Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges

In recent years, blockchain has gained widespread attention as an emerging technology for decentralization, transparency, and immutability in advancing online activities over public networks. As an essential market process, auctions have been well studied and applied in many business fields due to their efficiency and contributions to fair trade. Complementary features between blockchain and auction models trigger a great potential for research and innovation. On the one hand, the decentralized nature of blockchain can provide a trustworthy, secure, and cost-effective mechanism to manage the auction process; on the other hand, auction models can be utilized to design incentive and consensus protocols in blockchain architectures. These opportunities have attracted enormous research and innovation activities in both academia and industry; however, there is a lack of an in-depth review of existing solutions and achievements. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of these two research topics. We review the existing solutions for integrating blockchain and auction models, with some application-oriented taxonomies generated. Additionally, we highlight some open research challenges and future directions towards integrated blockchain-auction models

Decentralized Resource Scheduling in Grid/Cloud Computing

In the Grid/Cloud environment, applications or services and resources belong to different organizations with different objectives. Entities in the Grid/Cloud are autonomous and self-interested; however, they are willing to share their resources and services to achieve their individual and collective goals. In such open environment, the scheduling decision is a challenge given the decentralized nature of the environment. Each entity has specific requirements and objectives that need to achieve. In this thesis, we review the Grid/Cloud computing technologies, environment characteristics and structure and indicate the challenges within the resource scheduling. We capture the Grid/Cloud scheduling model based on the complete requirement of the environment. We further create a mapping between the Grid/Cloud scheduling problem and the combinatorial allocation problem and propose an adequate economic-based optimization model based on the characteristic and the structure nature of the Grid/Cloud. By adequacy, we mean that a comprehensive view of required properties of the Grid/Cloud is captured. We utilize the captured properties and propose a bidding language that is expressive where entities have the ability to specify any set of preferences in the Grid/Cloud and simple as entities have the ability to express structured preferences directly. We propose a winner determination model and mechanism that utilizes the proposed bidding language and finds a scheduling solution. Our proposed approach integrates concepts and principles of mechanism design and classical scheduling theory. Furthermore, we argue that in such open environment privacy concerns by nature is part of the requirement in the Grid/Cloud. Hence, any scheduling decision within the Grid/Cloud computing environment is to incorporate the feasibility of privacy protection of an entity. Each entity has specific requirements in terms of scheduling and privacy preferences. We analyze the privacy problem in the Grid/Cloud computing environment and propose an economic based model and solution architecture that provides a scheduling solution given privacy concerns in the Grid/Cloud. Finally, as a demonstration of the applicability of the approach, we apply our solution by integrating with Globus toolkit (a well adopted tool to enable Grid/Cloud computing environment). We also, created simulation experimental results to capture the economic and time efficiency of the proposed solution

Strategy-proof resource pricing in federated systems

Ph.DDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPH

Economic algorithms for the management of resources in computer systems

Cloud computing and distributed Grid computations in the e-science and commercial spheres are beginning to make accessible huge amounts of computing power with “just in time” availability. However, the economic models surrounding these systems are static and uniform, with charging models that, for web-based cloud systems work on a price per unit per hour basis, whilst for educational type resources, fixed contractual arrangements and multi-year projects are more prevalent. The common place practice of using just-in-time capacity planning and variable pricing algorithms, such as those pioneered by airlines like EasyJet, tells us that the cost of delivering these services and the price that should be paid for them is a much more complex beast. Future Grid and Cloud Computing computations will be enabled by participants trading resources in order to construct bundles of goods or services in both new commercial arenas and the more well established “e-science” experiments in science, engineering and, now emerging, social sciences. A combinatorial auction (CA) is a natural choice for determining the optimal allocation for a bundle of required goods and services, but the space and time dimensions that characterise a Grid compute cloud would appear to indicate they are incompatible. This thesis proposes that an analogue of a physical commodities market is more appropriate for distributed resource allocation and that there is a class of bundling problems whose complexity properties appear to make the utilisation of a CA impractical. We therefore compare the two techniques for resource bundling and investigate the crossover point, to enrich our understanding of how combinatorial auctions and distributed markets may be used together to improve distributed resource allocation practices.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo

Resource Management in Distributed Camera Systems

The aim of this work is to investigate different methods to solve the problem of allocating the correct amount of resources (network bandwidth and storage space) to video camera systems. Here we explore the intersection between two research areas: automatic control and game theory. Camera systems are a good example of the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) and its impact on our daily lives and the environment. We aim to improve today’s systems, shift from resources over-provisioning to allocate dynamically resources where they are needed the most. We optimize the storage and bandwidth allocation of camera systems to limit the impact on the environment as well as provide the best visual quality attainable with the resource limitations. This thesis is written as a collection of papers. It begins by introducing the problem with today’s camera systems, and continues with background information about resource allocation, automatic control and game theory. The third chapter de- scribes the models of the considered systems, their limitations and challenges. It then continues by providing more background on the automatic control and game theory techniques used in the proposed solutions. Finally, the proposed solutions are provided in five papers.Paper I proposes an approach to estimate the amount of data needed by surveillance cameras given camera and scenario parameters. This model is used for calculating the quasi Worst-Case Transmission Times of videos over a network. Papers II and III apply control concepts to camera network storage and bandwidth assignment. They provide simple, yet elegant solutions to the allocation of these resources in distributed camera systems. Paper IV com- bines pricing theory with control techniques to force the video quality of cam- era systems to converge to a common value based solely on the compression parameter of the provided videos. Paper V uses the VCG auction mechanism to solve the storage space allocation problem in competitive camera systems. It allows for a better system-wide visual quality than a simple split allocation given the limited system knowledge, trust and resource constraints