114 research outputs found
Noncomparabilities & Non Standard Logics
Many normative theories set forth in the welfare economics, distributive justice and cognate literatures posit noncomparabilities or incommensurabilities between magnitudes of various kinds. In some cases these gaps are predicated on metaphysical claims, in others upon epistemic claims, and in still others upon political-moral claims. I show that in all such cases they are best given formal expression in nonstandard logics that reject bivalence, excluded middle, or both. I do so by reference to an illustrative case study: a contradiction known to beset John Rawls\u27s selection and characterization of primary goods as the proper distribuendum in any distributively just society. The contradiction is avoided only by reformulating Rawls\u27s claims in a nonstandard form, which form happens also to cohere quite attractively with Rawls\u27s intuitive argumentation on behalf of his claims
Noncomparabilities & Non Standard Logics
Many normative theories set forth in the welfare economics, distributive justice and cognate literatures posit noncomparabilities or incommensurabilities between magnitudes of various kinds. In some cases these gaps are predicated on metaphysical claims, in others upon epistemic claims, and in still others upon political-moral claims. I show that in all such cases they are best given formal expression in nonstandard logics that reject bivalence, excluded middle, or both. I do so by reference to an illustrative case study: a contradiction known to beset John Rawls\u27s selection and characterization of primary goods as the proper distribuendum in any distributively just society. The contradiction is avoided only by reformulating Rawls\u27s claims in a nonstandard form, which form happens also to cohere quite attractively with Rawls\u27s intuitive argumentation on behalf of his claims
Neutrality and Many-Valued Logics
In this book, we consider various many-valued logics: standard, linear,
hyperbolic, parabolic, non-Archimedean, p-adic, interval, neutrosophic, etc. We
survey also results which show the tree different proof-theoretic frameworks
for many-valued logics, e.g. frameworks of the following deductive calculi:
Hilbert's style, sequent, and hypersequent. We present a general way that
allows to construct systematically analytic calculi for a large family of
non-Archimedean many-valued logics: hyperrational-valued, hyperreal-valued, and
p-adic valued logics characterized by a special format of semantics with an
appropriate rejection of Archimedes' axiom. These logics are built as different
extensions of standard many-valued logics (namely, Lukasiewicz's, Goedel's,
Product, and Post's logics). The informal sense of Archimedes' axiom is that
anything can be measured by a ruler. Also logical multiple-validity without
Archimedes' axiom consists in that the set of truth values is infinite and it
is not well-founded and well-ordered. On the base of non-Archimedean valued
logics, we construct non-Archimedean valued interval neutrosophic logic INL by
which we can describe neutrality phenomena.Comment: 119 page
A modal theorem-preserving translation of a class of three-valued logics of incomplete information
International audienceThere are several three-valued logical systems that form a scattered landscape, even if all reasonable connectives in three-valued logics can be derived from a few of them. Most papers on this subject neglect the issue of the relevance of such logics in relation with the intended meaning of the third truth-value. Here, we focus on the case where the third truth-value means unknown, as suggested by Kleene. Under such an understanding, we show that any truth-qualified formula in a large range of three-valued logics can be translated into KD as a modal formula of depth 1, with modalities in front of literals only, while preserving all tautologies and inference rules of the original three-valued logic. This simple information logic is a two-tiered classical propositional logic with simple semantics in terms of epistemic states understood as subsets of classical interpretations. We study in particular the translations of Kleene, Gödel, ᴌukasiewicz and Nelson logics. We show that Priest’s logic of paradox, closely connected to Kleene’s, can also be translated into our modal setting, simply by exchanging the modalities possible and necessary. Our work enables the precise expressive power of three-valued logics to be laid bare for the purpose of uncertainty management
Probability and nonclassical logic
