Dual-Context Calculi for Modal Logic

We present natural deduction systems and associated modal lambda calculi for the necessity fragments of the normal modal logics K, T, K4, GL and S4. These systems are in the dual-context style: they feature two distinct zones of assumptions, one of which can be thought as modal, and the other as intuitionistic. We show that these calculi have their roots in in sequent calculi. We then investigate their metatheory, equip them with a confluent and strongly normalizing notion of reduction, and show that they coincide with the usual Hilbert systems up to provability. Finally, we investigate a categorical semantics which interprets the modality as a product-preserving functor.Comment: Full version of article previously presented at LICS 2017 (see arXiv:1602.04860v4 or doi: 10.1109/LICS.2017.8005089

Reflexive-insensitive Modal Logics

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)We analyze a class of modal logics rendered insensitive to reflexivity by way of a modification to the semantic definition of the modal operator. We explore the extent to which these logics can be characterized, and prove a general completeness theorem on the basis of a translation between normal modal logics and their reflexive-insensitive counterparts. Lastly, we provide a sufficient semantic condition describing when a similarly general soundness result is also available.9167180CAPES (Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel) in BrazilFAPESP (Sao Paulo Research Foundation) [2013/25095-4]Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP

A Galois connection between classical and intuitionistic logics. I: Syntax

In a 1985 commentary to his collected works, Kolmogorov remarked that his 1932 paper "was written in hope that with time, the logic of solution of problems [i.e., intuitionistic logic] will become a permanent part of a [standard] course of logic. A unified logical apparatus was intended to be created, which would deal with objects of two types - propositions and problems." We construct such a formal system QHC, which is a conservative extension of both the intuitionistic predicate calculus QH and the classical predicate calculus QC. The only new connectives ? and ! of QHC induce a Galois connection (i.e., a pair of adjoint functors) between the Lindenbaum posets (i.e. the underlying posets of the Lindenbaum algebras) of QH and QC. Kolmogorov's double negation translation of propositions into problems extends to a retraction of QHC onto QH; whereas Goedel's provability translation of problems into modal propositions extends to a retraction of QHC onto its QC+(?!) fragment, identified with the modal logic QS4. The QH+(!?) fragment is an intuitionistic modal logic, whose modality !? is a strict lax modality in the sense of Aczel - and thus resembles the squash/bracket operation in intuitionistic type theories. The axioms of QHC attempt to give a fuller formalization (with respect to the axioms of intuitionistic logic) to the two best known contentual interpretations of intiuitionistic logic: Kolmogorov's problem interpretation (incorporating standard refinements by Heyting and Kreisel) and the proof interpretation by Orlov and Heyting (as clarified by G\"odel). While these two interpretations are often conflated, from the viewpoint of the axioms of QHC neither of them reduces to the other one, although they do overlap.Comment: 47 pages. The paper is rewritten in terms of a formal meta-logic (a simplified version of Isabelle's meta-logic

On the proof complexity of logics of bounded branching

We investigate the proof complexity of extended Frege (EF) systems for basic transitive modal logics (K4, S4, GL, ...) augmented with the bounded branching axioms $\mathbf{BB}_k$. First, we study feasibility of the disjunction property and more general extension rules in EF systems for these logics: we show that the corresponding decision problems reduce to total coNP search problems (or equivalently, disjoint NP pairs, in the binary case); more precisely, the decision problem for extension rules is equivalent to a certain special case of interpolation for the classical EF system. Next, we use this characterization to prove superpolynomial (or even exponential, with stronger hypotheses) separations between EF and substitution Frege (SF) systems for all transitive logics contained in $\mathbf{S4.2GrzBB_2}$ or $\mathbf{GL.2BB_2}$ under some assumptions weaker than $\mathrm{PSPACE \ne NP}$. We also prove analogous results for superintuitionistic logics: we characterize the decision complexity of multi-conclusion Visser's rules in EF systems for Gabbay--de Jongh logics $\mathbf T_k$, and we show conditional separations between EF and SF for all intermediate logics contained in $\mathbf{T_2 + KC}$.Comment: 58 page

On the proof-theory of a first-order extension of GL

We introduce a first order extension of GL, called ML3, and develop its proof theory via a proxy cut-free sequent calculus GLTS. We prove the highly nontrivial result that cut is a derived rule in GLTS, a result that is unavailable in other known first-order extensions of GL. This leads to proofs of weak reflection and the related conservation result for ML3, as well as proofs for Craig’s interpolation theorem for GLTS. Turning to semantics we prove that ML3 is sound with respect to arithmetical interpretations and that it is also sound and complete with respect to converse well-founded and transitive finite Kripke models. This leads us to expect that a Solovay-like proof of arithmetical completeness of ML3 is possible

The Broadest Necessity

In this paper the logic of broad necessity is explored. Definitions of what it means for one modality to be broader than another are formulated, and it is proven, in the context of higher-order logic, that there is a broadest necessity, settling one of the central questions of this investigation. It is shown, moreover, that it is possible to give a reductive analysis of this necessity in extensional language. This relates more generally to a conjecture that it is not possible to define intensional connectives from extensional notions. This conjecture is formulated precisely in higher-order logic, and concrete cases in which it fails are examined. The paper ends with a discussion of the logic of broad necessity. It is shown that the logic of broad necessity is a normal modal logic between S4 and Triv, and that it is consistent with a natural axiomatic system of higher-order logic that it is exactly S4. Some philosophical reasons to think that the logic of broad necessity does not include the S5 principle are given

