302 research outputs found

    Vertical cooperative advertising models: a new game theoretic approach

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    Nel capitolo 1° viene introdotta la strategia di cooperazione verticale nelle spese pubblicitarie. Nel capitolo 2° invece, si spiegano dei concetti fondamentali di teoria dei giochi, che verranno poi applicati nel capitolo 3° (dove si presentano 3 pubblicazioni scientifiche) e nel capitolo 4° è introdotto un nuovo modell

    A Game Theoretic Framework for Competing/Cooperating Retailers under price and advertising dependent demand

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    In this paper, we develop a game theoretic model for cooperative advertising in a supply chain consisting of a monopolistic manufacturer selling its product to the consumer only through competing duopolistic retailers. We consider a new form of the demand function which is an additive form. The demand is influenced by both retail price and advertising expenditures. To identify optimal advertising and pricing decisions, we discuss three possible games (two non cooperative games including Stackelberg-Cournot and Stackelberg-Collusion, and one cooperative game) and then we compare the various decision variables and the profits for all cases and also with similar results of the existing literature to develop some important insights

    Local advertising externalities and cooperation in one manufacturer-two retailers channel

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    In this paper, we consider a static model for advertising strategies and pricing decisions in supply chain with one monopolistic manufacturer and two duopolistic retailers. We assume an additive form of the consumer demand which is influenced by retail price and advertising. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price, invests in advertising (at national level) and offers cooperative advertising to boost the advertising expenditures of their retailers. The retailers set the retail price and invest in advertising (at local level). By means of game theory, we discuss three different relationships between the supply chain members: two non cooperative games including the Stackelberg – Cournot and the Stackelberg – Collusion and one cooperative game. The comparison between the three models reveals that the advertising, the pricing, the consumer demand and the profits are affected by various relationships. Furthermore, under the cooperation situation, we propose a channel coordination mechanism through a manufacturer’s participation rate in retailers’ local advertising cost and wholesale price by using utility function

    The effects of decision timing for pricing and marketing efforts in a supply chain with competing manufacturers

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    Producción CientíficaThis paper investigates the impact of decision timing for pricing and marketing efforts in a supply chain led by competing manufacturers. We develop and solve six games to consider the scenarios (games) where prices and marketing efforts (ME) are decided simultaneously, and when they are not (i.e., ME is set either before or after prices). We examine these three scenarios for the benchmark case of a bilateral monopolistic channel, then extend the analysis to a supply chain with competing manufacturers. We identify the optimal decision timing by comparing equilibrium profits and strategies across games in each supply chain setup. We find that a monopolistic manufacturer always prefers that prices and ME be decided simultaneously. However, this result does not hold when product competition is taken into account. The optimal decision timing for competing manufacturers depends on the retailer's and manufacturers' ME effectiveness levels as well as on competition intensity. Specifically, when ME are not very effective, a simultaneous decision scenario is preferred because it provides the advantage of higher profit margins or sales. However, for highly effective ME, manufacturers prefer to decouple ME and pricing decisions. The retailer's optimal scenario is either to make all decisions simultaneously or to choose prices prior to ME. This means that supply chain firms can face conflict due to the decision timing for prices and ME

    Manufacturer's pricing strategies in cooperative and non-cooperative advertising supply chain under retail competition

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    This article studies the manufacturer's pricing strategy in a supply chain with a single manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader specifies wholesale prices to two retailers who face advertisement dependent demand. Based on this gaming structure, two mathematical models are developed - the cooperative advertising model where manufacturer shares a fraction of retailers' advertising costs and the non-cooperative advertising model where manufacturer does not share any retailer's advertising expenses. The optimal strategies of the manufacturer and retailers are determined and a numerical example is taken to illustrate the theoretical results derived. We show that cooperative advertising policy is beneficial not only for the participating entities but also for the entire supply chain

    An Integrated Bargaining Solution Analysis For Vertical Cooperative Sales Promotion Campaigns Based On The Win-Win-Win Papakonstantinidis Model

