Proximal-like algorithms for equilibrium seeking in mixed-integer Nash equilibrium problems

We consider potential games with mixed-integer variables, for which we propose two distributed, proximal-like equilibrium seeking algorithms. Specifically, we focus on two scenarios: i) the underlying game is generalized ordinal and the agents update through iterations by choosing an exact optimal strategy; ii) the game admits an exact potential and the agents adopt approximated optimal responses. By exploiting the properties of integer-compatible regularization functions used as penalty terms, we show that both algorithms converge to either an exact or an $\epsilon$-approximate equilibrium. We corroborate our findings on a numerical instance of a Cournot oligopoly model

International Conference on Continuous Optimization (ICCOPT) 2019 Conference Book

The Sixth International Conference on Continuous Optimization took place on the campus of the Technical University of Berlin, August 3-8, 2019. The ICCOPT is a flagship conference of the Mathematical Optimization Society (MOS), organized every three years. ICCOPT 2019 was hosted by the Weierstrass Institute for Applied Analysis and Stochastics (WIAS) Berlin. It included a Summer School and a Conference with a series of plenary and semi-plenary talks, organized and contributed sessions, and poster sessions. This book comprises the full conference program. It contains, in particular, the scientific program in survey style as well as with all details, and information on the social program, the venue, special meetings, and more

Convergence Analysis of the Best Response Algorithm for Time-Varying Games

This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best respond to other agents' previous actions; we call this a best response scheme. We start by analyzing the convergence rate of this best response scheme for standard time-invariant games. Specifically, we provide a sufficient condition on the strong monotonicity parameter of the time-invariant games under which the proposed best response algorithm achieves exponential convergence to the static Nash equilibrium. We further illustrate that this best response algorithm may oscillate when the proposed sufficient condition fails to hold, which indicates that this condition is tight. Next, we analyze this best response algorithm for time-varying games where the cost functions of each agent change over time. Under similar conditions as for time-invariant games, we show that the proposed best response algorithm stays asymptotically close to the evolving equilibrium. We do so by analyzing both the equilibrium tracking error and the dynamic regret. Numerical experiments on economic market problems are presented to validate our analysis

Probably Approximately Correct Nash Equilibrium Learning

We consider a multi-agent noncooperative game with agents' objective functions being affected by uncertainty. Following a data driven paradigm, we represent uncertainty by means of scenarios and seek a robust Nash equilibrium solution. We treat the Nash equilibrium computation problem within the realm of probably approximately correct (PAC) learning. Building upon recent developments in scenario-based optimization, we accompany the computed Nash equilibrium with a priori and a posteriori probabilistic robustness certificates, providing confidence that the computed equilibrium remains unaffected (in probabilistic terms) when a new uncertainty realization is encountered. For a wide class of games, we also show that the computation of the so called compression set - a key concept in scenario-based optimization - can be directly obtained as a byproduct of the proposed solution methodology. Finally, we illustrate how to overcome differentiability issues, arising due to the introduction of scenarios, and compute a Nash equilibrium solution in a decentralized manner. We demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed approach on an electric vehicle charging control problem.Comment: Preprint submitted to IEEE Transactions on Automatic Contro

Study Of Stochastic Market Clearing Problems In Power Systems With High Renewable Integration

Integrating large-scale renewable energy resources into the power grid poses several operational and economic problems due to their inherently stochastic nature. The lack of predictability of renewable outputs deteriorates the power grid’s reliability. The power system operators have recognized this need to account for uncertainty in making operational decisions and forming electricity pricing. In this regard, this dissertation studies three aspects that aid large-scale renewable integration into power systems. 1. We develop a nonparametric change point-based statistical model to generate scenarios that accurately capture the renewable generation stochastic processes; 2. We design new pricing mechanisms derived from alternative stochastic programming formulations of the electricity market clearing problem under uncertainty; 3. We devise a novel approach to coordinate strategic operations of multiple noncooperative system operators. The current industry practices are based on deterministic models that do not account for the stochasticity of renewable energy. Therefore, the solutions obtained from these deterministic models will not provide accurate measurements. Stochastic programming (SP) can accommodate the stochasticity of renewable energy by considering a set of possible scenarios. However, the reliability of the SP model solution depends on the accuracy of the scenarios. We develop a nonparametric statistical simulation method to develop scenarios for wind generation using wind speed data. In this method, we address the nonstationarity issues that come with wind-speed time-series data using a nonparametric change point detection method. Using this approach, we retain the covariance structure of the original wind-speed time series in all the simulated series. With an accurate set of scenarios, we develop alternative two-stage SP models for the two-settlement electricity market clearing problem using different representations of the non-anticipativity constraints. Different forms of non-anticipativity constraints reveal different hidden dual information inside the canonical two-stage SP model, which we use to develop new pricing mechanisms. The new pricing mechanisms preserve properties of previously proposed pricing mechanisms, such as revenue adequacy in expectation and cost recovery in expectation. More importantly, our pricing mechanisms can guarantee cost recovery for every scenario. Furthermore, we develop bounds for the price distortion under every scenario instead of the expected distortion bounds. We demonstrate the differences in prices obtained from the alternative mechanisms through numerical experiments. Finally, we discuss the importance of distributed smart grid operations inside the power grid. We develop an information and electricity exchange system among multiple distribution systems. These distribution systems participate/compete in common markets cohere electricity is exchanged. We develop a standard Nash game treating each distribution system (DS) as an individual player who optimizes their strategies separately. We develop proximal best response (BR) schemes to solve this problem. We present results from numerical experiments conducted on three and six DS settings