Reviewing Technological Solutions of Source Address Validation

It is essential to know the source IP address of a packet to prevent the IP spoofing attack which masquerades the sender\u27s true identity. If there is a way to trace back the origin of the massive DDoS attacks, we could find the responsible parties of the incidents and prevent future attacks by blocking them. Unfortunately, the original TCP/IP stacks don\u27t require the real source IP address to forward the packets to the destination. Malicious attackers can modify the source IP address to hide its true identity and able to send the fraudulent packets to the victim. One of the critical features of the next generation Internet is having a secure Internet which provides trust between participants and protects the privacy of the individuals. In this paper, we review the various approach to provide the source address validation (SAV) schemes. There are many new methods have been proposed, no single way is providing the comprehensive solution to this issue. Privacy is a critical issue to consider when the true identity is available on the network as well

Adaptive Response System for Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks

The continued prevalence and severe damaging effects of the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in today’s Internet raise growing security concerns and call for an immediate response to come up with better solutions to tackle DDoS attacks. The current DDoS prevention mechanisms are usually inflexible and determined attackers with knowledge of these mechanisms, could work around them. Most existing detection and response mechanisms are standalone systems which do not rely on adaptive updates to mitigate attacks. As different responses vary in their “leniency” in treating detected attack traffic, there is a need for an Adaptive Response System. We designed and implemented our DDoS Adaptive ResponsE (DARE) System, which is a distributed DDoS mitigation system capable of executing appropriate detection and mitigation responses automatically and adaptively according to the attacks. It supports easy integrations for both signature-based and anomaly-based detection modules. Additionally, the design of DARE’s individual components takes into consideration the strengths and weaknesses of existing defence mechanisms, and the characteristics and possible future mutations of DDoS attacks. These components consist of an Enhanced TCP SYN Attack Detector and Bloom-based Filter, a DDoS Flooding Attack Detector and Flow Identifier, and a Non Intrusive IP Traceback mechanism. The components work together interactively to adapt the detections and responses in accordance to the attack types. Experiments conducted on DARE show that the attack detection and mitigation are successfully completed within seconds, with about 60% to 86% of the attack traffic being dropped, while availability for legitimate and new legitimate requests is maintained. DARE is able to detect and trigger appropriate responses in accordance to the attacks being launched with high accuracy, effectiveness and efficiency. We also designed and implemented a Traffic Redirection Attack Protection System (TRAPS), a stand-alone DDoS attack detection and mitigation system for IPv6 networks. In TRAPS, the victim under attack verifies the authenticity of the source by performing virtual relocations to differentiate the legitimate traffic from the attack traffic. TRAPS requires minimal deployment effort and does not require modifications to the Internet infrastructure due to its incorporation of the Mobile IPv6 protocol. Experiments to test the feasibility of TRAPS were carried out in a testbed environment to verify that it would work with the existing Mobile IPv6 implementation. It was observed that the operations of each module were functioning correctly and TRAPS was able to successfully mitigate an attack launched with spoofed source IP addresses

FAIR: Forwarding Accountability for Internet Reputability

This paper presents FAIR, a forwarding accountability mechanism that incentivizes ISPs to apply stricter security policies to their customers. The Autonomous System (AS) of the receiver specifies a traffic profile that the sender AS must adhere to. Transit ASes on the path mark packets. In case of traffic profile violations, the marked packets are used as a proof of misbehavior. FAIR introduces low bandwidth overhead and requires no per-packet and no per-flow state for forwarding. We describe integration with IP and demonstrate a software switch running on commodity hardware that can switch packets at a line rate of 120 Gbps, and can forward 140M minimum-sized packets per second, limited by the hardware I/O subsystem. Moreover, this paper proposes a "suspicious bit" for packet headers - an application that builds on top of FAIR's proofs of misbehavior and flags packets to warn other entities in the network.Comment: 16 pages, 12 figure

Including network routers in forensic investigation

Network forensics concerns the identification and preservation of evidence from an event that has occurred or is likely to occur. The scope of network forensics encompasses the networks, systems and devices associated with the physical and human networks. In this paper we are assessing the forensic potential of a router in investigations. A single router is taken as a case study and analysed to determine its forensic value from both static and live investigation perspectives. In the live investigation, tests using steps from two to seven routers were used to establish benchmark expectations for network variations. We find that the router has many attributes that make it a repository and a site for evidence collection. The implications of this research are for investigators and the inclusion of routers in network forensic investigations

