369,510 research outputs found
Locally Stable Marriage with Strict Preferences
We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control.
In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched
to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents
it can be matched with. Agents can match arbitrarily, and they learn about
possible partners dynamically based on their current neighborhood. We consider
convergence of dynamics to locally stable matchings -- states that are stable
with respect to their imposed information structure in the network. In the
two-sided case of stable marriage in which existence is guaranteed, we show
that the existence of a path to stability becomes NP-hard to decide. This holds
even when the network exists only among one partition of agents. In contrast,
if one partition has no network and agents remember a previous match every
round, a path to stability is guaranteed and random dynamics converge with
probability 1. We characterize this positive result in various ways. For
instance, it holds for random memory and for cache memory with the most recent
partner, but not for cache memory with the best partner. Also, it is crucial
which partition of the agents has memory. Finally, we present results for
centralized computation of locally stable matchings, i.e., computing maximum
locally stable matchings in the two-sided case and deciding existence in the
roommates case.Comment: Conference version in ICALP 2013; to appear in SIAM J. Disc Mat
Matching Dynamics with Constraints
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints
that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in
markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be
matched to another agent. Each agent has a complete preference list over all
other agents it can be matched with. However, depending on the constraints and
the current state of the game, not all possible partners are available for
matching at all times. For correlated preferences, we propose and study a
general class of hedonic coalition formation games that we call coalition
formation games with constraints. This class includes and extends many recently
studied variants of stable matching, such as locally stable matching, socially
stable matching, or friendship matching. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that all
these variants are encompassed in a class of "consistent" instances that always
allow a polynomial improvement sequence to a stable state. In addition, we show
that for consistent instances there always exists a polynomial sequence to
every reachable state. Our characterization is tight in the sense that we
provide exponential lower bounds when each of the requirements for consistency
is violated. We also analyze matching with uncorrelated preferences, where we
obtain a larger variety of results. While socially stable matching always
allows a polynomial sequence to a stable state, for other classes different
additional assumptions are sufficient to guarantee the same results. For the
problem of reaching a given stable state, we show NP-hardness in almost all
considered classes of matching games.Comment: Conference Version in WINE 201
Mechanism Design without Money via Stable Matching
Mechanism design without money has a rich history in social choice
literature. Due to the strong impossibility theorem by Gibbard and
Satterthwaite, exploring domains in which there exist dominant strategy
mechanisms is one of the central questions in the field. We propose a general
framework, called the generalized packing problem (\gpp), to study the
mechanism design questions without payment. The \gpp\ possesses a rich
structure and comprises a number of well-studied models as special cases,
including, e.g., matroid, matching, knapsack, independent set, and the
generalized assignment problem.
We adopt the agenda of approximate mechanism design where the objective is to
design a truthful (or strategyproof) mechanism without money that can be
implemented in polynomial time and yields a good approximation to the socially
optimal solution. We study several special cases of \gpp, and give constant
approximation mechanisms for matroid, matching, knapsack, and the generalized
assignment problem. Our result for generalized assignment problem solves an
open problem proposed in \cite{DG10}.
Our main technical contribution is in exploitation of the approaches from
stable matching, which is a fundamental solution concept in the context of
matching marketplaces, in application to mechanism design. Stable matching,
while conceptually simple, provides a set of powerful tools to manage and
analyze self-interested behaviors of participating agents. Our mechanism uses a
stable matching algorithm as a critical component and adopts other approaches
like random sampling and online mechanisms. Our work also enriches the stable
matching theory with a new knapsack constrained matching model
The weighted stable matching problem
We study the stable matching problem in non-bipartite graphs with incomplete
but strict preference lists, where the edges have weights and the goal is to
compute a stable matching of minimum or maximum weight. This problem is known
to be NP-hard in general. Our contribution is two fold: a polyhedral
characterization and an approximation algorithm. Previously Chen et al. have
shown that the stable matching polytope is integral if and only if the subgraph
obtained after running phase one of Irving's algorithm is bipartite. We improve
upon this result by showing that there are instances where this subgraph might
not be bipartite but one can further eliminate some edges and arrive at a
bipartite subgraph. Our elimination procedure ensures that the set of stable
matchings remains the same, and thus the stable matching polytope of the final
subgraph contains the incidence vectors of all stable matchings of our original
graph. This allows us to characterize a larger class of instances for which the
weighted stable matching problem is polynomial-time solvable. We also show that
our edge elimination procedure is best possible, meaning that if the subgraph
we arrive at is not bipartite, then there is no bipartite subgraph that has the
same set of stable matchings as the original graph. We complement these results
with a -approximation algorithm for the minimum weight stable matching
problem for instances where each agent has at most two possible partners in any
stable matching. This is the first approximation result for any class of
instances with general weights.Comment: This is an extended version of a paper to appear at the The Fourth
International Workshop on Matching Under Preferences (MATCH-UP 2017
Solving Hard Stable Matching Problems Involving Groups of Similar Agents
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when
strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify
structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow
us to design efficient algorithms using elementary techniques. We focus on the
setting in which all agents involved in some matching problem can be
partitioned into k different types, where the type of an agent determines his
or her preferences, and agents have preferences over types (which may be
refined by more detailed preferences within a single type). This situation
would arise in practice if agents form preferences solely based on some small
collection of agents' attributes. We also consider a generalisation in which
each agent may consider some small collection of other agents to be
exceptional, and rank these in a way that is not consistent with their types;
this could happen in practice if agents have prior contact with a small number
of candidates. We show that (for the case without exceptions), several
well-studied NP-hard stable matching problems including Max SMTI (that of
finding the maximum cardinality stable matching in an instance of stable
marriage with ties and incomplete lists) belong to the parameterised complexity
class FPT when parameterised by the number of different types of agents needed
to describe the instance. For Max SMTI this tractability result can be extended
to the setting in which each agent promotes at most one `exceptional' candidate
to the top of his/her list (when preferences within types are not refined), but
the problem remains NP-hard if preference lists can contain two or more
exceptions and the exceptional candidates can be placed anywhere in the
preference lists, even if the number of types is bounded by a constant.Comment: Results on SMTI appear in proceedings of WINE 2018; Section 6
contains work in progres
The stable roommates problem with ties
We study the variant of the well-known stable roommates problem in which participants are permitted to express ties in their preference lists. In this setting, more than one definition of stability is possible. Here we consider two of these stability criteria, so-called super-stability and weak stability. We present a linear–time algorithm for finding a super-stable matching if one exists, given a stable roommates instance with ties. This contrasts with the known NP-hardness of the analogous problem under weak stability. We also extend our algorithm to cope with preference lists that are incomplete and/or partially ordered. On the other hand, for a given stable roommates instance with ties and incomplete lists, we show that the weakly stable matchings may be of different sizes and the problem of finding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching is NP-hard, though approximable within a factor of 2
An Algorithm for a Super-Stable Roommates Problem
In this paper we describe an efficient algorithm that decides if a stable
matching exists for a generalized stable roommates problem, where, instead of
linear preferences, agents have partial preference orders on potential partners.
Furthermore, we may forbid certain partnerships, that is, we are looking for
a matching such that none of the matched pairs is forbidden, and yet, no
blocking pair (forbidden or not) exists.
To solve the above problem, we generalize the first algorithm for the ordi-
nary stable roommates problem
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