20,102 research outputs found
Relativism, Faultlessness and Parity
Some philosophers, like Mark Richard and Paul Boghossian, have argued against relativism that it cannot account for the possibility of faultless disagreement. However, I will contend that the objections they moved against relativism do not target its ability to account for the possibility of faultless disagreement per se. Ra- ther, they should be taken to challenge its capacity to account for another element of our folk conception of disagreement in certain areas of discourseâwhat Cris- pin Wright has dubbed parity. What parity demands is to account for the possibil- ity of coherently appreciating, within a committed perspective, that our oppo- nentâs contrary judgement is somehow on a par with our own judgement. Under- stood in this way, Boghossianâs and Richardâs objections put indeed considerable pressure on relativismâor so I will argue. I will consider John MacFarlaneâs at- tempt to resist their objections and I will show that, once their arguments are properly understood as targeting parity, the attempt is not successful. In the last section of the paper I will offer a diagnosis of what is at the heart of the relativist inability to account for parityânamely its assumption of a monistic conception of the normativity of truth
The structure of thoughts
In this paper I examine one well-known attempt to justify the claim that thoughts are intrinsically structured, Evansâs justification of the Generality Constraint. I compare this with a rival account, proposed by Peaocke. I end by suggesting that a naĂŻve, Aristotelian realist has no difficulty at all in providing a justification of the Generality Constraint, which is therefore a view that deserves serious consideration
Knowledge-yielding communication
A satisfactory theory of linguistic communication must explain how it is that, through the interpersonal exchange of auditory, visual, and tactile stimuli, the communicative preconditions for the acquisition of testimonial knowledge regularly come to be satisfied. Without an account of knowledge-yielding communication this success condition for linguistic theorizing is left opaque, and we are left with an incomplete understanding of testimony, and communication more generally, as a source of knowledge. This paper argues that knowledge-yielding communication should be modelled on knowledge itself. It is argued that knowledge-yielding communication occurs iff interlocutors coordinate on truth values in a non-lucky and non-deviant way. This account is able to do significant explanatory work: it sheds light on the nature of referential communication, and it allows us to capture, in an informative way, the sense in which interlocutors must entertain similar propositions in order to communicate successfully
Why We Need Corpus Linguistics in Intuition-Based Semantics
The following method is popular in some areas of philosophy and linguistics when trying to describe the semantics of a given sentence Ί. Present ordinary speakers with scenarios that involve an utterance of Ί, ask them whether these utterances are felicitous or infelicitous and then construct a semantics that assigns the truth-value True to felicitous utterances of Ί and the truth-value False to infelicitous utterances of Ί. The author makes five observations about this intuition-based approach to semantics; their upshot is that it should be revised in favour of a more nuanced method. The author suggests that this method should be based on corpus linguistics and makes some tentative remarks about what it might look like and which questions we need to address in order to develop it
What we talk about when we talk about numbers
In this paper, I describe and motivate a new species of mathematical structuralism, which I call Instrumental Nominalism about Set-Theoretic Structuralism. As the name suggests, this approach takes standard Set-Theoretic Structuralism of the sort championed by Bourbaki and removes its ontological commitments by taking an instrumental nominalist approach to that ontology of the sort described by Joseph Melia and Gideon Rosen. I argue that this avoids all of the problems that plague other versions of structuralism
Analytic Metaphysics versus Naturalized Metaphysics: The Relevance of Applied Ontology
The relevance of analytic metaphysics has come under criticism: Ladyman & Ross, for instance, have suggested do discontinue the field. French & McKenzie have argued in defense of analytic metaphysics that it develops tools that could turn out to be useful for philosophy of physics. In this article, we show first that this heuristic defense of metaphysics can be extended to the scientific field of applied ontology, which uses constructs from analytic metaphysics. Second, we elaborate on a parallel by French & McKenzie between mathematics and metaphysics to show that the whole field of analytic metaphysics, being useful not only for philosophy but also for science, should continue to exist as a largely autonomous field
An alternative to Kitcher's theory of conceptual progress and his account of the change of the gene concept
The present paper discusses Kitcherâs framework for studying conceptual change and progress. Kitcherâs core notion of reference potential is hard to apply to concrete cases. In addition, an account of conceptual change as change in reference potential misses some important aspects of conceptual change and conceptual progress. I propose an alternative framework that focuses on the inferences and explanations supported by scientific concepts. The application of my approach to the history of the gene concept offers a better account of the conceptual progress that occurred in the transition from the Mendelian to the molecular gene than Kitcherâs theory
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AQUA: an ontology driven question answering system
This paper describes AQUA our question answering over the Web. AQUA was designed to work over heterogeneous sources. This means that AQUA is equipped to work as closed domain and in addition to open-domain question answering. As a first instance, AQUA tries to answer a question using a Knowledge base. If a query cannot be satisfied over a knowledge base/database. Then, AQUA tries to find an answer on web pages (i.e. it uses as corpus the internet as resource). Our system uses NLP (Natural Language Processing), First order logic and Information Extraction technologies. AQUA has been tested using an ontology which describes academic life. Keywords Ontologies, Information Extraction, Machine Learnin
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