The role of peers in estimating tenure-performance profiles: evidence from personnel data

In this paper, we estimate tenure-performance proles using unique panel data that containdetailed information on individual workers'' performance. We find that a 10 per cent increase intenure leads to an increase in performance of 5.5 per cent of a standard deviation. Thistranslates to an average performance increase of about 75 per cent within the first year of theemployment relationship. Furthermore, we show that there are peer effects in learning on-the-job:Workers placed in teams with more experienced and thus more productive peers performsignificantly better than those placed in teams with less experienced peers. An increase in theaverage team tenure by one standard deviation leads to an increase of 11 to 14 per cent of astandard deviation in performance.labour economics ;

Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts

This paper reports experimental evidence on a stylized labor market. The experiment is designed as a sequence of three phases. In the rst two phases, P1 and P2; agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects social and reciprocity concerns, together with their beliefs. In the last phase, P3; four principals, who face four teams of two agents, compete by o¤ering agents a contract from a xed menu. Then, each agent selects one of the available contracts (i.e. he "chooses to work" for a principal). Production is determined by the outcome of a simple effort game induced by the chosen contract. We nd that (heterogeneous) social preferences are signi cant determinants of choices in all phases of the experiment. Since the available contracts display a trade-of between fairness and strategic uncertainty, we observe that the latter is a much stronger determinant of choices, for both principals and agents. Finally, we also see that social preferences explain, to a large extent, matching between principals and agents, since agents display a marked propensity to work for principals with similar social preferences

Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts

This paper reports experimental evidence on a stylized labor market. The experiment is designed as a sequence of three phases. In the rst two phases, P1 and P2; agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects social and reciprocity concerns, together with their beliefs. In the last phase, P3; four principals, who face four teams of two agents, compete by o¤ering agents a contract from a xed menu. Then, each agent selects one of the available contracts (i.e. he "chooses to work" for a principal). Production is determined by the outcome of a simple effort game induced by the chosen contract. We nd that (heterogeneous) social preferences are signi cant determinants of choices in all phases of the experiment. Since the available contracts display a trade-of between fairness and strategic uncertainty, we observe that the latter is a much stronger determinant of choices, for both principals and agents. Finally, we also see that social preferences explain, to a large extent, matching between principals and agents, since agents display a marked propensity to work for principals with similar social preferences

Academic team formation as evolving hypergraphs

This paper quantitatively explores the social and socio-semantic patterns of constitution of academic collaboration teams. To this end, we broadly underline two critical features of social networks of knowledge-based collaboration: first, they essentially consist of group-level interactions which call for team-centered approaches. Formally, this induces the use of hypergraphs and n-adic interactions, rather than traditional dyadic frameworks of interaction such as graphs, binding only pairs of agents. Second, we advocate the joint consideration of structural and semantic features, as collaborations are allegedly constrained by both of them. Considering these provisions, we propose a framework which principally enables us to empirically test a series of hypotheses related to academic team formation patterns. In particular, we exhibit and characterize the influence of an implicit group structure driving recurrent team formation processes. On the whole, innovative production does not appear to be correlated with more original teams, while a polarization appears between groups composed of experts only or non-experts only, altogether corresponding to collectives with a high rate of repeated interactions