A multi-agent based evolutionary algorithm in non-stationary environments

This article is posted here with permission of IEEE - Copyright @ 2008 IEEEIn this paper, a multi-agent based evolutionary algorithm (MAEA) is introduced to solve dynamic optimization problems. The agents simulate living organism features and co-evolve to find optimum. All agents live in a lattice like environment, where each agent is fixed on a lattice point. In order to increase the energy, agents can compete with their neighbors and can also acquire knowledge based on statistic information. In order to maintain the diversity of the population, the random immigrants and adaptive primal dual mapping schemes are used. Simulation experiments on a set of dynamic benchmark problems show that MAEA can obtain a better performance in non-stationary environments in comparison with several peer genetic algorithms.This work was suported by the Key Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 70431003, the Science Fund for Creative Research Group of the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 60521003, the National Science and Technology Support Plan of China under Grant No. 2006BAH02A09, and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council of the United Kingdom under Grant No. EP/E060722/1

Evolutionary Algorithms for Reinforcement Learning

There are two distinct approaches to solving reinforcement learning problems, namely, searching in value function space and searching in policy space. Temporal difference methods and evolutionary algorithms are well-known examples of these approaches. Kaelbling, Littman and Moore recently provided an informative survey of temporal difference methods. This article focuses on the application of evolutionary algorithms to the reinforcement learning problem, emphasizing alternative policy representations, credit assignment methods, and problem-specific genetic operators. Strengths and weaknesses of the evolutionary approach to reinforcement learning are presented, along with a survey of representative applications

Evolutionary Tournament-Based Comparison of Learning and Non-Learning Algorithms for Iterated Games

Evolutionary tournaments have been used effectively as a tool for comparing game-playing algorithms. For instance, in the late 1970's, Axelrod organized tournaments to compare algorithms for playing the iterated prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. These tournaments capture the dynamics in a population of agents that periodically adopt relatively successful algorithms in the environment. While these tournaments have provided us with a better understanding of the relative merits of algorithms for iterated PD, our understanding is less clear about algorithms for playing iterated versions of arbitrary single-stage games in an environment of heterogeneous agents. While the Nash equilibrium solution concept has been used to recommend using Nash equilibrium strategies for rational players playing general-sum games, learning algorithms like fictitious play may be preferred for playing against sub-rational players. In this paper, we study the relative performance of learning and non-learning algorithms in an evolutionary tournament where agents periodically adopt relatively successful algorithms in the population. The tournament is played over a testbed composed of all possible structurally distinct 2×2 conflicted games with ordinal payoffs: a baseline, neutral testbed for comparing algorithms. Before analyzing results from the evolutionary tournament, we discuss the testbed, our choice of representative learning and non-learning algorithms and relative rankings of these algorithms in a round-robin competition. The results from the tournament highlight the advantage of learning algorithms over players using static equilibrium strategies for repeated plays of arbitrary single-stage games. The results are likely to be of more benefit compared to work on static analysis of equilibrium strategies for choosing decision procedures for open, adapting agent society consisting of a variety of competitors.Repeated Games, Evolution, Simulation

Learning in evolutionary environments

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