26,902 research outputs found
Public Evidence from Secret Ballots
Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique,
challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are
high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the
results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they
have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to
be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and
pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area
spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable
security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts:
convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to
convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person
voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this
tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1
The economics of coercion and conflict : an introduction
This chapter introduces the author’s selected papers on the economics of
coercion and conflict. It defines coercion and conflict and relates them. In
conflict, adversaries make costly investments in the means of coercion.
The application of coercion does not remove choice but limits it to options
that leave the victim worse off than before. Coercion and conflict are
always political, but a number of key concepts from economics can help
us understand them. These include rational choice, strategic interaction,
increasing and diminishing returns, scale and state capacity, surplus
extraction, and Type I errors. The chapter concludes that the economist’s
toolkit, although not complete, is useful
Cryptographic Protocols for Privacy Enhancing Technologies: From Privacy Preserving Human Attestation to Internet Voting
Desire of privacy is oftentimes associated with the intention to hide certain
aspects of our thoughts or actions due to some illicit activity. This is a
narrow understanding of privacy, and a marginal fragment of the motivations
for undertaking an action with a desired level of privacy. The right for not
being subject to arbitrary interference of our privacy is part of the universal
declaration of human rights (Article 12) and, above that, a requisite for
our freedom. Developing as a person freely, which results in the development
of society, requires actions to be done without a watchful eye. While
the awareness of privacy in the context of modern technologies is not widely
spread, it is clearly understood, as can be seen in the context of elections,
that in order to make a free choice one needs to maintain its privacy. So
why demand privacy when electing our government, but not when selecting
our daily interests, books we read, sites we browse, or persons we encounter?
It is popular belief that the data that we expose of ourselves would not be
exploited if one is a law-abiding citizen. No further from the truth, as this
data is used daily for commercial purposes: users’ data has value. To make
matters worse, data has also been used for political purposes without the
user’s consent or knowledge. However, the benefits that data can bring to
individuals seem endless and a solution of not using this data at all seems
extremist. Legislative efforts have tried, in the past years, to provide mechanisms
for users to decide what is done with their data and define a framework
where companies can use user data, but always under the consent of the latter.
However, these attempts take time to take track, and have unfortunately
not been very successful since their introduction.
In this thesis we explore the possibility of constructing cryptographic protocols
to provide a technical, rather than legislative, solution to the privacy
problem. In particular we focus on two aspects of society: browsing and
internet voting. These two events shape our lives in one way or another, and
require high levels of privacy to provide a safe environment for humans to
act upon them freely. However, these two problems have opposite solutions.
On the one hand, elections are a well established event in society that has
been around for millennia, and privacy and accountability are well rooted
requirements for such events. This might be the reason why its digitalisation
is something which is falling behind with respect to other acts of our society
(banking, shopping, reading, etc). On the other hand, browsing is a recently
introduced action, but that has quickly taken track given the amount of possibilities
that it opens with such ease. We now have access to whatever we
can imagine (except for voting) at the distance of a click. However, the data
that we generate while browsing is extremely sensitive, and most of it is disclosed to third parties under the claims of making the user experience better
(targeted recommendations, ads or bot-detection).
Chapter 1 motivates why resolving such a problem is necessary for the
progress of digital society. It then introduces the problem that this thesis
aims to resolve, together with the methodology. In Chapter 2 we introduce
some technical concepts used throughout the thesis. Similarly, we expose the
state-of-the-art and its limitations.
In Chapter 3 we focus on a mechanism to provide private browsing. In
particular, we focus on how we can provide a safer, and more private way, for
human attestation. Determining whether a user is a human or a bot is important
for the survival of an online world. However, the existing mechanisms
are either invasive or pose a burden to the user. We present a solution that
is based on a machine learning model to distinguish between humans and
bots that uses natural events of normal browsing (such as touch the screen
of a phone) to make its prediction. To ensure that no private data leaves
the user’s device, we evaluate such a model in the device rather than sending
the data over the wire. To provide insurance that the expected model has
been evaluated, the user’s device generates a cryptographic proof. However
this opens an important question. Can we achieve a high level of accuracy
without resulting in a noneffective battery consumption? We provide a positive
answer to this question in this work, and show that a privacy-preserving
solution can be achieved while maintaining the accuracy high and the user’s
performance overhead low.
In Chapter 4 we focus on the problem of internet voting. Internet voting
means voting remotely, and therefore in an uncontrolled environment.
