Reallocation Problems in Agent Societies: A Local Mechanism to Maximize Social Welfare

Resource reallocation problems are common in real life and therefore gain an increasing interest in Computer Science and Economics. Such problems consider agents living in a society and negotiating their resources with each other in order to improve the welfare of the population. In many studies however, the unrealistic context considered, where agents have a flawless knowledge and unlimited interaction abilities, impedes the application of these techniques in real life problematics. In this paper, we study how agents should behave in order to maximize the welfare of the society. We propose a multi-agent method based on autonomous agents endowed with a local knowledge and local interactions. Our approach features a more realistic environment based on social networks, inside which we provide the behavior for the agents and the negotiation settings required for them to lead the negotiation processes towards socially optimal allocations. We prove that bilateral transactions of restricted cardinality are sufficient in practice to converge towards an optimal solution for different social objectives. An experimental study supports our claims and highlights the impact of a realistic environment on the efficiency of the techniques utilized.Resource Allocation, Negotiation, Social Welfare, Agent Society, Behavior, Emergence

Online Learning of Aggregate Knowledge about Non-linear Preferences Applied to Negotiating Prices and Bundles

In this paper, we consider a form of multi-issue negotiation where a shop negotiates both the contents and the price of bundles of goods with his customers. We present some key insights about, as well as a procedure for, locating mutually beneficial alternatives to the bundle currently under negotiation. The essence of our approach lies in combining aggregate (anonymous) knowledge of customer preferences with current data about the ongoing negotiation process. The developed procedure either works with already obtained aggregate knowledge or, in the absence of such knowledge, learns the relevant information online. We conduct computer experiments with simulated customers that have_nonlinear_ preferences. We show how, for various types of customers, with distinct negotiation heuristics, our procedure (with and without the necessary aggregate knowledge) increases the speed with which deals are reached, as well as the number and the Pareto efficiency of the deals reached compared to a benchmark.Comment: 10 pages, 5 eps figures, ACM Proceedings documentclass, Published in "Proc. 6th Int'l Conf. on Electronic Commerce ICEC04, Delft, The Netherlands," M. Janssen, H. Sol, R. Wagenaar (eds.). ACM Pres

BILATERAL TRADING AND THE CURSE OF KNOWLEDGE: AN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS STUDY

This research investigates the impact of reporting different kinds of trade information to buyers and sellers in laboratory markets, for which exchange is made through bilateral bargaining. Results suggest that public information may improve the bargaining position of buyers relative to sellers when there is spot delivery. In some cases sellers earn less than in a no information baseline. There is evidence of a curse of knowledge for sellers in our information experiments when quantity traded for the entire market is known. The mandatory price reporting of all trades does not improve the income of sellers.International Relations/Trade,

Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations

We experimentally compare first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations after introducing horizontal product differentiation into a standard procurement setting. The two institutions yield the buyer the same surplus, a difference from prior findings with homogeneous products that results from differentiation’s influence on the sellers’ pricing behavior. In particular, we find that introducing product differentiation intensifies price competition among the sellers in some treatments, and has no effect in others, which contrasts with the conventional wisdom that product differentiation softens competition.

Individual Tariffs for Mobile Services: Analysis of Operator Business and Risk Consequences

A design approach is offered for individual tariffs for mass customized mobile service products, whereby operators can determine their contract acceptance rules to guarantee with a set probability their minimum profit and risk levels. It uses realistic improvements to earlier reported negotiation algorithms [1], and a full operator operational model including infrastructure and content acquisition. Value at risk and profit are analyzed when a random user has consistent characteristics to a survey group, so that risk and profits are pooled. This analysis is necessary to give the supplier business guarantees to enter individual tariff agreements. A full numerical case is given for a class of mobile service.risks;mobile communication services;Individual tariffs

An Evolutionary Learning Approach for Adaptive Negotiation Agents

Developing effective and efficient negotiation mechanisms for real-world applications such as e-Business is challenging since negotiations in such a context are characterised by combinatorially complex negotiation spaces, tough deadlines, very limited information about the opponents, and volatile negotiator preferences. Accordingly, practical negotiation systems should be empowered by effective learning mechanisms to acquire dynamic domain knowledge from the possibly changing negotiation contexts. This paper illustrates our adaptive negotiation agents which are underpinned by robust evolutionary learning mechanisms to deal with complex and dynamic negotiation contexts. Our experimental results show that GA-based adaptive negotiation agents outperform a theoretically optimal negotiation mechanism which guarantees Pareto optimal. Our research work opens the door to the development of practical negotiation systems for real-world applications