Including Network Routers In Forensic Investigation

Network forensics concerns the identification and preservation of evidence from an event that has occurred or is likely to occur. The scope of network forensics encompasses the networks, systems and devices associated with the physical and human networks. In this paper we are assessing the forensic potential of a router in investigations. A single router is taken as a case study and analysed to determine its forensic value from both static and live investigation perspectives. In the live investigation, tests using steps from two to seven routers were used to establish benchmark expectations for network variations. We find that the router has many attributes that make it a repository and a site for evidence collection. The implications of this research are for investigators and the inclusion of routers in network forensic investigations

Wide spectrum attribution: Using deception for attribution intelligence in cyber attacks

Modern cyber attacks have evolved considerably. The skill level required to conduct a cyber attack is low. Computing power is cheap, targets are diverse and plentiful. Point-and-click crimeware kits are widely circulated in the underground economy, while source code for sophisticated malware such as Stuxnet is available for all to download and repurpose. Despite decades of research into defensive techniques, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, anti-virus, code auditing, etc, the quantity of successful cyber attacks continues to increase, as does the number of vulnerabilities identified. Measures to identify perpetrators, known as attribution, have existed for as long as there have been cyber attacks. The most actively researched technical attribution techniques involve the marking and logging of network packets. These techniques are performed by network devices along the packet journey, which most often requires modification of existing router hardware and/or software, or the inclusion of additional devices. These modifications require wide-scale infrastructure changes that are not only complex and costly, but invoke legal, ethical and governance issues. The usefulness of these techniques is also often questioned, as attack actors use multiple stepping stones, often innocent systems that have been compromised, to mask the true source. As such, this thesis identifies that no publicly known previous work has been deployed on a wide-scale basis in the Internet infrastructure. This research investigates the use of an often overlooked tool for attribution: cyber de- ception. The main contribution of this work is a significant advancement in the field of deception and honeypots as technical attribution techniques. Specifically, the design and implementation of two novel honeypot approaches; i) Deception Inside Credential Engine (DICE), that uses policy and honeytokens to identify adversaries returning from different origins and ii) Adaptive Honeynet Framework (AHFW), an introspection and adaptive honeynet framework that uses actor-dependent triggers to modify the honeynet envi- ronment, to engage the adversary, increasing the quantity and diversity of interactions. The two approaches are based on a systematic review of the technical attribution litera- ture that was used to derive a set of requirements for honeypots as technical attribution techniques. Both approaches lead the way for further research in this field

Defense Against Distributed Denial of Service Attacks in Computer Networks

Tohoku University亀山充隆課

Impact of denial of service solutions on network quality of service

The Internet has become a universal communication network tool. It has evolved from a platform that supports best-effort traffic to one that now carries different traffic types including those involving continuous media with quality of service (QoS) requirements. As more services are delivered over the Internet, we face increasing risk to their availability given that malicious attacks on those Internet services continue to increase. Several networks have witnessed denial of service (DoS) and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks over the past few years which have disrupted QoS of network services, thereby violating the Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the client and the Internet Service Provider (ISP). Hence DoS or DDoS attacks are major threats to network QoS. In this paper we survey techniques and solutions that have been deployed to thwart DoS and DDoS attacks and we evaluate them in terms of their impact on network QoS for Internet services. We also present vulnerabilities that can be exploited for QoS protocols and also affect QoS if exploited. In addition, we also highlight challenges that still need to be addressed to achieve end-to-end QoS with recently proposed DoS/DDoS solutions

Provenance-enabled Packet Path Tracing in the RPL-based Internet of Things

The interconnection of resource-constrained and globally accessible things with untrusted and unreliable Internet make them vulnerable to attacks including data forging, false data injection, and packet drop that affects applications with critical decision-making processes. For data trustworthiness, reliance on provenance is considered to be an effective mechanism that tracks both data acquisition and data transmission. However, provenance management for sensor networks introduces several challenges, such as low energy, bandwidth consumption, and efficient storage. This paper attempts to identify packet drop (either maliciously or due to network disruptions) and detect faulty or misbehaving nodes in the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) by following a bi-fold provenance-enabled packed path tracing (PPPT) approach. Firstly, a system-level ordered-provenance information encapsulates the data generating nodes and the forwarding nodes in the data packet. Secondly, to closely monitor the dropped packets, a node-level provenance in the form of the packet sequence number is enclosed as a routing entry in the routing table of each participating node. Lossless in nature, both approaches conserve the provenance size satisfying processing and storage requirements of IoT devices. Finally, we evaluate the efficacy of the proposed scheme with respect to provenance size, provenance generation time, and energy consumption.Comment: 14 pages, 18 Figure