90,081 research outputs found
Public Evidence from Secret Ballots
Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique,
challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are
high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the
results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they
have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to
be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and
pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area
spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable
security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts:
convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to
convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person
voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this
tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1
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Gaining assurance in a voter-verifiable voting system
The literature on e-voting systems has many examples of discussion of the correctness of the computer and communication algorithms of such systems, as well as discussions of their vulnerabilities. However, a gap in the literature concerns the practical need (before adoption of a specific e-voting system) for a complete case demonstrating that the system as a whole has sufficiently high probability of exhibiting the desired properties when in use in an actual election. This paper discusses the problem of producing such a case, with reference to a specific system: a version of the PrĂȘt Ă Voter scheme for voter-verifiable e-voting. We show a possible organisation of a case in terms of four main requirements â accuracy, privacy, termination and âtrustednessââ and show some of the detailed organisation that such a case should have, the diverse kinds of evidence that needs to be gathered and some of the interesting difficulties that arise
Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments
The paper elaborates the idea that voting is an instance of the aggregation of judgments, this being a more general concept than the aggregation of preferences. To aggregate judgments one must first measure them. I show that such aggregation has been unproblematic whenever it has been based on an independent and unrestricted scale. The scales analyzed in voting theory are either context dependent or subject to unreasonable restrictions. This is the real source of the diverse 'paradoxes of voting' that would better be termed 'voting pathologies'. The theory leads me to advocate what I term evaluative voting. It can also be called utilitarian voting as it is based on having voters express their cardinal preferences. The alternative that maximizes the sum wins. This proposal operationalizes, in an election context, the abstract cardinal theories of collective choice due to Fleming and Harsanyi. On pragmatic grounds, I argue for a three valued scale for general elections
Electronic Voting: the Devil is in the Details
Observing electronic voting from an international point of view gives some
perspective about its genesis and evolution. An analysis of the voting process
through its cultural, ontological, legal and political dimensions explains the
difficulty to normalize this process. It appears that international
organizations are not capable to properly defend the fundamental rights of the
citizens. The approach that was taken when DRE voting computers appeared seems
to have reoccured with VVAT voting computers and the european e-poll project.Comment: 9 page
Are Condorcet and minimax voting systems the best?
For decades, the minimax voting system was well known to experts on voting
systems, but was not widely considered to be one of the best systems. But in
recent years, two important experts, Nicolaus Tideman and Andrew Myers, have
both recognized minimax as one of the best systems. I agree with that. This
paper presents my own reasons for preferring minimax. The paper explicitly
discusses about 20 systems, though over 50 are known to exist.Comment: 41 pages, no figures. The Introduction has been changed. Also fixed
some version 6 errors in referencing subsection numbers in section
E-voting discourses in the UK and the Netherlands
A qualitative case study of the e-voting discourses in the UK and the Netherlands was performed based on the theory of strategic niche management. In both countries, eight e-voting experts were interviewed on their expectations, risk estimations, cooperation and learning experiences. The results show that differences in these variables can partly explain the variations in the embedding of e-voting in the two countries, from a qualitative point of view
What proof do we prefer? Variants of verifiability in voting
In this paper, we discuss one particular feature of Internet
voting, verifiability, against the background of scientific
literature and experiments in the Netherlands. In order
to conceptually clarify what verifiability is about, we distinguish
classical verifiability from constructive veriability in
both individual and universal verification. In classical individual
verifiability, a proof that a vote has been counted can
be given without revealing the vote. In constructive individual
verifiability, a proof is only accepted if the witness (i.e.
the vote) can be reconstructed. Analogous concepts are de-
fined for universal veriability of the tally. The RIES system
used in the Netherlands establishes constructive individual
verifiability and constructive universal verifiability,
whereas many advanced cryptographic systems described
in the scientific literature establish classical individual
verifiability and classical universal verifiability.
If systems with a particular kind of verifiability continue
to be used successfully in practice, this may influence the
way in which people are involved in elections, and their image
of democracy. Thus, the choice for a particular kind
of verifiability in an experiment may have political consequences.
We recommend making a well-informed democratic
choice for the way in which both individual and universal
verifiability should be realised in Internet voting, in
order to avoid these unconscious political side-effects of the
technology used. The safest choice in this respect, which
maintains most properties of current elections, is classical
individual verifiability combined with constructive universal
verifiability. We would like to encourage discussion
about the feasibility of this direction in scientific research
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