Proof-theoretic Semantics and Tactical Proof

The use of logical systems for problem-solving may be as diverse as in proving theorems in mathematics or in figuring out how to meet up with a friend. In either case, the problem solving activity is captured by the search for an \emph{argument}, broadly conceived as a certificate for a solution to the problem. Crucially, for such a certificate to be a solution, it has be \emph{valid}, and what makes it valid is that they are well-constructed according to a notion of inference for the underlying logical system. We provide a general framework uniformly describing the use of logic as a mathematics of reasoning in the above sense. We use proof-theoretic validity in the Dummett-Prawitz tradition to define validity of arguments, and use the theory of tactical proof to relate arguments, inference, and search.Comment: submitte

Defining Logical Systems via Algebraic Constraints on Proofs

We comprehensively present a program of decomposition of proof systems for non-classical logics into proof systems for other logics, especially classical logic, using an algebra of constraints. That is, one recovers a proof system for a target logic by enriching a proof system for another, typically simpler, logic with an algebra of constraints that act as correctness conditions on the latter to capture the former; for example, one may use Boolean algebra to give constraints in a sequent calculus for classical propositional logic to produce a sequent calculus for intuitionistic propositional logic. The idea behind such forms of reduction is to obtain a tool for uniform and modular treatment of proof theory and provide a bridge between semantics logics and their proof theory. The article discusses the theoretical background of the project and provides several illustrations of its work in the field of intuitionistic and modal logics. The results include the following: a uniform treatment of modular and cut-free proof systems for a large class of propositional logics; a general criterion for a novel approach to soundness and completeness of a logic with respect to a model-theoretic semantics; and a case study deriving a model-theoretic semantics from a proof-theoretic specification of a logic.Comment: submitte

Dagstuhl News January - December 2001

"Dagstuhl News" is a publication edited especially for the members of the Foundation "Informatikzentrum Schloss Dagstuhl" to thank them for their support. The News give a summary of the scientific work being done in Dagstuhl. Each Dagstuhl Seminar is presented by a small abstract describing the contents and scientific highlights of the seminar as well as the perspectives or challenges of the research topic

A 4-valued logic of strong conditional

How to say no less, no more about conditional than what is needed? From a logical analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions (Section 1), we argue that a stronger account of conditional can be obtained in two steps: firstly, by reminding its historical roots inside modal logic and set-theory (Section 2); secondly, by revising the meaning of logical values, thereby getting rid of the paradoxes of material implication whilst showing the bivalent roots of conditional as a speech-act based on affirmations and rejections (Section 3). Finally, the two main inference rules for conditional, viz. Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens, are reassessed through a broader definition of logical consequence that encompasses both a normal relation of truth propagation and a weaker relation of falsity non-propagation from premises to conclusion (Section 3)

How in the world?

....the final proof of God's omnipotence [is] that he need not exist in order to save us. Peter DeVries, The Mackerel Plaza Is it just me, or do philosophers have a way of bringing existence in where it is not wanted? All of the most popular analyses, it seems, take notions that are not overtly existence-involving and connect them up with notions that are existence-involving up to their teeth. An inference is valid or invalid according to whether or not there exists a countermodel to it; the Fs are equinumerous with the Gs iff there exists a one-to-one function between them; it will rain iff there exists a future time at which it does rain; and, of course, such and such is possible iff there exists a world at which such and such is the case. The problem with these analyses is not just the unwelcome ontology; it is more the ontology's intuitive irrelevance to the notions being analyzed. Even someone not especially opposed to functions, to-1- take that example, is still liable to feel uneasy about putting facts o