324 research outputs found

    Bargaining in Supply Chains (Long Version)

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    We study experimentally bargaining in a multiple-tier supply chain with horizontal competition and sequential bargaining between tiers. Our treatments vary the cost differences between firms in tiers 1 and 2. We measure how these underlying costs influence the efficiency, negotiated prices and profit distribution across the supply chain, and the consistency of these outcomes with existing theory. We find that the structural issue of cost differentials dominates personal characteristics in explaining outcomes, with profits in a tier generally increasing with decreased competition in the tier and increasing with decreased competition in alternate tiers. The Balanced Principal model of supply chain bargaining does a good job explaining our data, and outperforms the common assumption of leader-follower negotiations. We find a significant anchoring effect from a firm's first bid but no effect of the sequence of those bids, no evidence of failure to close via escalation of commitment, and mixed results for a deadline effect. We also find an interesting asymmetry between the buy and sells sides in employed bidding strategy. The buy side makes predominantly concessionary offers after the initial anchor, but a significant number of sell side firms engage in aggressive anti-concessionary bidding, a strategy that is effective in that it increases prices while not compromising closure rates.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/109717/1/1259_Lovejoy.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/109717/4/1259_Lovejoy_Mar2015.pdfDescription of 1259_Lovejoy_Mar2015.pdf : Long Version March 201

    Value of supplier's capacity information in a two-echelon supply chain

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    Cataloged from PDF version of article.In traditional supply chain models it is generally assumed that full information is available to all parties involved. Although this seems reasonable, there are cases where chain members are independent agents and possess different levels of information. In this study, we analyze a two-echelon, single supplier-multiple retailers supply chain in a single-period setting where the capacity of the supplier is limited. Embedding the lack of information about the capacity of the supplier in the model, we aim to analyze the reaction of the retailers, compare it with the full-information case, and assess the value of information and the effects of information asymmetry using game theoretic analysis. In our numerical studies, we conclude that the value of information is highly dependent on the capacity conditions and estimates of the retailers, and having information is not necessarily beneficial to the retailers

    Value of supplier's capacity information in a two-echelon supply chain

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    In traditional supply chain models it is generally assumed that full information is available to all parties involved. Although this seems reasonable, there are cases where chain members are independent agents and possess different levels of information. In this study, we analyze a two-echelon, single supplier-multiple retailers supply chain in a single-period setting where the capacity of the supplier is limited. Embedding the lack of information about the capacity of the supplier in the model, we aim to analyze the reaction of the retailers, compare it with the full-information case, and assess the value of information and the effects of information asymmetry using game theoretic analysis. In our numerical studies, we conclude that the value of information is highly dependent on the capacity conditions and estimates of the retailers, and having information is not necessarily beneficial to the retailers

    Yield Uncertainty and Strategic Formation of Supply Chain Networks

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    How does supply uncertainty affect the structure of supply chain networks? To answer this question we consider a setting where retailers and suppliers must establish a costly relationship with each other prior to engaging in trade. Suppliers, with uncertain yield, announce wholesale prices, while retailers must decide which suppliers to link to based on their wholesale prices. Subsequently, retailers compete with each other in Cournot fashion to sell the acquired supply to consumers. We find that in equilibrium retailers concentrate their links among too few suppliers, i.e., there is insufficient diversification of the supply base. We find that either reduction of supply variance or increase of mean supply, increases a supplier's profit. However, these two ways of improving service have qualitatively different effects on welfare: improvement of the expected supply by a supplier makes everyone better off, whereas improvement of supply variance lowers consumer surplus

    Understanding Supply Chain Disruptions - Empirical Analysis of Supply Chain Structures

