A Grey-Box Approach to Automated Mechanism Design

Auctions play an important role in electronic commerce, and have been used to solve problems in distributed computing. Automated approaches to designing effective auction mechanisms are helpful in reducing the burden of traditional game theoretic, analytic approaches and in searching through the large space of possible auction mechanisms. This paper presents an approach to automated mechanism design (AMD) in the domain of double auctions. We describe a novel parametrized space of double auctions, and then introduce an evolutionary search method that searches this space of parameters. The approach evaluates auction mechanisms using the framework of the TAC Market Design Game and relates the performance of the markets in that game to their constituent parts using reinforcement learning. Experiments show that the strongest mechanisms we found using this approach not only win the Market Design Game against known, strong opponents, but also exhibit desirable economic properties when they run in isolation.Comment: 18 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables, and 1 algorithm. Extended abstract to appear in the proceedings of AAMAS'201

The river sharing problem: A review of the technical literature for policy economists

Water is essential for life. However, the basic problem of water resource allocation has been that water tends to be over-allocated. Demand for water exceeds the available supply. Essentially, the water economy is bankrupt. Bankruptcy problems have been almost exhaustively studied in the literature on economic theory-primarily from the perspective of cooperative game theory. The main concern of this literature has been how to fairly divide up the assets of a bankrupt entity. In water resource economics cooperative game theory has often been employed as a means of analyzing water resource allocation. It was only recently that the problem of directional flow was incorporated into such analyses. This has come to be known as the “river sharing problem” in the theoretical literature. Accounting for the direction of flow in water resource allocation problems has profound implications for policies that wish to facilitate both fair and efficient water allocations. This is the case whether proposed policies are interventionist or market based in nature. There is now a considerable literature on the allocation and distribution of water resources characterized by unidirectional flow. In this paper I critically review and appraise this literature with a view to making it more accessible to applied and policy economists. A key feature of the paper is that the connection between the bankruptcy literature, which has recently also realized the importance of flow, and the river sharing literature is discussed. The current state of the art in game theoretic models of water resource allocation with directional flow is discussed and implications and consequences for water resource policy highlightedRiver sharing problem, Bankruptcy, Cooperative game theory, Water resouyrce allocation, distributive justice

Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography

This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is continually updated on the webpage \url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail (\textit{[email protected]})

Optimal pricing for optimal transport

Suppose that $c(x,y)$ is the cost of transporting a unit of mass from $x\in X$ to $y\in Y$ and suppose that a mass distribution $\mu$ on $X$ is transported optimally (so that the total cost of transportation is minimal) to the mass distribution $\nu$ on $Y$. Then, roughly speaking, the Kantorovich duality theorem asserts that there is a price $f(x)$ for a unit of mass sold (say by the producer to the distributor) at $x$ and a price $g(y)$ for a unit of mass sold (say by the distributor to the end consumer) at $y$ such that for any $x\in X$ and $y\in Y$, the price difference $g(y)-f(x)$ is not greater than the cost of transportation $c(x,y)$ and such that there is equality $g(y)-f(x)=c(x,y)$ if indeed a nonzero mass was transported (via the optimal transportation plan) from $x$ to $y$. We consider the following optimal pricing problem: suppose that a new pricing policy is to be determined while keeping a part of the optimal transportation plan fixed and, in addition, some prices at the sources of this part are also kept fixed. From the producers' side, what would then be the highest compatible pricing policy possible? From the consumers' side, what would then be the lowest compatible pricing policy possible? In the framework of $c$-convexity theory, we have recently introduced and studied optimal $c$-convex $c$-antiderivatives and explicit constructions of these optimizers were presented. In the present paper we employ optimal $c$-convex $c$-antiderivatives and conclude that these are natural solutions to the optimal pricing problems mentioned above. This type of problems drew attention in the past and existence results were previously established in the case where $X=Y=R^n$ under various specifications. We solve the above problem for general spaces $X,Y$ and real-valued, lower semicontinuous cost functions $c$

Trade and harmonization : if your institutions are good, does it matter if they are different ?

Good institutional quality (function) and similar institutional design (form) can promote international trade by reducing transactions costs. The authors evaluate the relative importance of function versus form in a gravity model, using an indicator of different legal systems as a proxy for differences in form, together with indicators of overall institutional quality. They find that good institutions promote trade much more than similar legal systems and have much more explanatory power. This effect is economically large-up to 10 times the effect of different legal systems. Moreover, better infrastructure matters as much as good institutions.Legal Products,Trade Law,Economic Theory&Research,Transport and Trade Logistics,Common Carriers Industry