Decision Support System for the Negotiation of Bilateral Contracts in Electricity Markets

The use of Decision Support Systems (DSS) in the eld of Electricity Markets (EM) is essential to provide strategic support to its players. EM are constantly changing, dynamic environments, with many entities which give them a particularly complex nature. There are several simulators for this purpose, including Bilateral Contracting. However, a gap is noticeable in the pre-negotiation phase of energy transactions, particularly in gathering information on opposing negotiators. This paper presents an overview of existing tools for decision support to the Bilateral Contracting in EM, and proposes a new tool that addresses the identied gap, using concepts related to automated negotiation, game theory and data mining.This work has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 641794 (project DREAM-GO) and grant agreement No 703689 (project ADAPT); and from FEDER Funds through COMPETE program and from National Funds through FCT under the project UID/EEA/00760/2013info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Teleoperation of passivity-based model reference robust control over the internet

This dissertation offers a survey of a known theoretical approach and novel experimental results in establishing a live communication medium through the internet to host a virtual communication environment for use in Passivity-Based Model Reference Robust Control systems with delays. The controller which is used as a carrier to support a robust communication between input-to-state stability is designed as a control strategy that passively compensates for position errors that arise during contact tasks and strives to achieve delay-independent stability for controlling of aircrafts or other mobile objects. Furthermore the controller is used for nonlinear systems, coordination of multiple agents, bilateral teleoperation, and collision avoidance thus maintaining a communication link with an upper bound of constant delay is crucial for robustness and stability of the overall system. For utilizing such framework an elucidation can be formulated by preparing site survey for analyzing not only the geographical distances separating the nodes in which the teleoperation will occur but also the communication parameters that define the virtual topography that the data will travel through. This survey will first define the feasibility of the overall operation since the teleoperation will be used to sustain a delay based controller over the internet thus obtaining a hypothetical upper bound for the delay via site survey is crucial not only for the communication system but also the delay is required for the design of the passivity-based model reference robust control. Following delay calculation and measurement via site survey, bandwidth tests for unidirectional and bidirectional communication is inspected to ensure that the speed is viable to maintain a real-time connection. Furthermore from obtaining the results it becomes crucial to measure the consistency of the delay throughout a sampled period to guarantee that the upper bound is not breached at any point within the communication to jeopardize the robustness of the controller. Following delay analysis a geographical and topological overview of the communication is also briefly examined via a trace-route to understand the underlying nodes and their contribution to the delay and round-trip consistency. To accommodate the communication channel for the controller the input and output data from both nodes need to be encapsulated within a transmission control protocol via a multithreaded design of a robust program within the C language. The program will construct a multithreaded client-server relationship in which the control data is transmitted. For added stability and higher level of security the channel is then encapsulated via an internet protocol security by utilizing a protocol suite for protecting the communication by authentication and encrypting each packet of the session using negotiation of cryptographic keys during each session

The effect of cost information on buyer-supplier negotiations in different power settings.

We investigate the influence of cost information on buyer-supplier negotiations in different power settings. Based on exchange theory, we expect that buyers with detailed cost information and less power than their opponent may try to (re)gain control over their own outcomes by sharing information. The results of our experiment indicate that the performance disadvantage of less powerful buyers is less pronounced when the buyer has detailed cost information and that this result can be explained by the buyer's negotiation behavior.Behavior; Control; Cost; Exchange; Information; Negotiations;

Can the Doha Round be a Development Round? Setting a Place at the Table

A fundamental objective of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations is to improve the trading prospects of developing countries. The 2001 declaration from the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, commits the member governments to negotiations aimed at substantial improvements in market access with a view to phasing out export subsidies, while embracing “special and differential treatment” for developing countries as an integral part of all elements of the negotiations. The main message of this paper comes in three parts. First, these stated aims are incompatible from the perspective of our economic analysis; thus, if these aims are pursued as stated, then we conclude that they are unlikely to deliver the meaningful trade gains for developing countries that the WTO membership seeks. Second, in attempting to integrate its developing country membership into the world trading system, the WTO may face a “latecomers” problem that, while occurring also in earlier rounds, is unprecedented in its scale in the Doha Round, and which could potentially account for the current impasse. And third, we argue that if the Round maintains its stated aims but moves away from the non-reciprocal special-and-differential treatment norm as the cornerstone of the approach to meeting developing country needs in the WTO, and if developing countries prepare, in markets where they are large, to come to the bargaining table and to negotiate reciprocally with each other and with developing nations, then it might be possible to break the impasse at Doha, to address the latecomers problem, and to deliver trade gains for developing countries.