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    Firms have encountered an ever-increasing number of supply chain disruptions in the past decade, triggered by a wide range of natural and man-made causes. Supply chain risk management is thus an active research area, while the concerning topics mainly focused on the management at the immediate supplier level. In contrast, anecdotes reveal that shortages can oftentimes be traced back to the problems at sub-tier suppliers, i.e., tier-2 or more upstream suppliers. Further, the structure of a supply chain is not exogenously generated. For example, lack of incentives may discourage manufacturers from entering a market and create a highly concentrated industry that could be vulnerable to supply shocks and price manipulation. These two topics, the sub-tier supplier structure and impacts and the entry decisions of manufacturers are the two main themes of this thesis. More specifically, this thesis presents empirical results that improve our understanding of 1) risk propagation from sub-tier suppliers to the connected focal firms and 2) barriers to entry for manufacturers. The first part of the thesis considers the sub-tier suppliers and the network structure that connects the supply chain partners. It demonstrates the financial performance link between firms and their tier-2 suppliers respectively. It also establishes the intermediary effect of network concentration: when a firm’s tier-1 suppliers share tier-2 suppliers. The second part of the thesis focuses on the generic pharmaceutical industry plagued by the high concentration of firms in markets with expired patents. This chapter studies the key determinants of market entry decisions by generic firms and confirms the role of manufacturing process and regulatory environment. Policy simulation result shows the non-monotone relationship between the speed of the government review process and market concentration level.PHDBusiness AdministrationUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/146024/1/iriswang_1.pd

    Efficient Contract Design in Multi-Principal Multi-Agent Supply Chains

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    We consider a general multi-principal multi-agent contracting game in a complete-information 4supply-chain setting and determine coordinating equilibrium transfer schedules in closed form.The resulting contracts manage to align incentives for decentralized decision-making and achieve first-best channel solutions. We allow for multidimensional actions and arbitrary payoff externalities between all members of the supply chain. For the coordinating contracts to exist it suffices that all payoff functions are continuous on the compact action sets in a general sense that accommodates discrete action sets. Our approach unifies and generalizes a significant portion of the extant supply-chain literature. It can be applied to a very large class of many-to-many supply-chain settings

    An Investigation into Factors Affecting the Chilled Food Industry

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    With the advent of Industry 4.0, many new approaches towards process monitoring, benchmarking and traceability are becoming available, and these techniques have the potential to radically transform the agri-food sector. In particular, the chilled food supply chain (CFSC) contains a number of unique challenges by virtue of it being thought of as a temperature controlled supply chain. Therefore, once the key issues affecting the CFSC have been identified, algorithms can be proposed, which would allow realistic thresholds to be established for managing these problems on the micro, meso and macro scales. Hence, a study is required into factors affecting the CFSC within the scope of Industry 4.0. The study itself has been broken down into four main topics: identifying the key issues within the CFSC; implementing a philosophy of continuous improvement within the CFSC; identifying uncertainty within the CFSC; improving and measuring the performance of the supply chain. However, as a consequence of this study two further topics were added: a discussion of some of the issues surrounding information sharing between retailers and suppliers; some of the wider issues affecting food losses and wastage (FLW) on the micro, meso and macro scales. A hybrid algorithm is developed, which incorporates the analytic hierarchical process (AHP) for qualitative issues and data envelopment analysis (DEA) for quantitative issues. The hybrid algorithm itself is a development of the internal auditing algorithm proposed by Sueyoshi et al (2009), which in turn was developed following corporate scandals such as Tyco, Enron, and WorldCom, which have led to a decline in public trust. However, the advantage of the proposed solution is that all of the key issues within the CFSC identified can be managed from a single computer terminal, whilst the risk of food contamination such as the 2013 horsemeat scandal can be avoided via improved traceability

    SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT IN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY

