Edit languages for information trees

We consider a simple set of edit operations for unordered, edge-labeled trees, called information trees by Dal Zilio et al in "A Logic You Can Count On". We define tree languages using the sheaves automata from Foster et al's "A Logic Your Typechecker Can Count On" which in turn are based on Dal Zilio et al and provide an algorithm for deciding whether a complex edit preserves membership in a tree language. This allows us to view sheaves automata and subsets of tree edits as edit languages in the sense of Hofmann et al's "Edit Lenses". They can then be used to instantiate the framework of edit lenses between such languages and model concrete examples such as synchronisation between different file systems or address directories

Religion, Capital social et réduction de la pauvreté au Cameroun: Le cas de la ville de Yaoundé

This paper inscribes itself in the logic of debates on the policies of poverty reduction which have been taking place for a decade now. The author evaluates the influence of social religious capital on the poverty of households in Cameroon and particularly in Yaounde. First he identifies the determinants of religious social capital on the basis of a composite indicator, obtained by taking into account the percentage of heads of families who respond affirmatively to the question: "Can you count on the financial support of your religious community, that is of its leaders or other members, in the form of a loan and/or a gift, in the case of illness, of the death of a family member, of a job loss or when you experience short-term financial difficulties ?" The performed estimations allow us to reach the conclusion that the answer to this question depends on the head of family's level of education, on the frequency of his/her perusal of the sacred book (the Bible or the Koran), on the frequency of his/her participation in meetings of his/her religious community and on the existence or the non-existence of a formal and/or informal system of support on which the head of family can count in unexpected situations. Afterwards the author makes use of three different models to estimate three indicators - of monetary poverty, of poverty of living conditions and of poverty of potentialities - on the basis of socioeconomic determinants and of religious variables which allow one to explain the level of resources of the religious social capital. The obtained results prove that these religious variables influence the poverty of households in Yaounde.social capital; poverty

Vagueness

In ordinary conversation, we describe all sorts of different things as vague: you can have vague plans, vague ideas and vague aches and pains. In philosophy of language, in contrast, it is parts of language – words, expressions and so on – that are said to be vague. One classic example of a vague term is the word ‘heap’. A single grain clearly does not make a heap, and a million grains (when arranged in the right way) does make a heap, but where exactly does the boundary lie? How many grains do you need to make a heap? There seems to be no precise answer to this question, and because the term is imprecise in this way, we call it vague. Vague terms are extremely common in natural language. The term ‘bald’ is vague, because there is no precise number of hairs that mark the boundary between ‘bald’ and ‘not bald’; the term ‘hot’ is vague because there is no precise temperature that something must reach to count as hot – and so on. As we have seen, adjectives can be vague, but so can nouns, adverbs and perhaps all parts of language. To find terms which are precise rather than vague, we need to look to the languages of logic and mathematics. We can use vague terms to construct paradoxes known as sorites paradoxes. From an obviously true premise, such as that a collection of 1 million grains (in a certain arrangement) is a heap, together with the claim that ‘heap’ has no sharp boundary, we can derive the absurd conclusion that just 1 grain counts as a heap. Any theory of vagueness must offer some solution to this paradox. Some of the most popular theories of vagueness include supervaluationism, the degree theory of truth and the epistemic theory, and many of the available theories demand a radical rethink of classical accounts of logic and language

INTRODUCING AN 150NM TECHNIQUE TO DECREASE AVERAGE POWER CONSUMPTION

In the present paper, we advise the style of the entire subtract or using GDI technique that will consume lesser power, exhibit greater speed therefore delivering a much better power delay product plus a reduced transistor count. Gate Diffusion Input (GDI) method is dependent on the effective use of an easy cell that you can use for low power digital circuits. This paper proposes the style of a power efficient, high-speed and occasional power full subtract or using Gate Diffusion Input (GDI) technique. The whole design continues to be performed in 150nm technology as well as on comparison having a full subtract or using the conventional CMOS transistors, transmission gates and Complementary Pass-Transistor Logic (CPL), correspondingly it's been discovered that there's a great deal of decrease in Average Power consumption (Pavg), delay time in addition to Power Delay Product (PDP). This process enables decrease in power consumption, propagation delay and transistor count of digital circuit. The technique may be used to minimize the amount of transistors when compared with conventional Complementary Pass-transistor Logic (CPL) and Dual Pass transistor Logic (DPL) CMOS design. Pavg is as little as 13.96nW as the delay time is discovered to be 18.02pico second therefore giving a PDP as little as 2.51x10-19 Joule for 1 volt power. Additionally for this there's a substantial decrease in transistor count when compared with traditional full subtract or employing CMOS transistors, transmission gates and CPL, accordingly implying minimization of area. The simulation from the suggested design continues to be transported in Tanner SPICE and also the layout continues to be developed in Micro wind

