Fault Tolerant Air Bubble Sensor using Triple Modular Redundancy Method

Detection of air bubbles in the blood is important for various medical treatments that use Extracorporeal Blood Circuits (ECBC), such as hemodialysis, hemofiltration and cardio-pulmonary bypass. Therefore a reliable air bubble detector is needed. In this study designed a fault tolerant air bubble detector. Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) method is used on the sensor section. A voter circuit of the TMR will choose one of three sensor output to be processed further. Application of TMR will prevent errors in the detection of air bubbles, especially if the sensor fails to work

Protecting the Viability of the Small Donor in Modern Elections

Campaign finance reform stands as one of the most important issues in today’s modern elections. From national to municipal contests, the influx of large donations places wealthy individuals—and interests—at odds with the average voter. Over the years, volumes of academic and legislative reforms have been proposed that encompass a wide range of electoral subject matter. From Citizens United to Federal Elections Commission (FEC) control mechanisms, solutions on how to change our campaign finance regulatory regime cover a large and diverse area of law and policy. However, the central theme throughout these reforms is maximizing transparency and curbing the undue influence of candidates through large donations

Revisiting Local Campaign Effects: An Experiment Involving Literature Mail Drops in the 2007 Ontario Election

An invariant feature of constituency election campaigns is the literature mail drop, usually a one-page leaflet or card left at the door profiling the candidate and appealing for electoral support. In this article, we report on a field experiment designed to assess the effects of such mail drops. The experiment was conducted during the 2007 Ontario provincial election campaign in the constituency of Cambridge and entailed distributing literature for the Green party candidate in that constituency. After randomly assigning constituency polls to treatment and control groups, and delivering the Green candidate’s partisan literature only to the selected treatment group polls, we compared the candidate’s support levels in the treated polls with those in the control group. Our research detected a modest effect associated with the literature drop. The effect was largely limited to constituency neighbourhoods fitting at least part of the Green party’s traditional demographic, that is, those with higher than average socio-economic status

What is Discrimination? Gender in the American Economic Association

Measuring market discrimination is extremely difficult except in the increasingly rare case where physical output measures allow direct measurement of productivity. We illustrate this point with evidence on elections to offices of the American Economic Association. Using a new technique to infer the determinants of the chances of observing a particular outcome when there are K choices out of N possibilities, we find that female candidates have a much better than random chance of victory. This advantage can be interpreted either as reverse discrimination or as reflecting voters' beliefs that women are more productive than observationally identical men in this activity. If the former this finding could be explained by the behavior of an unchanging median voter whose gender preferences were not satisfied by the suppliers of candidates for office; but there was a clear structural change in voting behavior in the mid-1970s. The results suggest that it is not generally possible to claim that differences in rewards for different groups measure the extent of discrimination or even its direction.

Evaluating a Voter Outreach Initiative

· This article describes an initiative designed to increase voting rates among low-income and ethnic groups in southern and central California communities. · A rigorous evaluation demonstrated that participation rates could be increased by up to 10% among these groups. · Using local, well-trained canvassers and making contact during the four weeks preceding the election were some of the more effective practices

U.S. Election Assistance Commission Urban-Rural Study: Final Report

In May, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission released a report comparing election administration in urban and rural jurisdictions. The survey uncovered more similarities than differences, in part because many small, urban jurisdictions have more in common with rural offices than with very large metropolitan ones. The size of the registered voter population seemed to influence administration more than did the degree of urbanization.The report was based on a national survey of local election administrators that focused on voter-outreach efforts and office personnel -- topics identified by a working group of election officials and researchers as likely to vary based on a jurisdiction's urbanization

A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria

It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice. Multiple game-theoretic models have been proposed to better understand and predict such behavior and the outcomes it induces. However, these models often make unrealistic assumptions regarding voters' behavior and the information on which they base their vote. We suggest a new model for strategic voting that takes into account voters' bounded rationality, as well as their limited access to reliable information. We introduce a simple behavioral heuristic based on \emph{local dominance}, where each voter considers a set of possible world states without assigning probabilities to them. This set is constructed based on prospective candidates' scores (e.g., available from an inaccurate poll). In a \emph{voting equilibrium}, all voters vote for candidates not dominated within the set of possible states. We prove that these voting equilibria exist in the Plurality rule for a broad class of local dominance relations (that is, different ways to decide which states are possible). Furthermore, we show that in an iterative setting where voters may repeatedly change their vote, local dominance-based dynamics quickly converge to an equilibrium if voters start from the truthful state. Weaker convergence guarantees in more general settings are also provided. Using extensive simulations of strategic voting on generated and real preference profiles, we show that convergence is fast and robust, that emerging equilibria are consistent across various starting conditions, and that they replicate widely known patterns of human voting behavior such as Duverger's law. Further, strategic voting generally improves the quality of the winner compared to truthful voting

Equality of Voice: Towards Fair Representation in Crowdsourced Top-K Recommendations

To help their users to discover important items at a particular time, major websites like Twitter, Yelp, TripAdvisor or NYTimes provide Top-K recommendations (e.g., 10 Trending Topics, Top 5 Hotels in Paris or 10 Most Viewed News Stories), which rely on crowdsourced popularity signals to select the items. However, different sections of a crowd may have different preferences, and there is a large silent majority who do not explicitly express their opinion. Also, the crowd often consists of actors like bots, spammers, or people running orchestrated campaigns. Recommendation algorithms today largely do not consider such nuances, hence are vulnerable to strategic manipulation by small but hyper-active user groups. To fairly aggregate the preferences of all users while recommending top-K items, we borrow ideas from prior research on social choice theory, and identify a voting mechanism called Single Transferable Vote (STV) as having many of the fairness properties we desire in top-K item (s)elections. We develop an innovative mechanism to attribute preferences of silent majority which also make STV completely operational. We show the generalizability of our approach by implementing it on two different real-world datasets. Through extensive experimentation and comparison with state-of-the-art techniques, we show that our proposed approach provides maximum user satisfaction, and cuts down drastically on items disliked by most but hyper-actively promoted by a few users.Comment: In the proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT* '19). Please cite the conference versio