Booms and Busts: New Keynesian and Behavioral Explanations

Capitalism is characterized by booms and busts. Periods of strong growth in output alternate with periods of declines in economic growth. Every macro-economic theory should attempt to explain these endemic business cycle movements. In this paper I present two paradigms that attempt to explain these booms and busts. One is the DSGE-paradigm in which agents have unlimited cognitive abilities. The other paradigm is a behavioural one in which agents are assumed to have limited cognitive abilities. These two types of models produce a radically different macroeconomic dynamics. I analyze these differences. I also study the different policy implications of these two paradigms.DSGE-model, imperfect information, heuristics, animal spirits

Stable combustion of a high-velocity gas in a heated boundary layer

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Understanding the determinants of stability and folding of small globular proteins from their energetics

The results of minimal model calculations suggest that the stability and the kinetic accessibility of the native state of small globular proteins are controlled by few "hot" sites. By mean of molecular dynamics simulations around the native conformation, which simulate the protein and the surrounding solvent at full--atom level, we generate an energetic map of the equilibrium state of the protein and simplify it with an Eigenvalue decomposition. The components of the Eigenvector associated with the lowest Eigenvalue indicate which are the "hot" sites responsible for the stability and for the fast folding of the protein. Comparison of these predictions with the results of mutatgenesis experiments, performed for five small proteins, provide an excellent agreement

Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization: Stylized facts and Hypothesis Tests

This paper describes agricultural policy choices and tests some predictions of political economy theories. It begins with three broad stylized facts: governments tend to tax agriculture in poorer countries, and subsidize it in richer ones, tax both imports and exports more than nontradables, and tax more and subsidize less where there is more land per capita. We test a variety of political-economy explanations, finding results consistent with hypothesized effects of rural and urban constituents’ rational ignorance about small per-person effects, governance institutions’ control of rent-seeking by political leaders, governments’ revenue motive for taxation, and the role of time consistency in policy-making. We also find that larger groups obtain more favorable policies, suggesting that positive group size effects outweigh any negative influence from more free-ridership, and that demographically driven entry of new farmers is associated with less favorable farm policies, suggesting the arrival of new farmers erodes policy rents and discourages political activity by incumbents. Another new result is that governments achieve very little price stabilization relative to our benchmark estimates of undistorted prices, and governments in the poorest countries actually destabilize domestic prices.Distorted incentives, agricultural and trade policy reforms, national agricultural development, Agricultural price distortions, political economy, Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade, F13, F14, Q17, Q18, D72, D78, F11, H23,

Imperfect knowledge, inflation expectations, and monetary policy

This paper investigates the role that imperfect knowledge about the structure of the economy plays in the formation of expectations, macroeconomic dynamics, and the efficient formulation of monetary policy. Economic agents rely on an adaptive learning technology to form expectations and to update continuously their beliefs regarding the dynamic structure of the economy based on incoming data. The process of perpetual learning introduces an additional layer of dynamic interaction between monetary policy and economic outcomes. We find that policies that would be efficient under rational expectations can perform poorly when knowledge is imperfect. In particular, policies that fail to maintain tight control over inflation are prone to episodes in which the public's expectations of inflation become uncoupled from the policy objective and stagflation results, in a pattern similar to that experienced in the United States during the 1970s. Our results highlight the value of effective communication of a central bank's inflation objective and of continued vigilance against inflation in anchoring inflation expectations and fostering macroeconomic stability. July 2003

Stabilization of systems with asynchronous sensors and controllers

We study the stabilization of networked control systems with asynchronous sensors and controllers. Offsets between the sensor and controller clocks are unknown and modeled as parametric uncertainty. First we consider multi-input linear systems and provide a sufficient condition for the existence of linear time-invariant controllers that are capable of stabilizing the closed-loop system for every clock offset in a given range of admissible values. For first-order systems, we next obtain the maximum length of the offset range for which the system can be stabilized by a single controller. Finally, this bound is compared with the offset bounds that would be allowed if we restricted our attention to static output feedback controllers.Comment: 32 pages, 6 figures. This paper was partially presented at the 2015 American Control Conference, July 1-3, 2015, the US

Privatization and State Capacity in Postcommunist Society

Economists have used cross-national regression analysis to argue that postcommunist economic failure is the result of inadequate adherence liberal economic policies. Sociologists have relied on case study data to show that postcommunist economic failure is the outcome of too close adherence to liberal policy recommendations, which has led to an erosion of state effectiveness, and thus produced poor economic performance. The present paper advances a version of this statist theory based on a quantitative analysis of mass privatization programs in the postcommunist world. We argue that rapid large-scale privatization creates severe supply and demand shocks for enterprises, thereby inducing firm failure. The resulting erosion of tax revenues leads to a fiscal crisis for the state, and severely weakens its capacity and bureaucratic character. This, in turn, reacts back on the enterprise sector, as the state can no longer support the institutions necessary for the effective functioning of a modern economy, thus resulting in deindustrialization. Using cross-national regression techniques we find that the implementation of mass privatization programs negatively impacts measures of economic growth, state capacity and the security of property rights.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40192/3/wp806.pd

The role of expectations in economic fluctuations and the efficacy of monetary policy

We show diverse beliefs is an important propagation mechanism of fluctuations, money non neutrality and efficacy of monetary policy. Since expectations affect demand, our theory shows economic fluctuations are mostly driven by varying demand not supply shocks. Using a competitive model with flexible prices in which agents hold Rational Belief (see Kurz (1994)) we show that (i) our economy replicates well the empirical record of fluctuations in the U.S. (ii) Under monetary rules without discretion, monetary policy has a strong stabilization effect and an aggressive anti-inflationary policy can reduce inflation volatility to zero. (iii) The statistical Phillips Curve changes substantially with policy instruments and activist policy rules render it vertical. (iv) Although prices are flexible, money shocks result in less than proportional changes in inflation hence the aggregate price level appears "sticky" with respect to money shocks. (v) Discretion in monetary policy adds a random element to policy and increases volatility. The impact of discretion on the efficacy of policy depends upon the structure of market beliefs about future discretionary decisions. We study two rationalizable beliefs. In one case, market beliefs weaken the effect of policy and in the second, beliefs bolster policy outcomes and discretion could be a desirable attribute of the policy rule. Since the central bank does not know any more than the private sector, real social gain from discretion arise only in extraordinary cases. Hence, the weight of the argument leads us to conclude that bank´s policy should be transparent and abandon discretion except for rare and unusual circumstances. (vi) An implication of our model suggests the current effective policy is only mildly activist and aims mostly to target inflation