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    Authors intention was to examine the possibility to investigate win-win-win papakonstantinidis model in order to develop an integrated bargaining solution analysis for vertical cooperative sales promotion campaigns. Based on previous theoretical extensions (Spais and Papakonstantinidis, 2011; Spais, Papakonstantinidis and Papakonstantinidis, 2009), this study presented an integrated bargaining solution analysis for cases of optimal allocation of a promotion budget in a cooperative sales promotion campaign in vertical marketing channels. This integrated bargaining solution analysis included: a) three (3) adjusted utility functions, considering the parameters of sales response budgeting method, the break-even sales analysis and the marketing channel members trade promotion goals; b) the referee solution, the optimal solution for the three players and the constraints; c) the definition of the third win in terms of a continuous sensitization process and perfect information; and d) the presentation of the potential outputs from a bargaining process regarding to the sharing of the cooperative sales promotion cost among A, B and C parties/players for different sales promotion offerings. Encouragingly, the review of the modern literature and the four (4) critical case studies of cooperative marketing programs confirmed the need for a win-win-win approach in cooperative sales promotion planning in vertical marketing channels

    Assessing the Profitability of Cooperative Advertising Programs in Competing Channels

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    Producción CientíficaA large literature studied the profitability (effectiveness) of cooperative advertising programs (CAPs) in distribution channels, but very few studies modeled pricing decisions in competitive markets under different channel structures. This paper fills this gap. We propose a game-theoretic model where two competing channels make pricing and promotional decisions. The efectiveness of CAPs is studied under different channel structures to examine how vertical and horizontal externalities can impact the effectiveness of CAPs. Each channel structure can be integrated or decentralized to account for different vertical interaction effects, resulting in three cases: (i) both channels are decentralized (DD), (ii) both are integrated (II), and (iii) a hybrid structure where one channel is decentralized and is competing with an integrated channel (DI). We solve six non-cooperative games: (1) both manufacturers offer CAPs under DD, (2) only one manufacturer offers a CAP under DD, (3) both manufacturers do not offer CAPs under DD, (4) the decentralized manufacturer offers a CAP under DI, (5) the decentralized manufacturer does not offer a CAP under DI, and (6) the channel problem under II. Then, we obtain and compare equilibrium profits and strategies across these games. The main results indicate that the profitability of CAPs depends on the levels of price competition and of the advertising effects. Also,while manufacturers benefit from CAPs, retailers may not find such programs profitable. Finally, the decentralized or integrated structure of the competing channel significantly impacts the effects of cooperative advertising. For example, CAPs can effectively coordinate the DD channel and even help it exceed profits earned by a vertically integrated channel. However, in the DI case, although CAPs can improve total channel profits, they do not fully coordinate the channel.1Research of the first and third authors is supported by the National Sciences and Engineering Council of Canada (NSERC). The second author’s research is partially supported by MEC under project ECO2014-52343-P, co-financed by FEDER funds and the COST Action IS1104 “The EU in the new economic complex geography: models, tools and policy evaluation"

    Coordinating Pricing and Ordering Decisions in a Multi-Echelon Pharmacological Supply Chain under Different Market Power using Game Theory

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    Abstract The importance of supply chains in pharmacological industry is remarkable so that nowadays many pharmacological supply chains have an effective and critical role for supplying and distributing drugs in health area. So, this article studies a three-echelon pharmacological supply chain containing multi-distributor of raw materials, a pharmaceutical factory, and multi-drug distributors companies. The distributors of raw material order raw materials of some drugs to own suppliers and sell them to the pharmaceutical factory. The factory transmutes raw materials to the several finished products and sells them to some drug distributors companies. There are several types of raw materials and finished products. Here, it is supposed that the market powers of partners are different. So, the Stackelberg game among the members of the chain is deemed to analyze the coordination behavior of the members of the proposed chain. The aim of the research is to maximize the total profit of supply chain by employing the optimal pricing and ordering decision policies where the order quantities of the distributors and the selling prices of pharmaceutical factory (manufacturer) and the distributors are the decision variables. Besides, the closed form solutions of the decision variables are presented. At the end, numerical example and some sensitivity analysis are presented

    Game-theoretic study of the dynamics of tourism supply chains for package holidays under quantity competition

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