1,591 research outputs found
Constructive Provability Logic
We present constructive provability logic, an intuitionstic modal logic that
validates the L\"ob rule of G\"odel and L\"ob's provability logic by permitting
logical reflection over provability. Two distinct variants of this logic, CPL
and CPL*, are presented in natural deduction and sequent calculus forms which
are then shown to be equivalent. In addition, we discuss the use of
constructive provability logic to justify stratified negation in logic
programming within an intuitionstic and structural proof theory.Comment: Extended version of IMLA 2011 submission of the same titl
On formal aspects of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency
This paper reviews the central points and presents some recent developments of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency in terms of the preservation of evidence. Two formal systems are surveyed, the basic logic of evidence (BLE) and the logic of evidence and truth (LET J ), designed to deal, respectively, with evidence and with evidence and truth. While BLE is equivalent to Nelsonâs logic N4, it has been conceived for a different purpose. Adequate valuation semantics that provide decidability are given for both BLE and LET J . The meanings of the connectives of BLE and LET J , from the point of view of preservation of evidence, is explained with the aid of an inferential semantics. A formalization of the notion of evidence for BLE as proposed by M. Fitting is also reviewed here. As a novel result, the paper shows that LET J is semantically characterized through the so-called Fidel structures. Some opportunities for further research are also discussed
The First-Order Hypothetical Logic of Proofs
The Propositional Logic of Proofs (LP) is a modal logic in which the modality âĄA is revisited as [â[t]â]âA , t being an expression that bears witness to the validity of A . It enjoys arithmetical soundness and completeness, can realize all S4 theorems and is capable of reflecting its own proofs ( â˘A implies â˘[â[t]â]A , for some t ). A presentation of first-order LP has recently been proposed, FOLP, which enjoys arithmetical soundness and has an exact provability semantics. A key notion in this presentation is how free variables are dealt with in a formula of the form [â[t]â]âA(i) . We revisit this notion in the setting of a Natural Deduction presentation and propose a CurryâHoward correspondence for FOLP. A term assignment is provided and a proof of strong normalization is given.Fil: Steren, Gabriela. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Departamento de ComputaciĂłn; ArgentinaFil: Bonelli, Eduardo Augusto. Universidad Nacional de Quilmes. Departamento de Ciencia y TecnologĂa; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones CientĂficas y TĂŠcnicas; Argentin
On an Intuitionistic Logic for Pragmatics
We reconsider the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic [21]
regarded as a logic of assertions and their justications and its relations with classical
logic. We recall an extension of this approach to a logic dealing with assertions
and obligations, related by a notion of causal implication [14, 45]. We focus on
the extension to co-intuitionistic logic, seen as a logic of hypotheses [8, 9, 13] and on
polarized bi-intuitionistic logic as a logic of assertions and conjectures: looking at the
S4 modal translation, we give a denition of a system AHL of bi-intuitionistic logic
that correctly represents the duality between intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic,
correcting a mistake in previous work [7, 10]. A computational interpretation of cointuitionism
as a distributed calculus of coroutines is then used to give an operational
interpretation of subtraction.Work on linear co-intuitionism is then recalled, a linear
calculus of co-intuitionistic coroutines is dened and a probabilistic interpretation
of linear co-intuitionism is given as in [9]. Also we remark that by extending the
language of intuitionistic logic we can express the notion of expectation, an assertion
that in all situations the truth of p is possible and that in a logic of expectations
the law of double negation holds. Similarly, extending co-intuitionistic logic, we can
express the notion of conjecture that p, dened as a hypothesis that in some situation
the truth of p is epistemically necessary
Propositional Logics Complexity and the Sub-Formula Property
In 1979 Richard Statman proved, using proof-theory, that the purely
implicational fragment of Intuitionistic Logic (M-imply) is PSPACE-complete. He
showed a polynomially bounded translation from full Intuitionistic
Propositional Logic into its implicational fragment. By the PSPACE-completeness
of S4, proved by Ladner, and the Goedel translation from S4 into Intuitionistic
Logic, the PSPACE- completeness of M-imply is drawn. The sub-formula principle
for a deductive system for a logic L states that whenever F1,...,Fk proves A,
there is a proof in which each formula occurrence is either a sub-formula of A
or of some of Fi. In this work we extend Statman result and show that any
propositional (possibly modal) structural logic satisfying a particular
formulation of the sub-formula principle is in PSPACE. If the logic includes
the minimal purely implicational logic then it is PSPACE-complete. As a
consequence, EXPTIME-complete propositional logics, such as PDL and the
common-knowledge epistemic logic with at least 2 agents satisfy this particular
sub-formula principle, if and only if, PSPACE=EXPTIME. We also show how our
technique can be used to prove that any finitely many-valued logic has the set
of its tautologies in PSPACE.Comment: In Proceedings DCM 2014, arXiv:1504.0192
Deciding regular grammar logics with converse through first-order logic
We provide a simple translation of the satisfiability problem for regular
grammar logics with converse into GF2, which is the intersection of the guarded
fragment and the 2-variable fragment of first-order logic. This translation is
theoretically interesting because it translates modal logics with certain frame
conditions into first-order logic, without explicitly expressing the frame
conditions.
A consequence of the translation is that the general satisfiability problem
for regular grammar logics with converse is in EXPTIME. This extends a previous
result of the first author for grammar logics without converse. Using the same
method, we show how some other modal logics can be naturally translated into
GF2, including nominal tense logics and intuitionistic logic.
In our view, the results in this paper show that the natural first-order
fragment corresponding to regular grammar logics is simply GF2 without extra
machinery such as fixed point-operators.Comment: 34 page
Intuitionism and the Modal Logic of Vagueness
Intuitionistic logic provides an elegant solution to the Sorites Paradox. Its acceptance has been hampered by two factors. First, the lack of an accepted semantics for languages containing vague terms has led even philosophers sympathetic to intuitionism to complain that no explanation has been given of why intuitionistic logic is the correct logic for such languages. Second, switching from classical to intuitionistic logic, while it may help with the Sorites, does not appear to offer any advantages when dealing with the so-called paradoxes of higher-order vagueness. We offer a proposal that makes strides on both issues. We argue that the intuitionistâs characteristic rejection of any third alethic value alongside true and false is best elaborated by taking the normal modal system S4M to be the sentential logic of the operator âit is clearly the case thatâ. S4M opens the way to an account of higher-order vagueness which avoids the paradoxes that have been thought to infect the notion. S4M is one of the modal counterparts of the intuitionistic sentential calculus and we use this fact to explain why IPC is the correct sentential logic to use when reasoning with vague statements. We also show that our key results go through in an intuitionistic version of S4M. Finally, we deploy our analysis to reply to Timothy Williamsonâs objections to intuitionistic treatments of vagueness
Reasoning about Knowledge in Linear Logic: Modalities and Complexity
In a recent paper, Jean-Yves Girard commented that âit has been a long time since philosophy has stopped intereacting with logicâ[17]. Actually, it has no
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