This means that anyone can be voting under the supervision of a coercer,
which makes the main goal of the protocols presented to be that of coercionresistance.
We need to build a protocol that allows a voter to escape the
act of coercion. We present two proposals with the main goal of providing
a usable, and scalable coercion resistant protocol. They both have different
trade-offs. On the one hand we provide a coercion resistance mechanism
that results in linear filtering, but that provides a slightly weaker notion of
coercion-resistance. Secondly, we present a mechanism with a slightly higher
complexity (poly-logarithmic) but that instead provides a stronger notion of
coercion resistance. Both solutions are based on a same idea: allowing the
voter to cast several votes (such that only the last one is counted) in a way
that cannot be determined by a coercer.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we conclude the thesis, and expose how our results
push one step further the state-of-the-art. We concisely expose our contributions,
and describe clearly what are the next steps to follow. The results
presented in this work argue against the two main claims against privacy preserving solutions: either that privacy is not practical or that higher levels
of privacy result in lower levels of security.Programa de Doctorado en Ciencia y Tecnología Informática por la Universidad Carlos III de MadridPresidente: Agustín Martín Muñoz.- Secretario: José María de Fuentes García-Romero de Tejada.- Vocal: Alberto Peinado Domíngue
Power Processes in Bargaining
This is a theoretical article that integrates and extends a particular program of work on power in bargaining relationships. Power is conceptualized as a structurally based capability, and power use as tactical action falling within either conciliatory or hostile categories. The core propositions are (1) the greater the total amount of power in a relationship, the greater the use of conciliatory tactics and the lower the use of hostile tactics; and (2) an unequal power relationship fosters more use of hostile tactics and less use of conciliatory tactics than an equal power relationship. Distinct research on power dependence and bilateral deterrence provides support for both propositions. Implications are discussed for power struggle in ongoing relationships
An Introduction to Destructive Coordination
Polanyi (1944, [1957] 1968) has distinguished three 'patterns of social integration,' namely 'reciprocity', 'redistribution' and 'exchange.' This triad has provided the starting point for most subsequent discussion. Our purpose is to introduce a further type of coordination, the 'destructive mode of coordination'. This mode achieves coordination by intimidation, threat, and the use of non-institutionalized coercive means. Resources and human efforts are allocated in order to appropriate what other people produce. Two simple examples provide an introductory illustration, traffic circles (roundabouts) and prisons. Appropriation through pirating provides a further example of destructive coordination. More specifically, biopiracy (blood patenting) is discussed in order to clarify the relationship between destructive coordination and the institutionalization of property rights. Finally, we focus on the role of destructive coordination as a transitional mechanism that is supported by the institutional vacuum ultimately yielding to other modes of coordination.mode of coordination, destructive coordination, institutional vacuum, biopiracy, indeterminate property rights
Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World
Privacy and surveillance scholars increasingly worry that data collectors can use the information they gather about our behaviors, preferences, interests, incomes, and so on to manipulate us. Yet what it means, exactly, to manipulate someone, and how we might systematically distinguish cases of manipulation from other forms of influence—such as persuasion and coercion—has not been thoroughly enough explored in light of the unprecedented capacities that information technologies and digital media enable. In this paper, we develop a definition of manipulation that addresses these enhanced capacities, investigate how information technologies facilitate manipulative practices, and describe the harms—to individuals and to social institutions—that flow from such practices.
We use the term “online manipulation” to highlight the particular class of manipulative practices enabled by a broad range of information technologies. We argue that at its core, manipulation is hidden influence—the covert subversion of another person’s decision-making power. We argue that information technology, for a number of reasons, makes engaging in manipulative practices significantly easier, and it makes the effects of such practices potentially more deeply debilitating. And we argue that by subverting another person’s decision-making power, manipulation undermines his or her autonomy. Given that respect for individual autonomy is a bedrock principle of liberal democracy, the threat of online manipulation is a cause for grave concern
Law As Culture
This Essay is an attempt to theorize the relationship of law to culture and culture to law beyond the intuitive, commonplace sense that law partakes of culture - by reflecting it as well as by reacting against it - and that culture refracts law. It proposes a theory of law as culture that, in detailing the mutually constitutive nature of the relationship, distinguishes itself from the way law and culture have been conceived by realist and critical legal scholars, as well as by social norms writers. The Essay concludes by speculating about one possible method by which this theorizing might be analytically employed in a cultural interpretation of law
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