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    The automotive industry is one of the world\u27s most important economic sectors in terms of revenue and employment. The automotive supply chain is complex owing to the large number of parts in an automobile, the multiple layers of suppliers to supply those parts, and the coordination of materials, information, and financial flows across the supply chain. Many uncertainties and different natural and man-made disasters have repeatedly stricken and disrupted automotive manufacturers and their supply chains. Managing supply chain risk in a complex environment is always a challenge for the automotive industry. This research first provides a comprehensive literature review of the existing research work on the supply chain risk identification and management, considering, but not limited to, the characteristics of the automotive supply chain, since the literature focusing on automotive supply chain risk management (ASCRM) is limited. The review provides a summary and a classification for the underlying supply chain risk resources in the automotive industry; and state-of-the-art research in the area is discussed, with an emphasis on the quantitative methods and mathematical models currently used. The future research topics in ASCRM are identified. Then two mathematical models are developed in this research, concentrating on supply chain risk management in the automotive industry. The first model is for optimizing manufacturer cooperation in supply chains. OEMs often invest a large amount of money in supplier development to improve suppliers’ capabilities and performance. Allocating the investment optimally among multiple suppliers to minimize risks while maintaining an acceptable level of return becomes a critical issue for manufacturers. This research develops a new non-linear investment return mathematical model for supplier development, which is more applicable in reality. The solutions of this new model can assist supply chain management in deciding investment at different levels in addition to making “yes or no” decisions. The new model is validated and verified using numerical examples. The second model is the optimal contract for new product development with the risk consideration in the automotive industry. More specifically, we investigated how to decide the supplier’s capacity and the manufacturer’s order in the supply contract in order to reduce the risks and maximize their profits when the demand of the new product is highly uncertain. Based on the newsvendor model and Stackelberg game theory, a single period two-stage supply chain model for a product development contract, consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer, is developed. A practical back induction algorithm is conducted to get subgame perfect optimal solutions for the contract model. Extensive model analyses are accomplished for various situations with theoretical results leading to conditions of solution optimality. The model is then applied to a uniform distribution for uncertain demands. Based on a real automotive supply chain case, the numerical experiments and sensitivity analyses are conducted to study the behavior and performance of the proposed model, from which some interesting managerial insights were provided. The proposed solutions provide an effective tool for making the supplier-manufacturer contracts when manufacturers face high uncertain demand. We believe that the quantitative models and solutions studied in this research have great potentials to be applied in automotive and other industries in developing the efficient supply chains involving advanced and emerging technologies

    Competing for shelf space

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    This paper studies competition for shelf space in a multi-supplier retail point. We consider a retailer that seeks to allocate her shelf space to maximize her profit. Because products associated with larger profit margin are granted more shelf space, suppliers can offer the retailer financial incentives to obtain larger space allocations. We analyze the competitive dynamics arising from the scarcity of space, and show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. We then demonstrate that the inefficiencies from decentralizing decision-making are limited to 6% with wholesale-price contracts, and that full coordination can be achieved with pay-to-stay fee contracts. We finally investigate how competition is distorted under the practice of category management.Game theory; Supply chain competition; Price of Anarchy; Pricing; Supply contracts;

    Exploring the Relationship between Supply Network Configuration, Interorganizational Information Sharing and Performance

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    ABSTRACT EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUPPLY NETWORK CONFIGURATION, INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SHARING AND PERFORMANCE By MARCIA DALEY August 2008 Committee Chair: Dr. Subhashish Samaddar Major Department: Decision Science Critical to the success of a firm is the ability of managers to coordinate the complex network of business relationships that can exist between business partners in the supply network. However many managers are unsure on how best to leverage their resources to capitalize on the information sharing opportunities that are available in such networks. Although there is significant research on information sharing, the area of inter-organizational information sharing (IIS) is still evolving and there is limited research on IIS in relation to systemic factors within supply networks. To help fill this gap in the literature, a primary focus of this dissertation is on the relationship between the design of the supply network and IIS. The design of the supply network is characterized by the supply network configuration which is comprised of (1) the network pattern, (2) the number of stages in the supply network, and (3) where the firm is located in that supply network. Four different types of IIS are investigated, herein. These types of IIS are a function of the frequency with which information is shared and the scope of information shared. Type 1 (Type 2) IIS is the low (high) frequency state where only operational information is shared. Similarly, Type 3 (Type 4) is the low (high) frequency state where strategic information is shared. The argument is that the type of IIS varies depending on the configuration of the supply network and that this relationship is influenced by the coordination structure established between firms in the network. The second focus of this dissertation deals with the relationship between IIS and performance. Research findings on the benefits to be gained from IIS have been ambiguous, with some researchers claiming reduced cost in the supply network with IIS, and others finding minimal or no benefits. To add clarity to these findings, the role that uncertainty plays in the relationship between IIS and performance is examined. The thesis presented is that the positive relationship between IIS types and the performance of the supply network is impacted by process uncertainty (i.e. the variability in process outcomes and production times), and partner uncertainty. Social network theory and transaction cost economics provide the theoretical lens for this dissertation. A model is developed and will be empirically validated in a cross-sectional setting, utilizing a sampling frame randomly selected and comprised of supply management executives from various industries within the United States
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