A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks.

Ma Tianbai.Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2004.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 49-51).Abstracts in English and Chinese.Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1Chapter 2 --- Incentive P2P System Overview --- p.6Chapter 3 --- Resource Distribution Mechanism --- p.11Chapter 4 --- Resource Competition Game --- p.22Chapter 4.1 --- Theoretical Competition Game --- p.22Chapter 4.2 --- Practical Competition Game Protocol --- p.26Chapter 5 --- Generalized Mechanism and Game --- p.33Chapter 5.1 --- Generalized Mechanism with Incentive --- p.33Chapter 5.2 --- Generalized Mechanism with Utility --- p.35Chapter 6 --- Experiments --- p.38Chapter 7 --- Conclusion --- p.4

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives in Content Production and Sharing over Peer-to-Peer Networks

User-generated content can be distributed at a low cost using peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, but the free-rider problem hinders the utilization of P2P networks. In order to achieve an efficient use of P2P networks, we investigate fundamental issues on incentives in content production and sharing using game theory. We build a basic model to analyze non-cooperative outcomes without an incentive scheme and then use different game formulations derived from the basic model to examine five incentive schemes: cooperative, payment, repeated interaction, intervention, and enforced full sharing. The results of this paper show that 1) cooperative peers share all produced content while non-cooperative peers do not share at all without an incentive scheme; 2) a cooperative scheme allows peers to consume more content than non-cooperative outcomes do; 3) a cooperative outcome can be achieved among non-cooperative peers by introducing an incentive scheme based on payment, repeated interaction, or intervention; and 4) enforced full sharing has ambiguous welfare effects on peers. In addition to describing the solutions of different formulations, we discuss enforcement and informational requirements to implement each solution, aiming to offer a guideline for protocol designers when designing incentive schemes for P2P networks.Comment: 31 pages, 3 figures, 1 tabl

Mathematical modeling of incentive policies in P2P systems.

Zhao, Qiao.Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 35-36).Abstracts also in Chinese.Abstract --- p.iAcknowledgement --- p.vChapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1Chapter 2 --- Model Description --- p.3Chapter 2.1 --- An Incentive Model for P2P Networks --- p.3Chapter 2.2 --- Learning Models for P2P Networks --- p.5Chapter 2.2.1 --- Current-best Learning Model (CBLM) --- p.5Chapter 2.2.2 --- Opportunistic Learning Model (OLM) --- p.6Chapter 2.3 --- Incentive Policies for P2P Networks --- p.7Chapter 2.3.1 --- Mirror Incentive Policy Vmirror --- p.8Chapter 2.3.2 --- Proportional Incentive Policy Vprop --- p.9Chapter 2.3.3 --- Linear Incentive Policy Class CLIP --- p.9Chapter 2.4 --- Performance and Robustness of Incentive Policies --- p.10Chapter 2.4.1 --- Robustness Analysis of Mirror Incentive Policy using the current-best learning method --- p.10Chapter 2.4.2 --- Robustness Analysis of Mirror Incentive Policy using the opportunistic learning method --- p.12Chapter 2.4.3 --- Robustness Analysis of Proportional Incentive Policy Using the current-best learning method --- p.12Chapter 2.4.4 --- Robustness Analysis of Proportional Incentive Policy Using the opportunistic learning method --- p.13Chapter 2.4.5 --- Robustness Analysis for Incentive Protocol in the Linear Incentive Class --- p.14Chapter 2.5 --- Connection with Evolutionary Game Theory --- p.17Chapter 3 --- Performance Evaluation --- p.21Chapter 3.1 --- Performance and Robustness of the Mirror Incentive Policy (Pmirror): --- p.21Chapter 3.2 --- Performance and Robustness of the Proportional Incentive Policy {Pprop): --- p.23Chapter 3.3 --- Performance and Robustness of incentive policy in the Linear Incentive Class (CLIP)： --- p.24Chapter 3.4 --- The Effect of Non-adaptive Peers: --- p.25Chapter 4 --- Adversary Effect of Altruism --- p.29Chapter 4.1 --- The Effect of Protocol Cost --- p.29Chapter 4.2 --- The Tradeoff between Altruism and System Robustness --- p.30Chapter 5 --- Related Work --- p.33Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.34Bibliography --- p.3