5,884 research outputs found
Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches
Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy
management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the
network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This
poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process
of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to
participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving
different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process
needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can
ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an
overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a
feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various
games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification
to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy
research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key
features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the
paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models
that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important
finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac
Social Interactions and Economic Behavior
This paper is a critical introduction to the new wave of economic literature on the effect of social interactions on individual behavior and aggregate economic outcomes. I refer to this research program, also known as new social economics, as the socioeconomic analysis of behavior, to distinguish it from the more popular economic analysis of social behavior. I discuss the main features of so-called interactions-based models, and I show how they help us to understand substantive economic phenomena. In order to restrict the focus, I choose five possible applications: matching in the labor market, welfare participation, poverty traps and inequality, investor behavior, and consumer behavior. Then I dwell upon two key undecided questions: (i) why economic behavior is affected by social interactions, and (ii) how the social context is shaped by rational individuals. Finally, I briefly discuss the main empirical routes so far used.new social economics, social interactions, neighborhood effects, social networks, social norms, social multiplier
Mechanisms of Endogenous Institutional Change
This paper proposes an analytical-cum-conceptual framework for understanding the nature of institutions as well as their changes. In doing so, it attempts to achieve two things: First, it proposes a way to reconcile an equilibrium (endogenous) view of institutions with the notion of agents’ bounded rationality by introducing such concepts as a summary representation of equilibrium as common knowledge of agents. Second, it specifies some generic mechanisms of institutional coherence and change -- overlapping social embededdness, Schumpeterian innovation in bundling games and dynamic institutional complementarities -- useful for understanding the dynamic interactions of economic, political, social and organizational factors.
Strategic maritime container transport design in oligopolistic markets
AbstractThis paper considers the maritime container assignment problem in a market setting with two competing firms. Given a series of known, exogenous demands for service between pairs of ports, each company is free to design a liner service network serving a subset of the ports and demand, subject to the size of their fleets and the potential for profit. The model is designed as a three-stage complete information game: in the first stage, the firms simultaneously invest in their fleet; in the second stage, they individually design their networks and solve the route assignment problem with respect to the transport demand they expect to serve, given the fleet determined in the first stage; in the final stage, the firms compete in terms of freight rates on each origin-destination movement. The game is solved by backward induction. Numerical solutions are provided to characterize the equilibria of the game
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