Brentano e a Idealidade do Tempo

How is it possible to have present memory experiences of things that, being past, are no longer presently experienced? A possible answer to this long-standing philosophical question is what I call the “ideality of time view,” namely the view that temporal succession is unreal. In this paper I outline the basic idea behind Brentano’s version of the ideality of time view. Additionally, I contrast it with Hume’s version, suggesting that, despite significant differences, it can nonetheless be construed as broadly Humean.Como é possível ter experiências de memória presente de coisas que, sendo passadas, não são mais experimentadas no presente? Uma resposta possível a esta pergunta filosófica de longa data é o que eu chamo de "visão da idealidade do tempo", ou seja, a visão de que a sucessão temporal é irreal. Neste artigo, esboço a ideia por trás da versão de Brentano da visão da idealidade do tempo. Além disso, eu a contrasto com a versão de Hume, sugerindo que, apesar das diferenças significativas, ela pode, no entanto, ser interpretada como humeana em sentido amplo

Evolution of Leibniz's thought in the matter of fictions and infinitesimals

In this paper we offer a reconstruction of the evolution of Leibniz's thought concerning the problem of the infinite divisibility of bodies, the tension between actuality, unassignability and syncategorematicity, and the closely related question of the possibility of infinitesimal quantities, both in physics and in mathematics. Some scholars have argued that syncategorematicity is a mature acquisition, to which Leibniz resorts to solve the question of his infinitesimals namely the idea that infinitesimals are just signs for Archimedean exhaustions, and their unassignability is a nominalist maneuver. On the contrary, we show that sycategorematicity, as a traditional idea of classical scholasticism, is a feature of young Leibniz's thinking, from which he moves away in order to solve the same problem, as he gains mathematical knowledge. We have divided Leibniz's path toward his mature view of infinitesimals into five phases, which are especially significant for reconstructing the entire evolution. In our reconstruction, an important role is played by Leibniz's text De Quadratura Arithmetica. Based on this and other texts we dispute the thesis that fictionality coincides with syncategorematicity, and that unassignability can be bypassed. On the contrary, we maintain that unassignability, as incompatible with the principle of harmony, is the ultimate reason for the fictionality of infinitesimals.Comment: 36 page

William of Ockham, From His Summa of Logic, Part I: Adam (of Wodeham's) Prologue, Ockham's Prefatory Letter and Chs. 1–6, 8–13, 26–28, 30–31, 33, 63–66, 70, 72, with Summaries of Chs. 7, 29, 32 (translation)

An annotated English translation of several chapters from Part I of Ockham's Summa of Logic

Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory, Version 1.2.

A volume on early-fourteenth century logic and semantics, focusing primarily on the theories of signification and supposition (including ampliation), along with connotation-theory and the theory of mental language. The main authors discussed are Ockham, Burley, Peter of Ailly and, to some extent, Gregory of Rimini, although other people are treated too. Ch. 2 contains a "Thumbnail Sketch of the History of Logic to the End of the Middle Ages." There is an Appendix with a chronological table of names (and comments), and another Appendix of short primary texts that are discussed in the book

Modality and Validity in the Logic of John Buridan

What makes a valid argument valid? Generally speaking, in a valid argument, if the premisses are true, then the conclusion must necessarily also be true. But on its own, this doesn’t tell us all that much. What is truth? And what is necessity? In what follows, I consider answers to these questions proposed by the fourteenth century logician John Buridan († ca. 1358). My central claim is that Buridan’s logic is downstream from his metaphysics. Accordingly, I treat his metaphysical discussions as the key to his logic. As has been often noted, Buridan’s metaphysics are radically anti-realist about universals, though I think the depth and scope of his anti-realism has at times been papered over. Buridan constructs his logic on an amazingly spartan ontology, and this accomplishment is overdue for reconsideration. To the foregoing questions: truth is a feature of propositions, and of propositions only—not of proposition-like states of affairs, or anything like that. It is a function of the reference or supposition (suppositio) of their terms, which depends on predication in a propositional context. And necessary truth is grounded in causation: a predication is necessary if it cannot be falsified by any power, natural or supernatural, without ii annihilating what its terms stand for. “Socrates is a human”, for instance, can only be falsified by annihilating Socrates, and so it is a necessary truth. These considerations provide an ample theoretical basis for a thorough examination of Buridan’s modal logic. This is what the thesis culminates with. In the final chapter, I set forth some novel and surprising findings, chief of which is this: Buridan’s modal syntax and semantics are nothing like Kripke’s—and indeed are incompatible with them. This has significant implications not only for modal logic and metaphysics, but for how we think about medieval logic and philosophy more generally. Throughout the thesis, I advocate a methodology of emphasising the differences, rather than the similarities, between past and present thought. Buridan is wildly unlike what we’re used to, and we should let him speak for himsel

Machines for Living: Philosophy of Technology and the Photographic Image

This dissertation examines the relationship that exists between two distinct and seemingly incompatible bodies of scholarship within the field of contemporary philosophy of technology. The first, as argued by postmodern pragmatist Barry Allen, posits that our tools and what we make with them are epistemically important; disputing the idea that knowledge is strictly sentential or propositional, he claims instead that knowledge is the product of a performance that is both superlative and artefactual, rendering technology importantly world-constituting. The second, as argued by Heidegger and his inheritors, is that technology is ontologically problematic; rather than technology being evidence of performative knowledge, it is instead existentially threatening by virtue of the fact that it changes the tenor of our relationship with the world-as-given. Despite the fact that these claims seem prima facie incompatible, I argue that they may be successfully reconciled by introducing a third body of scholarship: the philosophy of photography. For it is the case, I argue, that although we, qua human beings, occupy lifeworlds that are necessarily constituted by technology, technology also induces a kind of phenomenological scepticism: a concern that mediated action precludes us from the possibility of authentic experience. Arguing in favour of the sentiment that photographs serve as a kind of phenomenal anchor—a kind of machine for living—I claim that photographic images provide a panacea to this existential concern: despite being epistemically problematic, it is this selfsame epistemic “specialness” of photographs that forces us to phenomenologically recommit, if only temporarily, to the world in a serious way. Consequently, it is my belief that an analysis of our artefacts and the way they function is fundamentally incomplete without an analysis of the epistemic and ontological problems introduced of the photographic image; as I will demonstrate, the photographic image casts an extremely long shadow over the philosophy of technology

Philosophy of Language

How language works — its functions, mechanisms, and limitations — matters to the early moderns as much as it does to contemporary philosophers. Many of the moderns make reflection on language central to their philosophical projects, both as a tool for explaining human cognition and as a weapon to be used against competing views. Even in philosophers for whom language is less central, we can find important connections between their views on language and their other philosophical commitments