What do economists tell us about venture capital contracts?

Venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems and asymmetric information in an uncertain environment. All kinds of agency problems are present: moral hazard, adverse selection, hold-up problems, window dressing, etc. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists enter into contracts that influence their behavior and mitigate the agency costs. In particular, they select an appropriate kind and structure of financing and specify the rights as well as the duties of both parties. The typical features of venture capital investments are: an intensive screening and evaluation process, an active involvement of venture capitalists in their portfolio companies, a staging of capital infusions, the use of special financing instruments such as convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, syndication among venture capitalists, or a short investment horizon. --Venture Capital,Agency Costs

Equity Markets and Economic Development: What Do We Know

The objective of this paper is to review the transmission mechanisms uniting equity market development and economic growth in developing countries. We find that the theoretical impact of equity markets is ambiguous. At the domestic level, the allocation function of equity markets appears conditioned by the extent of informational efficiency. Turning to international linkages, theoretical models suggest that equity market integration lowers the cost of capital, increases financial vulnerability and has a mixed impact on capital flows. Taking this into account, two conclusions arise. First, equity market development policies should focus on reaching and maintaining adequate levels of institutional transparency. Second, the optimal degree of international integration depends on the society’s preference between international accessibility and domestic stability.Equity Markets, Economic Development.

Basel II and the German credit crunch?

(Abstract) In the market for German real estate finance at the end of 2001 a phenomenon could be identified that shows significant parallels to the shortening of credit supply in the US market in the early nineties, called the credit crunch. There are two basic reasons that explain the withdrawal of mortgage banks from the current events in real estate debt finance. Both are linked to a lack of risk identification in real estate investment. First, mortgage banks are engaged in a portfolio of bad real estate credits. In the past and today, banks do not receive information to price the true property risks. Especially from their money transfer to eastern Germany they still suffer of high deprecations in these engagements. The high impact of single properties can not be diversified. This is why banks were exposed to higher risks than they calculated in their market risk exposure. On the other hand, the preparation for Basel II indicates how sensitive risk have to be treated according to the new regulatory environment. This causes a split of relationship ties where real estate risks were not priced for decades. The result is a failure of all sorts of real estate finance in Germany. From the survey on institutional real estate investment behavior, it becomes evident that market participants ignore property risks and they do not have the instruments available to price these risks. This is why banks act so cautious in preparation for Basel II. Banks will have to find the instruments to either price these property risks or have intermediaries price them and include diversified securities into their holdings. True intermediaries are not present in German real estate finance. Banks failed in their function to price risk and monitor the quality of investors in debt finance. In addition, a lot of direct finance from households to real estate investors as open-ended or closedended funds takes place. We suggest the introduction of a real estate investment banking function that offers true intermediation services. It monitors the risk pricing of real estate investors and places the securitized and rated risk exposure at banks or in the capital market to provide finance to capital seekers. Future real estate investment would be financed risk-adjusted and financing volumes could increase again.

Portfolio optimization models for project valuation

This dissertation presents (i) a framework for selecting and managing a portfolio of risky multi-period projects, called Contingent Portfolio Programming (CPP), and (ii) an inverse optimization procedure that uses this framework to compute the value of a single project. The dissertation specifically examines a setting where the investor can invest both in private projects and securities in financial markets, but where the replication of project cash flows with securities is not necessarily possible. This setting is called a mixed asset portfolio selection (MAPS) setting. The valuation procedure is based on the concepts of breakeven selling and buying prices, which are obtained by first solving an optimization problem and then an inverse optimization problem. In the theoretical part of the dissertation, it is shown that breakeven prices are consistent valuation measures, exhibiting sequential consistency, consistency with contingent claims analysis (CCA), and sequential additivity. Due to consistency with CCA, the present approach can be regarded as a generalization of CCA to incomplete markets. It is also shown that, in some special cases, it is possible to derive simple calculation formulas for breakeven prices which do not require the use of inverse optimization. Further, it is proven that breakeven prices for a mean-variance investor converge towards the prices given by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as the investor's risk tolerance goes to infinity. The numerical experiments show that CPP is computationally feasible for relatively large portfolios both in terms of projects and states, and illustrate the basic phenomena that can be observed in a MAPS setting.reviewe

Corporate governance, moral hazard and conflict of interest in Italian universal banking, 1914-1933

