Interference patterns: Literary study, scientific knowledge, and disciplinary autonomy after the two cultures

This project interrogates the claims made for the possibility of collapsing all the various disciplines into one discipline, probably physics, and surely a science, in the name of making clearer the relations between our various fields of knowledge. This is the aim of the radical reductionist, and I take E. O. Wilson's Consilience as exemplary of such attempts. Central to Wilson's method of achieving unity is the new science of evolutionary psychology - itself a re-working of the sociobiology with which Wilson first achieved notoriety. In the on-going project of explaining culture under a Darwinian description, the evolutionary psychologists have begun to suggest explanations for the popularity and content of narrative fiction. Because they are consonant with the rest of science, these biologistic accounts of fiction might be preferable to the accounts traditionally offered by Literary Studies. Consequently, there is a risk that the traditional practices of Literary Studies will be made redundant within the academy and gradually atrophy. The demand is that Literary Studies either makes itself rigorous like the sciences (as with such projects as Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism), or else forfeit its claims to produce knowledge. Aware of this threat, some literary critics embrace forms of relativism in an attempt to deny the unity or effectiveness of scientific knowledge and so neuter the threatened takeover. Among these forms of relativism, Richard Rorty's account seeks to collapse the hierarchy of disciplines and seemingly offers Literary Studies a means of retaining its distinctive approach without denying the effectiveness of scientific knowledge. I aim to show that Literary Studies need not become a science, and that such sciences as evolutionary psychology are neither as threatening as some had feared, nor as useful to literary study as some have hoped

Religion explained? : a philosophical appraisal of the cognitive science of religion

