3,707 research outputs found
Parametric Constructive Kripke-Semantics for Standard Multi-Agent Belief and Knowledge (Knowledge As Unbiased Belief)
We propose parametric constructive Kripke-semantics for multi-agent
KD45-belief and S5-knowledge in terms of elementary set-theoretic constructions
of two basic functional building blocks, namely bias (or viewpoint) and
visibility, functioning also as the parameters of the doxastic and epistemic
accessibility relation. The doxastic accessibility relates two possible worlds
whenever the application of the composition of bias with visibility to the
first world is equal to the application of visibility to the second world. The
epistemic accessibility is the transitive closure of the union of our doxastic
accessibility and its converse. Therefrom, accessibility relations for common
and distributed belief and knowledge can be constructed in a standard way. As a
result, we obtain a general definition of knowledge in terms of belief that
enables us to view S5-knowledge as accurate (unbiased and thus true)
KD45-belief, negation-complete belief and knowledge as exact KD45-belief and
S5-knowledge, respectively, and perfect S5-knowledge as precise (exact and
accurate) KD45-belief, and all this generically for arbitrary functions of bias
and visibility. Our results can be seen as a semantic complement to previous
foundational results by Halpern et al. about the (un)definability and
(non-)reducibility of knowledge in terms of and to belief, respectively
Hyperintensional semantics: a Fregean approach
In this paper, we present a new semantic framework designed to capture a distinctly cognitive or epistemic notion of meaning akin to Fregean senses. Traditional Carnapian intensions are too coarse-grained for this purpose: they fail to draw semantic distinctions between sentences that, from a Fregean perspective, differ in meaning. This has led some philosophers to introduce more fine-grained hyperintensions that allow us to draw semantic distinctions among co-intensional sentences. But the hyperintensional strategy has a flip-side: it risks drawing semantic distinctions between sentences that, from a Fregean perspective, do not differ in meaning. This is what we call the ‘new problem’ of hyperintensionality to distinguish it from the ‘old problem’ that faced the intensional theory. We show that our semantic framework offers a joint solution to both these problems by virtue of satisfying a version of Frege’s so-called ‘equipollence principle’ for sense individuation. Frege’s principle, we argue, not only captures the semantic intuitions that give rise to the old and the new problem of hyperintensionality, but also points the way to an independently motivated solution to both problems
Logic of Non-Monotonic Interactive Proofs (Formal Theory of Temporary Knowledge Transfer)
We propose a monotonic logic of internalised non-monotonic or instant
interactive proofs (LiiP) and reconstruct an existing monotonic logic of
internalised monotonic or persistent interactive proofs (LiP) as a minimal
conservative extension of LiiP. Instant interactive proofs effect a fragile
epistemic impact in their intended communities of peer reviewers that consists
in the impermanent induction of the knowledge of their proof goal by means of
the knowledge of the proof with the interpreting reviewer: If my peer reviewer
knew my proof then she would at least then (in that instant) know that its
proof goal is true. Their impact is fragile and their induction of knowledge
impermanent in the sense of being the case possibly only at the instant of
learning the proof. This accounts for the important possibility of
internalising proofs of statements whose truth value can vary, which, as
opposed to invariant statements, cannot have persistent proofs. So instant
interactive proofs effect a temporary transfer of certain propositional
knowledge (knowable ephemeral facts) via the transmission of certain individual
knowledge (knowable non-monotonic proofs) in distributed systems of multiple
interacting agents.Comment: continuation of arXiv:1201.3667 ; published extended abstract:
DOI:10.1007/978-3-642-36039-8_16 ; related to arXiv:1208.591
Tool support for reasoning in display calculi
We present a tool for reasoning in and about propositional sequent calculi.
One aim is to support reasoning in calculi that contain a hundred rules or
more, so that even relatively small pen and paper derivations become tedious
and error prone. As an example, we implement the display calculus D.EAK of
dynamic epistemic logic. Second, we provide embeddings of the calculus in the
theorem prover Isabelle for formalising proofs about D.EAK. As a case study we
show that the solution of the muddy children puzzle is derivable for any number
of muddy children. Third, there is a set of meta-tools, that allows us to adapt
the tool for a wide variety of user defined calculi
Bisimulation in Inquisitive Modal Logic
Inquisitive modal logic, InqML, is a generalisation of standard Kripke-style
modal logic. In its epistemic incarnation, it extends standard epistemic logic
to capture not just the information that agents have, but also the questions
that they are interested in. Technically, InqML fits within the family of
logics based on team semantics. From a model-theoretic perspective, it takes us
a step in the direction of monadic second-order logic, as inquisitive modal
operators involve quantification over sets of worlds. We introduce and
investigate the natural notion of bisimulation equivalence in the setting of
InqML. We compare the expressiveness of InqML and first-order logic, and
characterise inquisitive modal logic as the bisimulation invariant fragments of
first-order logic over various classes of two-sorted relational structures.
These results crucially require non-classical methods in studying bisimulations
and first-order expressiveness over non-elementary classes.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825
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