Universal banking is widely held to enjoy comparative advantages in corporate finance. Recent theories of financial intermediation argue that 'insider systems' are better suited to effectively deal with long-term growth and moral hazard problems. However, little attention (if any) is usually paid to corporate governance problems that are specific to universal banking. How can banks' ownership structure and agency problems influence their ability to address longterm growth and moral hazard problems? Under which institutional arrangements, incentives and constraints can universal banking effectively realize its potential? The paper looks at such issues through the experience of interwar Italy. The evolution of universal banking in the 1920s emerges as heavily exposed to potentially serious problems of moral hazard and conflicts of interest, due to inefficient corporate governance, lack of external controls and a moral-hazard-enhancing institutional set-up. These factors may distort bank managers' incentives, affect strategic trade-offs and lead to unsound banking. The findings are consistent with that part of corporate governance literature which points to the potential for moral hazard and conflicts of interest inherent to universal banking and emphasise the conditional and historically-specific nature of its alleged benefits

Portfolio Selection in Multidimensional General and Partial Moment Space.

This paper develops a general approach for the single period portfolio optimization problem in a multidimensional general and partial moment space. A shortage function is defined that looks for possible increases in odd moments and decreases in even moments. A main result is that this shortage function ensures suffcient conditions for global optimality. It also forms a natural basis for developing tests on the infuence of additional moments. Furthermore, a link is made with an approximation of an arbitrary order of a general indirectutility function. This nonparametric effciency measurement framework permits to dfferentiate mainly between portfolio effciency and allocative effciency. Finally, information can,in principle, be inferred about the revealed risk aversion, prudence, temperance and otherhigher-order risk characteristics of investors.shortage function, efficient frontier, K-moment portfolios

Financial Intermediaries and Markets

A complex financial system comprises both financial markets and financial intermediaries. We distinguish financial intermediaries according to whether they issue complete contingent contracts or incomplete contracts. Intermediaries such as banks that issue incomplete contracts, e.g., demand deposits, are subject to runs, but this does not imply a market failure. A sophisticated financial system—a system with complete markets for aggregate risk and limited market participation—is incentive-efficient, if the intermediaries issue complete contingent contracts, or else constrained-efficient, if they issue incomplete contracts. We argue that there may be a role for regulating liquidity provision in an economy in which markets for aggregate risks are incomplete.

Why banks need commerce powers

Investment banking ; Securities ; Banks and banking - Germany ; Banks and banking - Japan

A Trojan horse or the golden fleece? small business investment companies and government guarantees

Profitability is a central concern when governments provide guarantees to increase the flow of funds to disadvantaged groups. We examine the profitability of small business investment companies (SBICs) that are chartered and regulated by the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) to finance the activities of small firms. We document, over the 1986-91 period, dismal performance by SBICs. Because SBICs have access to government-guaranteed funds, financial distress among SBICs can expose the SBA, and hence taxpayers, to losses. Using two alternative sample selection models, we examine the relationship between SBICs’ use of SBA funds and returns on equity (ROE) and survival probabilities. The first sample selection model is based on a model of failure/survival. The second selection model is based on our observation that many SBICs do not take advantage of SBA leverage: nearly one-third of SBICs use no leverage at all, and that figure rises to three-fifths for bank-owned SBICs. The results from our sample selection models indicate that SBA leverage--the amount of funds borrowed from the SBA as a percent of private capital--reduces ROE and the probability of survival. In addition, we find that the probability of using SBA leverage decreases for bank-owned SBICs relative to other SBICs and for highly profitable and efficient SBICs, while it increases for SBICs using debt to finance the activities of small firms. Thus, our results suggest that an SBIC’s performance is negatively correlated with SBA leverage.Small business

Are Foreign Banks Bad for Development Even If They Are Efficient? Evidence from the Indian Banking Industry

Most papers on banking focus on profitability and cost efficiency as measures of performance. In doing so, these papers ignore the fact that, unlike in the manufacturing and services sector industries, the long term viability of a bank depends more on its ability to assess credit worthiness of potential borrowers and provide credit, than on static measures of financial performance. At the same time, the political economy of economic growth and economic reforms cannot overlook the impact of ownership and reforms on credit infusion, which is a major determinant of economic growth. Specifically, there is widespread belief that while foreign banks are perhaps more efficient and profitable than domestic banks in emerging markets, these banks are content to ‘cherry pick’ and limit disbursal of loans. Using bank-level data from India, for six years (1995-96 to 2000-01), we show that given a favourable atmosphere involving economic reforms and banking sector liberalisation, as well as time needed to overcome the informational disadvantages vis a vis the domestic banks, foreign banks are willing to be aggressive in credit markets of emerging economies. The policy implication of our paper is that it provides a strong rationale for policy initiatives that encourages entry of foreign banks into emerging markets and the expansion of their activities in these economies.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40005/3/wp619.pd