The Integration of Connectionism and First-Order Knowledge Representation and Reasoning as a Challenge for Artificial Intelligence

Intelligent systems based on first-order logic on the one hand, and on artificial neural networks (also called connectionist systems) on the other, differ substantially. It would be very desirable to combine the robust neural networking machinery with symbolic knowledge representation and reasoning paradigms like logic programming in such a way that the strengths of either paradigm will be retained. Current state-of-the-art research, however, fails by far to achieve this ultimate goal. As one of the main obstacles to be overcome we perceive the question how symbolic knowledge can be encoded by means of connectionist systems: Satisfactory answers to this will naturally lead the way to knowledge extraction algorithms and to integrated neural-symbolic systems.Comment: In Proceedings of INFORMATION'2004, Tokyo, Japan, to appear. 12 page

"Meaning" as a sociological concept: A review of the modeling, mapping, and simulation of the communication of knowledge and meaning

The development of discursive knowledge presumes the communication of meaning as analytically different from the communication of information. Knowledge can then be considered as a meaning which makes a difference. Whereas the communication of information is studied in the information sciences and scientometrics, the communication of meaning has been central to Luhmann's attempts to make the theory of autopoiesis relevant for sociology. Analytical techniques such as semantic maps and the simulation of anticipatory systems enable us to operationalize the distinctions which Luhmann proposed as relevant to the elaboration of Husserl's "horizons of meaning" in empirical research: interactions among communications, the organization of meaning in instantiations, and the self-organization of interhuman communication in terms of symbolically generalized media such as truth, love, and power. Horizons of meaning, however, remain uncertain orders of expectations, and one should caution against reification from the meta-biological perspective of systems theory