This study examines philosophically the main theories and methodological assumptions of the field known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR). The study makes a philosophically informed reconstruction of the methodological principles of the CSR, indicates problems with them, and examines possible solutions to these problems. The study focuses on several different CSR writers, namely, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber. CSR theorising is done in the intersection between cognitive sciences, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. This multidisciplinary nature makes CSR a fertile ground for philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. The study begins by spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary theories of CSR writers by situating these theories and assumptions in the nexus of existing approaches to religion. The distinctive feature of CSR is its emphasis on information processing: CSR writers claim that contemporary cognitive sciences can inform anthropological theorising about the human mind and offer tools for producing causal explanations. Further, they claim to explain the prevalence and persistence of religion by cognitive systems that undergird religious thinking. I also examine the core theoretical contributions of the field focusing mainly on the (1) “minimally counter-intuitiveness hypothesis” and (2) the different ways in which supernatural agent representations activate our cognitive systems. Generally speaking, CSR writers argue for the naturalness of religion: religious ideas and practices are widespread and pervasive because human cognition operates in such a way that religious ideas are easy to acquire and transmit. The study raises two philosophical problems, namely, the “problem of scope” and the “problem of religious relevance”. The problem of scope is created by the insistence of several critics of the CSR that CSR explanations are mostly irrelevant for explaining religion. Most CSR writers themselves hold that cognitive explanations can answer most of our questions about religion. I argue that the problem of scope is created by differences in explanation-begging questions: the former group is interested in explaining different things than the latter group. I propose that we should not stick too rigidly to one set of methodological assumptions, but rather acknowledge that different assumptions might help us to answer different questions about religion. Instead of adhering to some robust metaphysics as some strongly naturalistic writers argue, we should adopt a pragmatic and explanatory pluralist approach which would allow different kinds of methodological presuppositions in the study of religion provided that they attempt to answer different kinds of why-questions, since religion appears to be a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans over a variety of fields of special sciences. The problem of religious relevance is created by the insistence of some writers that CSR theories show religious beliefs to be false or irrational, whereas others invoke CSR theories to defend certain religious ideas. The problem is interesting because it reveals the more general philosophical assumptions of those who make such interpretations. CSR theories can (and have been) interpreted in terms of three different philosophical frameworks: strict naturalism, broad naturalism and theism. I argue that CSR theories can be interpreted inside all three frameworks without doing violence to the theories and that these frameworks give different kinds of results regarding the religious relevance of CSR theories.Tutkimus on filosofinen analyysi kognitiivisen uskontotieteen (KU) keskeisistä metodologisista periaatteista ja teorioista. Kognitiivinen uskontotiede on uskontotieteen suuntaus, jossa uskonnon yleistä luonnetta pyritään selittämään kognitiivisen psykologian ja evoluutiopsykologian välinein. Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on rekonstruoida KU:n metodologiset periaatteet, osoittaa niissä eräitä ongelmia ja tarjota näihin ongelmiin mahdollisia ratkaisuja. KU:n edustajista tarkastellaan erityisesti Scott Atrania, Justin Barrettia, Pascal Boyeria ja Dan Sperberiä. Tutkimus lähtee liikkeelle kuvaamalla KU:n keskeiset metodologiset periaatteet ja taustateoriat tarkastelemalla KU:n suhdetta muihin tapoihin lähestyä uskontoa tieteellisesti. Se, mikä erottaa KU:n muista, on keskittyminen ihmisen mielen tiedonkäsittelyn ominaisuuksiin: KU:n edustajien mukaan kognitiotieteet auttavat antropologista ja uskontotieteellistä teorianmuodostusta kohti uskonnollisten ilmiöiden kausaalista selittämistä. KU siis pyrkii selittämään uskonnon yleisiä piirteitä kiinnittämällä huomiota uskonnollisen ajattelun taustalla vaikuttaviin kognitiivisiin mekanismeihin. Tutkimus tarkastelee myös KU:n keskeisiä teorioita, joista huomion kohteena ovat (1) uskonnollisten ideoiden intuitionvastaisuus ja (2) yliluonnollisten toimijoiden merkittävä rooli uskonnollisessa ajattelussa. Yleisesti ottaen voidaan sanoa, että KU:n edustajien mukaan uskonto on luonnollista: uskonnolliset ideat ja käytännöt ovat laajalle levinneitä ja suhteellisen pysyviä, koska ihmisen tiedonkäsittely toimii niin, että uskonnolliset ideat on helppo omaksua ja välittää eteenpäin. Tutkimus nostaa esiin kaksi filosofista ongelmaa: KU:n selityksien alaa koskevan ongelman ja uskonnollisen relevanssin ongelman. Monet KU:n kriitikot ovat kiinnittäneet huomiota siihen, että KU:n teoriat eivät näytä selittävän uskontoa siinä mielessä, kun se on tavallisesti ymmärretty. KU:n edustajat sen sijaan ajattelevat, että kognitiiviset selitykset vastaavat itse asiassa suurimpaan osaan uskontoa koskevista kysymyksistämme. Tutkimus väittää, että tämä KU:n selityksien alaa koskeva epäselvyys johtuu siitä, että osapuolet etsivät vastauksia erilaisiin uskontoa koskeviin kysymyksiin. Lisäksi tutkimus pyrkii osoittamaan, että uskontoa tutkittaessa ei tulisi pitäytyä dogmaattisesti vain yhteen joukkoon metodologisia oletuksia, vaan tunnustaa erilaisten metodologisten oletukset tarve. Sen sijaan, että uskontotieteen olisi välttämättä sitouduttava johonkin selkeään metafyysiseen näkemykseen, jotkut KU:n naturalistiset edustajat ovat vaatineet, meidän tulisi omaksua käytännöllisempi ja pluralistisempi tapa selittää uskontoa. Uskonnollisen relevanssin ongelma koskee KU:n teorioiden uskonnollisia seurauksia. Jotkut kirjoittajat ovat väittäneet, että KU:n teoriat itse asiassa osoittavat, että uskonnolliset näkemykset ovat virheellisiä tai irrationaalisia. Toiset ovat taas käyttäneet KU:n teorioita osoittamaan, että uskonnolliset ideat ovat rationaalisia. Ongelma on kiinnostava, koska se paljastaa kummankin osapuolen taustaoletukset varsin hyvin. Tutkimus rekonstruoi kolme laajempaa kehystä, jonka sisällä KU:n teorioita voidaan tulkita: kova naturalismi (metodologinen ateismi), pehmeä naturalismi (metodologinen naturalismi) ja teismi. Perusväite on, että KU:n teorioita voidaan tulkita näiden kaikilla kolmella tavalla tekemättä väkivaltaa itse teorioille. Kunkin kehyksen sisällä KU:n teorioiden teologinen relevanssi on erilainen

