12,714 research outputs found
Quantum Cryptography II: How to re-use a one-time pad safely even if P=NP
When elementary quantum systems, such as polarized photons, are used to
transmit digital information, the uncertainty principle gives rise to novel
cryptographic phenomena unachievable with traditional transmission media, e.g.
a communications channel on which it is impossible in principle to eavesdrop
without a high probability of being detected. With such a channel, a one-time
pad can safely be reused many times as long as no eavesdrop is detected, and,
planning ahead, part of the capacity of these uncompromised transmissions can
be used to send fresh random bits with which to replace the one-time pad when
an eavesdrop finally is detected. Unlike other schemes for stretching a
one-time pad, this scheme does not depend on complexity-theoretic assumptions
such as the difficulty of factoring.Comment: Original 1982 submission to ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing with
spelling and typographical corrections, and comments by the authors 32 years
later. Submitted to Natural Computin
Standard interface definition for avionics data bus systems
Data bus for avionics system of space shuttle, noting functions of interface unit, error detection and recovery, redundancy, and bus control philosoph
Is There an App for That? Electronic Health Records (EHRs) and a New Environment of Conflict Prevention and Resolution
Katsh discusses the new problems that are a consequence of a new technological environment in healthcare, one that has an array of elements that makes the emergence of disputes likely. Novel uses of technology have already addressed both the problem and its source in other contexts, such as e-commerce, where large numbers of transactions have generated large numbers of disputes. If technology-supported healthcare is to improve the field of medicine, a similar effort at dispute prevention and resolution will be necessary
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Design of Hardware with Quantifiable Security against Reverse Engineering
Semiconductors are a 412 billion dollar industry and integrated circuits take on important roles in human life, from everyday use in smart-devices to critical applications like healthcare and aviation. Saving today\u27s hardware systems from attackers can be a huge concern considering the budget spent on designing these chips and the sensitive information they may contain. In particular, after fabrication, the chip can be subject to a malicious reverse engineer that tries to invasively figure out the function of the chip or other sensitive data. Subsequent to an attack, a system can be subject to cloning, counterfeiting, or IP theft. This dissertation addresses some issues concerning the security of hardware systems in such scenarios.
First, the issue of privacy risks from approximate computing is investigated in Chapter 2. Simulation experiments show that the erroneous outputs produced on each chip instance can reveal the identity of the chip that performed the computation, which jeopardizes user privacy.
The next two chapters deal with camouflaging, which is a technique to prevent reverse engineering from extracting circuit information from the layout. Chapter 3 provides a design automation method to protect camouflaged circuits against an adversary with prior knowledge about the circuit\u27s viable functions. Chapter 4 provides a method to reverse engineer camouflaged circuits. The proposed reverse engineering formulation uses Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) solving in a way that incorporates laser fault injection and laser voltage probing capabilities to figure out the function of an aggressively camouflaged circuit with unknown gate functions and connections.
Chapter 5 addresses the challenge of secure key storage in hardware by proposing a new key storage method that applies threshold-defined behavior of memory cells to store secret information in a way that achieves a high degree of protection against invasive reverse engineering. This approach requires foundry support to encode the secrets as threshold voltage offsets in transistors. In Chapter 6, a secret key storage approach is introduced that does not rely on a trusted foundry. This approach only relies on the foundry to fabricate the hardware infrastructure for key generation but not to encode the secret key. The key is programmed by the IP integrator or the user after fabrication via directed accelerated aging of transistors. Additionally, this chapter presents the design of a working hardware prototype on PCB that demonstrates this scheme.
Finally, chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and summarizes possible future research
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