Classical tautologies have probability. Classical contradictions have probability. These familiar features reflect a connection between standard probability theory and classical logic. In contexts in which classical logic is questioned—to deal with the paradoxes of self-reference, or vague propositions, for the purposes of scientific theory or metaphysical anti-realism—we must equally question standard probability theory. Section 1 covers the intended interpretation of ‘nonclassical logic’ and ‘probability’. Section 2 reviews the connection between classical logic and classical probability. Section 3 briefly reviews salient aspects of nonclassical logic, laying out a couple of simple examples to fix ideas. Section 4 explores modifications of probability theory. The variations laid down will be motivated initially by formal analogies to the classical setting. In section 5, however, we look at two foundational justifications for the presentations of ‘nonclassical probabilities’ that are arrived at. Sections 6-7 describe extensions of the nonclassical framework: to conditionalization and decision theory in particular. Section 8 will consider some alternative approaches, and section 9 evaluates progress
On truth-gaps, bipolar belief and the assertability of vague propositions
AbstractThis paper proposes an integrated approach to indeterminacy and epistemic uncertainty in order to model an intelligent agentʼs decision making about the assertability of vague statements. Initially, valuation pairs are introduced as a model of truth-gaps for propositional logic sentences. These take the form of lower and upper truth-valuations representing absolutely true and not absolutely false respectively. In particular, we consider valuation pairs based on supervaluationist principles and also on Kleeneʼs three-valued logic. The relationship between Kleene valuation pairs and supervaluation pairs is then explored in some detail with particular reference to a natural ordering on semantic precision. In the second part of the paper we extend this approach by proposing bipolar belief pairs as an integrated model combining epistemic uncertainty and indeterminacy. These comprise of lower and upper belief measures on propositional sentences, defined by a probability distribution on a finite set of possible valuation pairs. The properties of these measures are investigated together with their relationship to different types of uncertainty measure. Finally, we apply bipolar belief measures in a preliminary decision theoretic study so as to begin to understand how the use of vague expressions can help to mitigate the risk associated with making forecasts or promises. This then has potential applications to natural language generation systems
Proof theory for hybrid(ised) logics
Hybridisation is a systematic process along which the characteristic features of hybrid logic, both at the syntactic and the semantic levels, are developed on top of an arbitrary logic framed as an institution. In a series of papers this process has been detailed and taken as a basis for a specification methodology for reconfigurable systems. The present paper extends this work by showing how a proof calculus (in both a Hilbert and a tableau based format) for the hybridised version of a logic can be systematically generated from a proof calculus for the latter. Such developments provide the basis for a complete proof theory for hybrid(ised) logics, and thus pave the way to the development of (dedicated) proof support.The authors are grateful to Torben Bräuner for helpful, inspiring discussions, and to the anonymous referees for their detailed comments.
This work is funded by ERDF—European Regional Development Fund, through the COMPETE Programme, and by National Funds through Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia(FCT) within project PTDC/EEI-CTP/4836/2014. Moreover, the first and the second authors are sponsored by FCT grants SFRH/BD/52234/2013 and SFRH/BPD/103004/2014, respectively. M. Mar-tins is also supported by the EU FP7 Marie Curie PIRSES-GA-2012-318986 project GeTFun: Generalizing Truth-Functionality and FCT project UID/MAT/04106/2013 through CIDMA. L.Barbosa is further supported by FCT in the context of SFRH/B-SAB/113890/2015
Modal logic with non-deterministic semantics: Part I—Propositional case
Dugundji proved in 1940 that most parts of standard modal systems cannot be characterized by a single finite deterministic matrix. In the eighties, Ivlev proposed a semantics of four-valued non-deterministic matrices (which he called quasi-matrices), in order to characterize a hierarchy of weak modal logics without the necessitation rule. In a previous paper, we extended some systems of Ivlev’s hierarchy, also proposing weaker six-valued systems in which the (T) axiom was replaced by the deontic (D) axiom. In this paper, we propose even weaker systems, by eliminating both axioms, which are characterized by eight-valued non-deterministic matrices. In addition, we prove completeness for those new systems. It is natural to ask if a characterization by finite ordinary (deterministic) logical matrices would be possible for all those Ivlev-like systems. We will show that finite deterministic matrices do not characterize any of them
- …