Understanding creativity through memes and schemata

When it comes to the notion of creativity, both R. Dawkins and D. Dennett argue that creativity is a matter of random mutation, in the same way that genes randomly mutate. Neither Dennett nor Dawkins see anything else in the mimetic theory of creativity than a process of Darwinian evolution. However, this complete reliance upon the extension of evolution for understanding creativity needs to be supplemented by combining it with other ideas such as those of "schema theory," because creativity always occurs within a structured context and is not simply a matter of random mutation of ideas. Schema theory comes largely from the works of E.H Gombrich, who argued that "schemas" play a crucial role in how it is that we are able to be creative. He defines schemas as structure and traditions in society that help to convey the meaning of our creative efforts. Just as semantics needs syntax within language in order to formulate and convey meaning, so by analogy memes need schemas for the creation and expression of new ideas. Rather than being the antithesis of creativity, existing forms of expression and traditions are important for the creation of new ideas. This needs to be factored into any theory of creativity in order to account for the effect of the social context on creative endeavours in addition to a Darwinian account of memes. The unconscious processes at work within the brain that are involved in the generation of ideas and other creative products can be understood using the notion of a "generator", as originally conceived by D. Dennett. This notion goes beyond mere concrete Skinnerian behavioural trial and error. Within this generator, there appear to be at work processes such as those of bisociation and association, as discussed by A. Koestler, as well as processes such as the role of language, memory, generate-and-test and intentionality that must be acknowledged in addition to the syntactic operations of schemas and the replicating contents of memes. The operation of all of these ingredients within the generator, when understood together, can be seen as responsible for our ability to be creative

Becoming a Self: The past, present and future of selfhood

What makes us persons? Is it our bodies, our minds, or our consciousness? For centuries, philosophers have sought to answer these questions. While some believe humans are physical or biological, others claim we have an immaterial soul. This book proposes a new alternative. Selves were formed in evolution through connections and commitments to others when early hominins lived in tribal groups and developed languages. As humans learned to fulfill these commitments, they not only cultivated relationships but also created their personal identities. Their habits of responsibility established their characters and therefore their reputations within their communities. This naturalistic approach proposes that a self is defined by the history of its commitments to cultural and personal norms. While brain processes are required, the self is not some internal, private mind but primarily a role within its community. As technology advances, selfhood could in the future be enabled by electronic, quantum, or other non-biological means. So if a self is formed through norms, could artificial intelligence evolve to have self-identity

The External Tape Hypothesis: a Turing machine based approach to cognitive computation

The symbol processing or "classical cognitivist" approach to mental computation suggests that the cognitive architecture operates rather like a digital computer. The components of the architecture are input, output and central systems. The input and output systems communicate with both the internal and external environments of the cognizer and transmit codes to and from the rule governed, central processing system which operates on structured representational expressions in the internal environment. The connectionist approach, by contrast, suggests that the cognitive architecture should be thought of as a network of interconnected neuron-like processing elements (nodes) which operates rather like a brain. Connectionism distinguishes input, output and central or "hidden" layers of nodes. Connectionists claim that internal processing consists not of the rule governed manipulation of structured symbolic expressions, but of the excitation and inhibition of activity and the alteration of connection strengths via message passing within and between layers of nodes in the network. A central claim of the thesis is that neither symbol processing nor connectionism provides an adequate characterization of the role of the external environment in cognitive computation. An alternative approach, called the External Tape Hypothesis (ETH), is developed which claims, on the basis of Turing's analysis of routine computation, that the Turing machine model can be used as the basis for a theory which includes the environment as an essential part of the cognitive architecture. The environment is thought of as the tape, and the brain as the control of a Turing machine. Finite state automata, Turing machines, and universal Turing machines are described, including details of Turing's original universal machine construction. A short account of relevant aspects of the history of digital computation is followed by a critique of the symbol processing approach as it is construed by influential proponents such as Allen Newell and Zenon Pylyshyn among others. The External Tape Hypothesis is then developed as an alternative theoretical basis. In the final chapter, the ETH is combined with the notion of a self-describing Turing machine to provide the basis for an account of thinking and the development of internal representations

