Applying the Free-Energy Principle to Complex Adaptive Systems

The free energy principle is a mathematical theory of the behaviour of self-organising systems that originally gained prominence as a unified model of the brain. Since then, the theory has been applied to a plethora of biological phenomena, extending from single-celled and multicellular organisms through to niche construction and human culture, and even the emergence of life itself. The free energy principle tells us that perception and action operate synergistically to minimize an organism’s exposure to surprising biological states, which are more likely to lead to decay. A key corollary of this hypothesis is active inference—the idea that all behavior involves the selective sampling of sensory data so that we experience what we expect to (in order to avoid surprises). Simply put, we act upon the world to fulfill our expectations. It is now widely recognized that the implications of the free energy principle for our understanding of the human mind and behavior are far-reaching and profound. To date, however, its capacity to extend beyond our brain—to more generally explain living and other complex adaptive systems—has only just begun to be explored. The aim of this collection is to showcase the breadth of the free energy principle as a unified theory of complex adaptive systems—conscious, social, living, or not

Artificial general intelligence: Proceedings of the Second Conference on Artificial General Intelligence, AGI 2009, Arlington, Virginia, USA, March 6-9, 2009

Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) research focuses on the original and ultimate goal of AI – to create broad human-like and transhuman intelligence, by exploring all available paths, including theoretical and experimental computer science, cognitive science, neuroscience, and innovative interdisciplinary methodologies. Due to the difficulty of this task, for the last few decades the majority of AI researchers have focused on what has been called narrow AI – the production of AI systems displaying intelligence regarding specific, highly constrained tasks. In recent years, however, more and more researchers have recognized the necessity – and feasibility – of returning to the original goals of the field. Increasingly, there is a call for a transition back to confronting the more difficult issues of human level intelligence and more broadly artificial general intelligence

Mathematical Foundations for a Compositional Account of the Bayesian Brain

This dissertation reports some first steps towards a compositional account of active inference and the Bayesian brain. Specifically, we use the tools of contemporary applied category theory to supply functorial semantics for approximate inference. To do so, we define on the `syntactic' side the new notion of Bayesian lens and show that Bayesian updating composes according to the compositional lens pattern. Using Bayesian lenses, and inspired by compositional game theory, we define fibrations of statistical games and classify various problems of statistical inference as corresponding sections: the chain rule of the relative entropy is formalized as a strict section, while maximum likelihood estimation and the free energy give lax sections. In the process, we introduce a new notion of `copy-composition'. On the `semantic' side, we present a new formalization of general open dynamical systems (particularly: deterministic, stochastic, and random; and discrete- and continuous-time) as certain coalgebras of polynomial functors, which we show collect into monoidal opindexed categories (or, alternatively, into algebras for multicategories of generalized polynomial functors). We use these opindexed categories to define monoidal bicategories of cilia: dynamical systems which control lenses, and which supply the target for our functorial semantics. Accordingly, we construct functors which explain the bidirectional compositional structure of predictive coding neural circuits under the free energy principle, thereby giving a formal mathematical underpinning to the bidirectionality observed in the cortex. Along the way, we explain how to compose rate-coded neural circuits using an algebra for a multicategory of linear circuit diagrams, showing subsequently that this is subsumed by lenses and polynomial functors.Comment: DPhil thesis; as submitted. Main change from v1: improved treatment of statistical games. A number of errors also fixed, and some presentation improved. Comments most welcom

A Defense of Pure Connectionism

Connectionism is an approach to neural-networks-based cognitive modeling that encompasses the recent deep learning movement in artificial intelligence. It came of age in the 1980s, with its roots in cybernetics and earlier attempts to model the brain as a system of simple parallel processors. Connectionist models center on statistical inference within neural networks with empirically learnable parameters, which can be represented as graphical models. More recent approaches focus on learning and inference within hierarchical generative models. Contra influential and ongoing critiques, I argue in this dissertation that the connectionist approach to cognitive science possesses in principle (and, as is becoming increasingly clear, in practice) the resources to model even the most rich and distinctly human cognitive capacities, such as abstract, conceptual thought and natural language comprehension and production. Consonant with much previous philosophical work on connectionism, I argue that a core principle—that proximal representations in a vector space have similar semantic values—is the key to a successful connectionist account of the systematicity and productivity of thought, language, and other core cognitive phenomena. My work here differs from preceding work in philosophy in several respects: (1) I compare a wide variety of connectionist responses to the systematicity challenge and isolate two main strands that are both historically important and reflected in ongoing work today: (a) vector symbolic architectures and (b) (compositional) vector space semantic models; (2) I consider very recent applications of these approaches, including their deployment on large-scale machine learning tasks such as machine translation; (3) I argue, again on the basis mostly of recent developments, for a continuity in representation and processing across natural language, image processing and other domains; (4) I explicitly link broad, abstract features of connectionist representation to recent proposals in cognitive science similar in spirit, such as hierarchical Bayesian and free energy minimization approaches, and offer a single rebuttal of criticisms of these related paradigms; (5) I critique recent alternative proposals that argue for a hybrid Classical (i.e. serial symbolic)/statistical model of mind; (6) I argue that defending the most plausible form of a connectionist cognitive architecture requires rethinking certain distinctions that have figured prominently in the history of the philosophy of mind and language, such as that between word- and phrase-level semantic content, and between inference and association