Giant Gating Tunability of Optical Refractive Index in Transition Metal Dichalcogenide Monolayers

We report that the refractive index of transition metal dichacolgenide (TMDC) monolayers, such as MoS2, WS2, and WSe2, can be substantially tuned by > 60% in the imaginary part and > 20% in the real part around exciton resonances using CMOS-compatible electrical gating. This giant tunablility is rooted in the dominance of excitonic effects in the refractive index of the monolayers and the strong susceptibility of the excitons to the influence of injected charge carriers. The tunability mainly results from the effects of injected charge carriers to broaden the spectral width of excitonic interband transitions and to facilitate the interconversion of neutral and charged excitons. The other effects of the injected charge carriers, such as renormalizing bandgap and changing exciton binding energy, only play negligible roles. We also demonstrate that the atomically thin monolayers, when combined with photonic structures, can enable the efficiencies of optical absorption (reflection) tuned from 40% (60%) to 80% (20%) due to the giant tunability of refractive index. This work may pave the way towards the development of field-effect photonics in which the optical functionality can be controlled with CMOS circuits

Matching Dynamics with Constraints

We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to another agent. Each agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it can be matched with. However, depending on the constraints and the current state of the game, not all possible partners are available for matching at all times. For correlated preferences, we propose and study a general class of hedonic coalition formation games that we call coalition formation games with constraints. This class includes and extends many recently studied variants of stable matching, such as locally stable matching, socially stable matching, or friendship matching. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that all these variants are encompassed in a class of "consistent" instances that always allow a polynomial improvement sequence to a stable state. In addition, we show that for consistent instances there always exists a polynomial sequence to every reachable state. Our characterization is tight in the sense that we provide exponential lower bounds when each of the requirements for consistency is violated. We also analyze matching with uncorrelated preferences, where we obtain a larger variety of results. While socially stable matching always allows a polynomial sequence to a stable state, for other classes different additional assumptions are sufficient to guarantee the same results. For the problem of reaching a given stable state, we show NP-hardness in almost all considered classes of matching games.Comment: Conference Version in WINE 201