Cost-Aware Green Cellular Networks with Energy and Communication Cooperation

Energy cost of cellular networks is ever-increasing to match the surge of wireless data traffic, and the saving of this cost is important to reduce the operational expenditure (OPEX) of wireless operators in future. The recent advancements of renewable energy integration and two-way energy flow in smart grid provide potential new solutions to save the cost. However, they also impose challenges, especially on how to use the stochastically and spatially distributed renewable energy harvested at cellular base stations (BSs) to reliably supply time- and space-varying wireless traffic over cellular networks. To overcome these challenges, in this article we present three approaches, namely, {\emph{energy cooperation, communication cooperation, and joint energy and communication cooperation}}, in which different BSs bidirectionally trade or share energy via the aggregator in smart grid, and/or share wireless resources and shift loads with each other to reduce the total energy cost.Comment: Submitted for possible publicatio

Secure wireless powered and cooperative jamming D2D communications

This paper investigates a secure wireless-powered device-to-device (D2D) communication network in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, where a hybrid base station (BS) in a cellular network not only provides power wirelessly for the D2D transmitter to guarantee power efficiency for the D2D network, but also serves as a cooperative jammer (CJ) to interfere with the eavesdroppers. The cellular and D2D networks can belong to different service providers, which means that the D2D transmitter would need to pay for the energy service released by the hybrid BS to guarantee secure D2D communication. In order to exploit the hierarchical interaction between the BS and the D2D transmitter, we first formulate a Stackelberg game based energy trading scheme, where the quadratic energy cost model is considered. Then, a non-energy trading based Stackelberg game is investigated to study the reversed roles of the BS and the D2D users. For comparison, we also formulate and resolve the social welfare optimization problem. We derive the closed-form Stackelberg equilibriums of the formulated games and the optimal solutions for the social welfare optimization problem. Simulation results are provided to validate our proposed schemes to highlight the importance of energy trading interaction between cellular and D2D networks

Secure wireless powered and cooperative jamming D2D communications

This paper investigates a secure wireless-powered device-to-device (D2D) communication network in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, where a hybrid base station (BS) in a cellular network not only provides power wirelessly for the D2D transmitter to guarantee power efficiency for the D2D network, but also serves as a cooperative jammer (CJ) to interfere with the eavesdroppers. The cellular and D2D networks can belong to different service providers, which means that the D2D transmitter would need to pay for the energy service released by the hybrid BS to guarantee secure D2D communication. In order to exploit the hierarchical interaction between the BS and the D2D transmitter, we first formulate a Stackelberg game based energy trading scheme, where the quadratic energy cost model is considered. Then, a non-energy trading based Stackelberg game is investigated to study the reversed roles of the BS and the D2D users. For comparison, we also formulate and resolve the social welfare optimization problem. We derive the closed-form Stackelberg equilibriums of the formulated games and the optimal solutions for the social welfare optimization problem. Simulation results are provided to validate our proposed schemes to highlight the importance of energy trading interaction between cellular and D2D networks

Wireless-powered cooperative communications: protocol design, performance analysis and resource allocation

Radio frequency (RF) energy transfer technique has attracted much attention and has recently been regarded as a key enabling technique for wireless-powered communications. However, the high attenuation of RF energy transfer over distance has greatly limited the performance and applications of WPCNs in practical scenarios. To overcome this essential hurdle, in this thesis we propose to combat the propagation attenuation by incorporating cooperative communication techniques in WPCNs. This opens a new paradigm named wireless-powered cooperative communication and raises many new research opportunities with promising applications. In this thesis, we focus on the novel protocol design, performance analysis and resource allocation of wireless-powered cooperative communication networks (WPCCNs). We first propose a harvest-then-cooperate (HTC) protocol for WPCCNs, where the wireless-powered source and relay(s) harvest energy from the AP in the downlink (DL) and work cooperatively in the uplink (UL) for transmitting source information. The average throughput performance of the HTC protocol with two single relay selection schemes is analyzed. We then design two novel protocols and study the optimal resource allocation for another setup of WPCCNs with a hybrid relay that has a constant power supply. Besides cooperating with the source for UL information transmission, the hybrid relay also transmits RF energy concurrently with the AP during the DL energy transfer phase. Subsequently, we adopt the Stackelberg game to model the strategic interactions in power beacon (PB)-assisted WPCCNs, where PBs are deployed to provide wireless charging services to wireless-powered users via RF energy transfer and are installed by different operators with the AP. Finally, we develop a distributed power splitting framework using non-cooperative game theory for a large-scale WPCCN, where multiple source-destination pairs communicate through their dedicated wireless-powered relays

Energy sustainable paradigms and methods for future mobile networks: A survey

In this survey, we discuss the role of energy in the design of future mobile networks and, in particular, we advocate and elaborate on the use of energy harvesting (EH) hardware as a means to decrease the environmental footprint of 5G technology. To take full advantage of the harvested (renewable) energy, while still meeting the quality of service required by dense 5G deployments, suitable management techniques are here reviewed, highlighting the open issues that are still to be solved to provide eco-friendly and cost-effective mobile architectures. Several solutions have recently been proposed to tackle capacity, coverage and efficiency problems, including: C-RAN, Software Defined Networking (SDN) and fog computing, among others. However, these are not explicitly tailored to increase the energy efficiency of networks featuring renewable energy sources, and have the following limitations: (i) their energy savings are in many cases still insufficient and (ii) they do not consider network elements possessing energy harvesting capabilities. In this paper, we systematically review existing energy sustainable paradigms and methods to address points (i) and (ii), discussing how these can be exploited to obtain highly efficient, energy self-sufficient and high capacity networks. Several open issues have emerged from our review, ranging from the need for accurate energy, transmission and consumption models, to the lack of accurate data traffic profiles, to the use of power transfer, energy cooperation and energy trading techniques. These challenges are here discussed along with some research directions to follow for achieving sustainable 5G systems.Comment: Accepted by Elsevier Computer Communications, 21 pages, 9 figure

A Stackelberg-game approach for disaster-recovery communications utilizing cooperative D2D

In this paper, we investigate disaster-recovery com- munications utilizing two-cell cooperative D2D communications. Specifically, one cell is in a healthy area while the other is in a disaster area. A user equipment (UE) in the healthy area aims to assist a UE in the disaster area to recover wireless information transfer (WIT) via an energy harvesting (EH) relay. In the healthy area, the cellular BS shares the spectrum with the UE, however, both of them may belong to different service providers. Thus, the UE pays an amount of price as incentive to the BS as part of two processes: energy trading and interference pricing. We formulate these two processes as two Stackelberg games, where their equilibrium is derived as closed- form solutions. The results help provide a sustainable framework for disaster recovery when the involving parties juggle between energy trading, interference compromise and payment incentives in establishing communications during the recovery process

A Stackelberg-game approach for disaster-recovery communications utilizing cooperative D2D

In this paper, we investigate disaster-recovery com- munications utilizing two-cell cooperative D2D communications. Specifically, one cell is in a healthy area while the other is in a disaster area. A user equipment (UE) in the healthy area aims to assist a UE in the disaster area to recover wireless information transfer (WIT) via an energy harvesting (EH) relay. In the healthy area, the cellular BS shares the spectrum with the UE, however, both of them may belong to different service providers. Thus, the UE pays an amount of price as incentive to the BS as part of two processes: energy trading and interference pricing. We formulate these two processes as two Stackelberg games, where their equilibrium is derived as closed- form solutions. The results help provide a sustainable framework for disaster recovery when the involving parties juggle between energy trading, interference compromise and payment incentives in establishing communications during the recovery process