The Collision of Church and State: A Primer to Beth Din Arbitrarion and the New York Secular Courts

This Comment analyzes the interaction between secular courts and beth din proceedings (arbitration panels made up of specialists in halacha, or Jewish law). Part I examines the reasons why an independent Jewish religious court system is required and utilized despite the existence of a fair and equitable secular court system. It describes the Jewish legal principles involved, and how they impact both Jewish litigants and lawyers. Part II describes the mechanics of transforming a religious tribunal into a legally binding arbitration panel in New York State. Part III discusses the limited grounds upon which a beth din award may be vacated through statutory requirements and recent developments in the case law. It demonstrates the courts\u27 reluctance to treat beth din as a standard arbitration panel because of the possibility of encroaching on the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution. Lastly, it identifies areas in which the courts have failed to vacate awards, seemingly deserving of vacature, due to a fundamental lack of understanding of Jewish mores and customs, demonstrating the need for further reform in this area of the law

A coalitional procedure leading to a family of bankruptcy rules

We provide a general coalitional procedure that characterizes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems inspired by the Talmud.bankruptcy, coalitions, claims, Talmud.

THE TALMUD RULE AND THE SECUREMENT OF AGENTS? AWARDS

This paper provides a new characterization of the Talmud rule by means of a new property, called securement. This property says that any agent holding a feasible claim will get at least one nht of her claim, where n is the number of agents involved. We show that securement together with a weak version of path independence and the standard properties of self-duality and consistency characterize the Talmud rule.bankruptcy problems, Talmud rule, characterization results

A coalitional procedure leading to a family of bankruptcy rules

We provide a general coalitional procedure that characterizes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems inspired by the Talmud.bankruptcy, coalitions, claims, Talmud

Population monotonicity, consistency and the random arrival rule

In bankruptcy problems we characterize the random arrival rule by means of CG-consistency and population monotonicity.

A Concede-and-Divide Rule for Bankruptcy Problems

The concede-and-divide rule is a basic solution for bankruptcy problems with two claimants.An extension of the concede-and-divide rule to bankruptcy problems with more than two claimants is provided.This extension not only uses the concede-and-divide principle in its procedural definition, but also preserves the main properties of the concede-and-divide rule.Bankruptcy problems;concede-and-divide rule

Allocation rules incorporating interval uncertainty

This paper provides several answers to the question “How to cope with rationing problems with interval data?” Interval allocation rules which are efficient and reasonable are designed, with special attention to interval bankruptcy problems with standard claims and allocation rules incorporating the interval uncertainty of the estate.allocation rules, bankruptcy, interval uncertainty

THE THREE MUSKETEERS: FOUR CLASSICAL SOLUTIONS TO BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS

This paper provides a comparative analysis of some classical solutions to bankruptcy problems from an axiomatic viewpoint. These rules are the constrained equal-awards rule, the constrained equal-losses rule, the proportional rule and the Talmud rule. The purpose of this study is to facilitate the understanding of their differences and to clarify the type of situations in which each of these rules is better.Bankruptcy problems, proportional solution, equal-awards solution

Distributive Concerns in the Bankruptcy Problem with an Endogenous Estate

We compare certain bankruptcy rules in a bankruptcy model with an endogenous estate on the basis of normative criteria. In particular, five properties related to distributive concerns are analyzed: minimal rights first, securement of initial investments, initial investments first, reasonable lower bounds on awards, and reasonable lower bounds on losses. The proportional rule receives the strongest support from this normative analysis among the rules considered. We also observe that the performance of the proportional rule improves in the family of bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates compared to the general set of bankruptcy problems. Our results complement those in Karagozoglu (2008) and provide a broader perspective to bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates.public economics ;