Rethinking emotion: New research in emotion and recent debates in cognitive science.

Cognitive science is currently the scene of a number of exciting debates. The so-called 'classical' approach, which has dominated the field since the 1950s, is increasingly being challenged on various fronts. Evolutionary psychologists and researchers in artificial life accuse classical cognitive scientists of ignoring the fact that natural cognition is not designed to solve abstract problems and prove theorems but to solve particular adaptive problems. Those working with a 'situated' view of the mind are challenging the classical commitment to internalism. Finally, proponents of dynamical approaches claim that the discrete models favoured by the classical approach are too coarse-grained and impute too much internal structure to the mind. In this thesis I argue that the 'non-classical' approaches are compatible with classical cognitive science, with the important proviso that compatibility comes in different kinds. In the final chapter I outline a vision of a comprehensive 'integrated non-classical cognitive science' that combines the three non-classical approaches into a single conceptual bundle. I illustrate these claims about cognitive science in general with reference to a particular field of research: the emotions. Emotions were ignored by most classical cognitive scientists, though some models of emotion were developed within the classical framework. These models, however, provided no way of distinguishing emotion from cognition. I argue that the non-classical approaches remedy this problem, and together provide a new way of thinking about the emotions which I dub 'the interruption theory'. Since the interruption theory borrows insights from all three of the non-classical forms of cognitive science, it serves as a good example of the integrated non-classical approach that I recommend for cognitive science in general

Where is cognition? Towards an embodied, situated, and distributed interactionist theory of cognitive activity

In recent years researchers from a variety of cognitive science disciplines have begun to challenge some of the core assumptions of the dominant theoretical framework of cognitivism including the representation-computational view of cognition, the sense-model-plan-act understanding of cognitive architecture, and the use of a formal task description strategy for investigating the organisation of internal mental processes. Challenges to these assumptions are illustrated using empirical findings and theoretical arguments from the fields such as situated robotics, dynamical systems approaches to cognition, situated action and distributed cognition research, and sociohistorical studies of cognitive development. Several shared themes are extracted from the findings in these research programmes including: a focus on agent-environment systems as the primary unit of analysis; an attention to agent-environment interaction dynamics; a vision of the cognizer's internal mechanisms as essentially reactive and decentralised in nature; and a tendency for mutual definitions of agent, environment, and activity. It is argued that, taken together, these themes signal the emergence of a new approach to cognition called embodied, situated, and distributed interactionism. This interactionist alternative has many resonances with the dynamical systems approach to cognition. However, this approach does not provide a theory of the implementing substrate sufficient for an interactionist theoretical framework. It is suggested that such a theory can be found in a view of animals as autonomous systems coupled with a portrayal of the nervous system as a regulatory, coordinative, and integrative bodily subsystem. Although a number of recent simulations show connectionism's promise as a computational technique in simulating the role of the nervous system from an interactionist perspective, this embodied connectionist framework does not lend itself to understanding the advanced 'representation hungry' cognition we witness in much human behaviour. It is argued that this problem can be solved by understanding advanced cognition as the re-use of basic perception-action skills and structures that this feat is enabled by a general education within a social symbol-using environment