Logical realism and the metaphysics of logic

‘Logical Realism’ is taken to mean many different things. I argue that if reality has a privileged structure, then a view I call metaphysical logical realism is true. The view says that, first, there is ‘One True Logic’; second, that the One True Logic is made true by the mind‐and‐language‐independent world; and third, that the mind‐and‐language‐independent world makes it the case that the One True Logic is better than any other logic at capturing the structure of reality. Along the way, I discuss a few alternatives, and clarify two distinct kinds of metaphysical logical realism.Accepted manuscrip

Relating Weight Constraint and Aggregate Programs: Semantics and Representation

Weight constraint and aggregate programs are among the most widely used logic programs with constraints. In this paper, we relate the semantics of these two classes of programs, namely the stable model semantics for weight constraint programs and the answer set semantics based on conditional satisfaction for aggregate programs. Both classes of programs are instances of logic programs with constraints, and in particular, the answer set semantics for aggregate programs can be applied to weight constraint programs. We show that the two semantics are closely related. First, we show that for a broad class of weight constraint programs, called strongly satisfiable programs, the two semantics coincide. When they disagree, a stable model admitted by the stable model semantics may be circularly justified. We show that the gap between the two semantics can be closed by transforming a weight constraint program to a strongly satisfiable one, so that no circular models may be generated under the current implementation of the stable model semantics. We further demonstrate the close relationship between the two semantics by formulating a transformation from weight constraint programs to logic programs with nested expressions which preserves the answer set semantics. Our study on the semantics leads to an investigation of a methodological issue, namely the possibility of compact representation of aggregate programs by weight constraint programs. We show that almost all standard aggregates can be encoded by weight constraints compactly. This makes it possible to compute the answer sets of aggregate programs using the ASP solvers for weight constraint programs. This approach is compared experimentally with the ones where aggregates are handled more explicitly, which show that the weight constraint encoding of aggregates enables a competitive approach to answer set computation for aggregate programs.Comment: To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP), 2011. 30 page

Contingent composition as identity

When the necessity of identity is combined with composition as identity, the contingency of composition is at risk. In the extant literature, either NI is seen as the basis for a refutation of CAI or CAI is associated with a theory of modality, such that: either NI is renounced ; or CC is renounced. In this paper, we investigate the prospects of a new variety of CAI, which aims to preserve both NI and CC. This new variety of CAI is the quite natural product of the attempt to make sense of CAI on the background of a broadly Kripkean view of modality, such that one and the same entity is allowed to exist at more than one possible world. CCAI introduces a world-relative kind of identity, which is different from standard identity, and claims that composition is this kind of world-relative identity. CCAI manages to preserve NI and CC. We compare CCAI with Gibbard’s and Gallois’ doctrines of contingent identity and we show that CCAI can be sensibly interpreted as a form of Weak CAI, that is of the thesis that composition is not standard identity, yet is significantly similar to it

Belief dependence: How do the numbers count?

This paper is about how to aggregate outside opinion. If two experts are on one side of an issue, while three experts are on the other side, what should a non-expert believe? Certainly, the non-expert should take into account more than just the numbers. But which other factors are relevant, and why? According to the view developed here, one important factor is whether the experts should have been expected, in advance, to reach the same conclusion. When the agreement of two (or of twenty) thinkers can be predicted with certainty in advance, their shared belief is worth only as much as one of their beliefs would be worth alone. This expectational model of belief dependence can be applied whether we think in terms of credences or in terms of all-or-nothing beliefs

Entropy? Honest!

Here we deconstruct, and then in a reasoned way reconstruct, the concept of "entropy of a system," paying particular attention to where the randomness may be coming from. We start with the core concept of entropy as a COUNT associated with a DESCRIPTION; this count (traditionally expressed in logarithmic form for a number of good reasons) is in essence the number of possibilities---specific instances or "scenarios," that MATCH that description. Very natural (and virtually inescapable) generalizations of the idea of description are the probability distribution and of its quantum mechanical counterpart, the density operator. We track the process of dynamically updating entropy as a system evolves. Three factors may cause entropy to change: (1) the system's INTERNAL DYNAMICS; (2) unsolicited EXTERNAL INFLUENCES on it; and (3) the approximations one has to make when one tries to predict the system's future state. The latter task is usually hampered by hard-to-quantify aspects of the original description, limited data storage and processing resource, and possibly algorithmic inadequacy. Factors 2 and 3 introduce randomness into one's predictions and accordingly degrade them. When forecasting, as long as the entropy bookkeping is conducted in an HONEST fashion, this degradation will ALWAYS lead to an entropy increase. To clarify the above point we introduce the notion of HONEST ENTROPY, which coalesces much of what is of course already done, often tacitly, in responsible entropy-bookkeping practice. This notion, we believe, will help to fill an expressivity gap in scientific discourse. With its help we shall prove that ANY dynamical system---not just our physical universe---strictly obeys Clausius's original formulation of the second law of thermodynamics IF AND ONLY IF it is invertible. Thus this law is a TAUTOLOGICAL PROPERTY of invertible systems!Comment: 27 pages, 11 figures. Published in the journal "Entropy" in June 2016. Abstracts from referee's reports quoted right after the abstrac