Contro
A survey of timing channels and countermeasures
A timing channel is a communication channel that can transfer information to a receiver/decoder by modulating the timing behavior of an entity. Examples of this entity include the interpacket delays of a packet stream, the reordering packets in a packet stream, or the resource access time of a cryptographic module. Advances in the information and coding theory and the availability of high-performance computing systems interconnected by high-speed networks have spurred interest in and development of various types of timing channels. With the emergence of complex timing channels, novel detection and prevention techniques are also being developed to counter them. In this article, we provide a detailed survey of timing channels broadly categorized into network timing channel, in which communicating entities are connected by a network, and in-system timing channel, in which the communicating entities are within a computing system. This survey builds on the last comprehensive survey by Zander et al. [2007] and considers all three canonical applications of timing channels, namely, covert communication, timing side channel, and network flow watermarking. We survey the theoretical foundations, the implementation, and the various detection and prevention techniques that have been reported in literature. Based on the analysis of the current literature, we discuss potential future research directions both in the design and application of timing channels and their detection and prevention techniques
Using Botnet Technologies to Counteract Network Traffic Analysis
Botnets have been problematic for over a decade. They are used to launch malicious activities including DDoS (Distributed-Denial-of-Service), spamming, identity theft, unauthorized bitcoin mining and malware distribution. A recent nation-wide DDoS attacks caused by the Mirai botnet on 10/21/2016 involving 10s of millions of IP addresses took down Twitter, Spotify, Reddit, The New York Times, Pinterest, PayPal and other major websites. In response to take-down campaigns by security personnel, botmasters have developed technologies to evade detection. The most widely used evasion technique is DNS fast-flux, where the botmaster frequently changes the mapping between domain names and IP addresses of the C&C server so that it will be too late or too costly to trace the C&C server locations. Domain names generated with Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) are used as the \u27rendezvous\u27 points between botmasters and bots. This work focuses on how to apply botnet technologies (fast-flux and DGA) to counteract network traffic analysis, therefore protecting user privacy. A better understanding of botnet technologies also helps us be pro-active in defending against botnets. First, we proposed two new DGAs using hidden Markov models (HMMs) and Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars (PCFGs) which can evade current detection methods and systems. Also, we developed two HMM-based DGA detection methods that can detect the botnet DGA-generated domain names with/without training sets. This helps security personnel understand the botnet phenomenon and develop pro-active tools to detect botnets. Second, we developed a distributed proxy system using fast-flux to evade national censorship and surveillance. The goal is to help journalists, human right advocates and NGOs in West Africa to have a secure and free Internet. Then we developed a covert data transport protocol to transform arbitrary message into real DNS traffic. We encode the message into benign-looking domain names generated by an HMM, which represents the statistical features of legitimate domain names. This can be used to evade Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and protect user privacy in a two-way communication. Both applications serve as examples of applying botnet technologies to legitimate use. Finally, we proposed a new protocol obfuscation technique by transforming arbitrary network protocol into another (Network Time Protocol and a video game protocol of Minecraft as examples) in terms of packet syntax and side-channel features (inter-packet delay and packet size). This research uses botnet technologies to help normal users have secure and private communications over the Internet. From our botnet research, we conclude that network traffic is a malleable and artificial construct. Although existing patterns are easy to detect and characterize, they are also subject to modification and mimicry. This means that we can construct transducers to make any communication pattern look like any other communication pattern. This is neither bad nor good for security. It is a fact that we need to accept and use as best we can
Characterizing and Mitigating Virtual Machine Interference in Public Clouds.
This dissertation studies the mitigation of the performance and security interference between guest virtual machines (VMs) in public clouds. The goals are to characterize the impact of VM interference, uncover the root cause of the negative impact, and design novel techniques to mitigate such impact. The central premise of this dissertation is that by identifying the shared resources that cause the VM interference and by exploiting the properties of the workloads that share these resources with adapted scheduling policies, public cloud services can reduce conflicts of resource usage between guests and hence mitigate their interference. Current techniques for conflict reduction and interference mitigation overlook the virtualization semantic gap between the cloud host infrastructure and guest virtual ma- chines and the unique challenges posed by the multi-tenancy service model necessary to support public cloud services.
This dissertation deals with both performance and security interference problems. It characterizes the impact of VM interference on inter-VM network latency using live measurements in a real public cloud and studies the root cause of the negative impact with controlled experiments on a local testbed. Two methods of improving the inter-VM net- work latency are explored. The first approach is a guest-centric solution that exploits the properties of application workloads to avoid interference without any support from the underlying host infrastructure. The second approach is a host-centric solution that adapts the scheduling policies for the contented resources that cause the interference without guest cooperation. Similarly, the characteristics of cache-based cross-VM attacks are studied in detail using both live cloud measurements and testbed experiments. To mitigate this security interference, a partition-based VM scheduling system is designed to reduce the effectiveness of these cache-based attacks.PhDComputer Science & EngineeringUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/107111/1/yunjing_1.pd
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