The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations

It’s commonly held that particular moral facts are explained by ‘natural’ or ‘descriptive’ facts, though there’s disagreement over how such explanations work. We defend the view that general moral principles also play a role in explaining particular moral facts. More specifically, we argue that this view best makes sense of some intuitive data points, including the supervenience of the moral upon the natural. We consider two alternative accounts of the nature and structure of moral principles—’the nomic view’ and ‘moral platonism’—before considering in what sense such principles obtain of necessity

What if God commanded something horrible? A pragmatics-based defence of divine command metaethics

The objection of horrible commands claims that divine command metaethics is doomed to failure because it is committed to the extremely counterintuitive assumption that torture of innocents, rape, and murder would be morally obligatory if God commanded these acts. Morriston, Wielenberg, and Sinnott-Armstrong have argued that formulating this objection in terms of counterpossibles is particularly forceful because it cannot be simply evaded by insisting on God’s necessary perfect moral goodness. I show that divine command metaethics can be defended even against this counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands because we can explain the truth-value intuitions about the disputed counterpossibles as the result of conversational implicatures. Furthermore, I show that this pragmatics-based defence of divine command metaethics has several advantages over Pruss’s reductio counterargument against the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands

No Coincidence?

This paper critically examines coincidence arguments and evolutionary debunking arguments against non-naturalist realism in metaethics. It advances a version of these arguments that goes roughly like this: Given a non-naturalist, realist metaethic, it would be cosmically coincidental if our first order normative beliefs were true. This coincidence undermines any prima facie justification enjoyed by those beliefs

Evolutionary Debunking Arguments

Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of evaluative beliefs to undermine their justification. This paper aims to clarify the premises and presuppositions of EDAs—a form of argument that is increasingly put to use in normative ethics. I argue that such arguments face serious obstacles. It is often overlooked, for example, that they presuppose the truth of metaethical objectivism. More importantly, even if objectivism is assumed, the use of EDAs in normative ethics is incompatible with a parallel and more sweeping global evolutionary debunking argument that has been discussed in recent metaethics. After examining several ways of responding to this global debunking argument, I end by arguing that even if we could resist it, this would still not rehabilitate the current targeted use of EDAs in normative ethics given that, if EDAs work at all, they will in any case lead to a truly radical revision of our evaluative outlook

Seeing Right from Wrong: A Defense of A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism

This dissertation develops and defends the claim that our epistemic access to moral properties is grounded in a posteriori perceptual experiences. It is divided into two parts. In part I, I present the epistemic access problem for realist moral epistemology, and then argue against several a priori attempts to resolve the problem. I begin by defending an understanding of evolutionary debunking arguments according to which the problem is grounded in a lack of epistemic access to sui generis, non-causal moral facts. Next, I argue that even the most sophisticated versions of reflective equilibrium fall victim to the “garbage in, garbage out” objection which besets coherentist theories more generally. I then survey the most influential other a priori approaches to epistemic access. I conclude that each of them is victim to some variation of the same dilemma: Either they fail to ensure epistemic access, or they succeed by providing epistemic access to the wrong properties—viz. not the robustly normative ones. In part II, I defend a wholly a posteriori moral epistemology according to which our epistemic access to the moral properties is via perceptual experience. I begin with a positive argument that moral properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience, making use of the “method of contrast” found in the philosophy of perception literature. Next, I defend the foundationalist credentials of the perceptualist view in light of the objection that moral experiences will be epistemically dependent on prior background (moral) beliefs. I claim that the epistemic dependence of these moral experiences depends on the nature of influence the prior beliefs have and that the influence is not of the problematic sort. I then discuss the role of emotions in generating moral perceptions. I argue that emotions play an essential role in moral perceptual experiences, but that this is compatible with foundationalism and perceptualism. Finally, I return to the issue of epistemic access, arguing that the perceptual view provides an explanation of our epistemic access to the moral properties

Why normative realists ought to be robust naturalists

Some philosophers think that facts about how we should think or act—the normative facts, as I will call them—do not depend wholly on the various attitudes or feelings we have about things. Call these philosophers realists. In my dissertation, I argue that the only viable form of realism is one on which normative facts are causally efficacious and fully depend on non-normative facts. Call this form of realism robust naturalism. Most arguments for robust naturalism assume a broader doctrine of metaphysical naturalism—roughly, the view that there are no non-natural or supernatural facts. My own arguments for robust naturalism do not assume this. I argue, first, that only robust naturalists can give a satisfactory reply to certain worries about the evolutionary influence on our normative beliefs; and second, that only robust naturalists can give a plausible account of how normative facts are groundedPhilosoph

Varieties of Objectivity: What\u27s Worth Keeping?

This dissertation addresses the problem of whether or not morality can be objective. Objectivity seems built into our everyday moral discourse and practice, yet it can be difficult to say just what moral objectivity consists in. There is significant disagreement in the philosophical literature on this topic. I examine three influential contemporary accounts of objectivity: Derek Parfit’s non-naturalist realism, Sharon Street’s anti-realist constructivism, and Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons’ cognitivist expressivism. Despite their differences, these authors share a common aim: to defend the idea that the truth of moral claims are at least in some sense invariant with respect to our subjective attitudes about morality. I argue that each view faces significant challenges and that none of the three offers a convincing account of moral objectivity. Parfit’s proposed epistemology is problematic, in particular the role he gives to rational intuition of self-evident truths. Street’s view of personal values as the source of moral truth does not adequately account for the authority of moral claims, and has a number of unappealing consequences. Horgan and Timmons\u27 minimalist view of truth is unconvincing and leaves their account vulnerable to charges of moral relativism. Nonetheless, each view also has something important to offer. I propose that a successful account of moral objectivity will need to take seriously Parfit\u27s idea that the source of reasons must be external to individuals, Street\u27s conviction that moral truths must not involve a mysterious epistemology or be too removed from the practical standpoint, and Horgan and Timmons idea that evaluative beliefs are unique and may require new ways of thinking about moral truth and cognitive content. I also note that reasons play a key role in all three accounts of objectivity, but that all three views also make moral reasoning and judgement a bit mysterious. I conclude that more work needs to be done on the nature of reasons and their relation to moral truth

Synthetic Reductionism in Moral Philosophy

I defend the view that moral properties are identical to properties that can be expressed without using moral vocabulary