Frontiers of Conditional Logic

Conditional logics were originally developed for the purpose of modeling intuitively correct modes of reasoning involving conditional—especially counterfactual—expressions in natural language. While the debate over the logic of conditionals is as old as propositional logic, it was the development of worlds semantics for modal logic in the past century that catalyzed the rapid maturation of the field. Moreover, like modal logic, conditional logic has subsequently found a wide array of uses, from the traditional (e.g. counterfactuals) to the exotic (e.g. conditional obligation). Despite the close connections between conditional and modal logic, both the technical development and philosophical exploitation of the latter has outstripped that of the former, with the result that noticeable lacunae exist in the literature on conditional logic. My dissertation addresses a number of these underdeveloped frontiers, producing new technical insights and philosophical applications. I contribute to the solution of a problem posed by Priest of finding sound and complete labeled tableaux for systems of conditional logic from Lewis\u27 V-family. To develop these tableaux, I draw on previous work on labeled tableaux for modal and conditional logic; errors and shortcomings in recent work on this problem are identified and corrected. While modal logic has by now been thoroughly studied in non-classical contexts, e.g. intuitionistic and relevant logic, the literature on conditional logic is still overwhelmingly classical. Another contribution of my dissertation is a thorough analysis of intuitionistic conditional logic, in which I utilize both algebraic and worlds semantics, and investigate how several novel embedding results might shed light on the philosophical interpretation of both intuitionistic logic and conditional logic extensions thereof. My dissertation examines deontic and connexive conditional logic as well as the underappreciated history of connexive notions in the analysis of conditional obligation. The possibility of interpreting deontic modal logics in such systems (via embedding results) serves as an important theoretical guide. A philosophically motivated proscription on impossible obligations is shown to correspond to, and justify, certain (weak) connexive theses. Finally, I contribute to the intensifying debate over counterpossibles, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, and take—in contrast to Lewis and Williamson—a non-vacuous line. Thus, in my view, a counterpossible like If there had been a counterexample to the law of the excluded middle, Brouwer would not have been vindicated is false, not (vacuously) true, although it has an impossible antecedent. I exploit impossible (non-normal) worlds—originally developed to model non-normal modal logics—to provide non-vacuous semantics for counterpossibles. I buttress the case for non-vacuous semantics by making recourse to both novel technical results and theoretical considerations

Boundary Algebra: A Simple Notation for Boolean Algebra and the Truth Functors

Boundary algebra [BA] is a simpler notation for Spencer-Brown’s (1969) primary algebra [pa], the Boolean algebra 2, and the truth functors. The primary arithmetic [PA] consists of the atoms ‘()’ and the blank page, concatenation, and enclosure between ‘(‘ and ‘)’, denoting the primitive notion of distinction. Inserting letters denoting the presence or absence of () into a PA formula yields a BA formula. The BA axioms are "()()=()" (A1), and "(()) [=?] may be written or erased at will” (A2). Repeated application of these axioms to a PA formula yields a member of B= {(),?} called its simplification. (a) has two intended interpretations: (a) ? a? (Boolean algebra 2), and (a) ? ~a (sentential logic). BA is self-dual: () ? 1 [dually 0] so that B is the carrier for 2, ab ? a?b [a?b], and (a)b [(a(b))] ? a=b, so that ?=() [()=?] follows trivially and B is a poset. The BA basis abc= bca (Dilworth 1938), a(ab)= a(b), and a()=() (Bricken 2002) facilitates clausal reasoning and proof by calculation. BA also simplifies normal forms and Quine’s (1982) truth value analysis. () ? true [false] yields boundary logic.G. Spencer Brown; boundary algebra; boundary logic; primary algebra; primary arithmetic; Boolean algebra; calculation proof; C.S. Peirce; existential graphs.

A Short and Readable Proof of Cut Elimination for Two 1st Order Modal Logics

Since 1960s, logicians, philosophers, AI people have cast eyes on modal logic. Among various modal logic systems, propositional provability logic which was established by Godel modeling provability in axiomatic Peano Arithmetic (PA) was the most striking application for mathematicians. After Godel, researchers gradually explored the predicate case in provability logic. However, the most natural application QGL for predicate provability logic is not able to admit cut elimination. Recently, a potential candidate for the predicate provability logic ML3 and its precursors BM and M3 introduced by Toulakis,Kibedi, Schwartz dedicated that A is always closed. Although ML3, BM and M3 are cut free, the cut elimination proof with the unfriendly nested induction of high multiplicity is difficult to understand. In this thesis, I will show a cut elimination proof for all (Gentzenisations) of BM, M3 and ML3, with much more readable inductions of lower multiplicity

Practical Reasoning for Very Expressive Description Logics

Description Logics (DLs) are a family of knowledge representation formalisms mainly characterised by constructors to build complex concepts and roles from atomic ones. Expressive role constructors are important in many applications, but can be computationally problematical. We present an algorithm that decides satisfiability of the DL ALC extended with transitive and inverse roles and functional restrictions with respect to general concept inclusion axioms and role hierarchies; early experiments indicate that this algorithm is well-suited for implementation. Additionally, we show that ALC extended with just transitive and inverse roles is still in PSPACE. We investigate the limits of decidability for this family of DLs, showing that relaxing the constraints placed on the kinds of roles used in number restrictions leads to the undecidability of all inference problems. Finally, we describe a number of optimisation techniques that are crucial in obtaining implementations of the decision procedures, which, despite the worst-case complexity of the problem, exhibit good performance with real-life problems