Remote Attacks on FPGA Hardware

Immer mehr Computersysteme sind weltweit miteinander verbunden und über das Internet zugänglich, was auch die Sicherheitsanforderungen an diese erhöht. Eine neuere Technologie, die zunehmend als Rechenbeschleuniger sowohl für eingebettete Systeme als auch in der Cloud verwendet wird, sind Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Sie sind sehr flexible Mikrochips, die per Software konfiguriert und programmiert werden können, um beliebige digitale Schaltungen zu implementieren. Wie auch andere integrierte Schaltkreise basieren FPGAs auf modernen Halbleitertechnologien, die von Fertigungstoleranzen und verschiedenen Laufzeitschwankungen betroffen sind. Es ist bereits bekannt, dass diese Variationen die Zuverlässigkeit eines Systems beeinflussen, aber ihre Auswirkungen auf die Sicherheit wurden nicht umfassend untersucht. Diese Doktorarbeit befasst sich mit einem Querschnitt dieser Themen: Sicherheitsprobleme die dadurch entstehen wenn FPGAs von mehreren Benutzern benutzt werden, oder über das Internet zugänglich sind, in Kombination mit physikalischen Schwankungen in modernen Halbleitertechnologien. Der erste Beitrag in dieser Arbeit identifiziert transiente Spannungsschwankungen als eine der stärksten Auswirkungen auf die FPGA-Leistung und analysiert experimentell wie sich verschiedene Arbeitslasten des FPGAs darauf auswirken. In der restlichen Arbeit werden dann die Auswirkungen dieser Spannungsschwankungen auf die Sicherheit untersucht. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass verschiedene Angriffe möglich sind, von denen früher angenommen wurde, dass sie physischen Zugriff auf den Chip und die Verwendung spezieller und teurer Test- und Messgeräte erfordern. Dies zeigt, dass bekannte Isolationsmaßnahmen innerhalb FPGAs von böswilligen Benutzern umgangen werden können, um andere Benutzer im selben FPGA oder sogar das gesamte System anzugreifen. Unter Verwendung von Schaltkreisen zur Beeinflussung der Spannung innerhalb eines FPGAs zeigt diese Arbeit aktive Angriffe, die Fehler (Faults) in anderen Teilen des Systems verursachen können. Auf diese Weise sind Denial-of-Service Angriffe möglich, als auch Fault-Angriffe um geheime Schlüsselinformationen aus dem System zu extrahieren. Darüber hinaus werden passive Angriffe gezeigt, die indirekt die Spannungsschwankungen auf dem Chip messen. Diese Messungen reichen aus, um geheime Schlüsselinformationen durch Power Analysis Seitenkanalangriffe zu extrahieren. In einer weiteren Eskalationsstufe können sich diese Angriffe auch auf andere Chips auswirken die an dasselbe Netzteil angeschlossen sind wie der FPGA. Um zu beweisen, dass vergleichbare Angriffe nicht nur innerhalb FPGAs möglich sind, wird gezeigt, dass auch kleine IoT-Geräte anfällig für Angriffe sind welche die gemeinsame Spannungsversorgung innerhalb eines Chips ausnutzen. Insgesamt zeigt diese Arbeit, dass grundlegende physikalische Variationen in integrierten Schaltkreisen die Sicherheit eines gesamten Systems untergraben können, selbst wenn der Angreifer keinen direkten Zugriff auf das Gerät hat. Für FPGAs in ihrer aktuellen Form müssen diese Probleme zuerst gelöst werden, bevor man sie mit mehreren Benutzern oder mit Zugriff von Drittanbietern sicher verwenden kann. In Veröffentlichungen die nicht Teil dieser Arbeit sind wurden bereits einige erste Gegenmaßnahmen untersucht

Remote Side-Channel Disassembly on Field-Programmable Gate Arrays

Over the last two decades, side-channel vulnerabilities have shown to be a major threat to embedded devices. Most side-channel research has developed our understanding of the vulnerabilities to cryptographic devices due to their implementation and how we can protect them. However, side-channel leakage can yield useful information about many other processes that run on the device. One promising area that has received little attention is the side-channel leakage due to the execution of assembly instructions. There has been some work in this area that has demonstrated the idea’s potential, but so far, this research has assumed the adversary has physical access to the device. In recent years, researchers have developed methods for remote side-channel attacks using power monitors implemented in reprogrammable hardware. In this work, we test if similar power monitors are capable of disassembling code running on a general purpose processor on the same chip die as the reconfigurable hardware fabric. We train a sequence of decision tree classifiers to first predict which group an instruction belongs to, then its type, and finally, the individual instruction. Our results demonstrate that our field-programmable gate array-based power monitors are correlated to the executed instructions and correctly classify individual instructions at about 13-15% depending on the clock rate. This is better than randomly guessing but far from being useful in practice. We also train coarse-grain models for classifying instructions based on their functional unit utilization. This approach improves the accuracy to about 20-30% depending on the clock rate and grouping used

ENABLING IOT AUTHENTICATION, PRIVACY AND SECURITY VIA BLOCKCHAIN

Although low-power and Internet-connected gadgets and sensors are increasingly integrated into our lives, the optimal design of these systems remains an issue. In particular, authentication, privacy, security, and performance are critical success factors. Furthermore, with emerging research areas such as autonomous cars, advanced manufacturing, smart cities, and building, usage of the Internet of Things (IoT) devices is expected to skyrocket. A single compromised node can be turned into a malicious one that brings down whole systems or causes disasters in safety-critical applications. This dissertation addresses the critical problems of (i) device management, (ii) data management, and (iii) service management in IoT systems. In particular, we propose an integrated platform solution for IoT device authentication, data privacy, and service security via blockchain-based smart contracts. We ensure IoT device authentication by blockchain-based IC traceability system, from its fabrication to its end-of-life, allowing both the supplier and a potential customer to verify an IC’s provenance. Results show that our proposed consortium blockchain framework implementation in Hyperledger Fabric for IC traceability achieves a throughput of 35 transactions per second (tps). To corroborate the blockchain information, we authenticate the IC securely and uniquely with an embedded Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). For reliable Weak PUF-based authentication, our proposed accelerated aging technique reduces the cumulative burn-in cost by ∼ 56%. We also propose a blockchain-based solution to integrate the privacy of data generated from the IoT devices by giving users control of their privacy. The smart contract controlled trust-base ensures that the users have private access to their IoT devices and data. We then propose a remote configuration of IC features via smart contracts, where an IC can be programmed repeatedly and securely. This programmability will enable users to upgrade IC features or rent upgraded IC features for a fixed period after users have purchased the IC. We tailor the hardware to meet the blockchain performance. Our on-die hardware module design enforces the hardware configuration’s secure execution and uses only 2,844 slices in the Xilinx Zedboard Zynq Evaluation board. The blockchain framework facilitates decentralized IoT, where interacting devices are empowered to execute digital contracts autonomously

Side-channel attacks and countermeasures in the design of secure IC's devices for cryptographic applications

Abstract--- A lot of devices which are daily used have to guarantee the retention of sensible data. Sensible data are ciphered by a secure key by which only the key holder can get the data. For this reason, to protect the cipher key against possible attacks becomes a main issue. The research activities in hardware cryptography are involved in finding new countermeasures against various attack scenarios and, in the same time, in studying new attack methodologies. During the PhD, three different logic families to counteract Power Analysis were presented and a novel class of attacks was studied. Moreover, two different activities related to Random Numbers Generators have been addressed

Microarchitectural Low-Power Design Techniques for Embedded Microprocessors

With the omnipresence of embedded processing in all forms of electronics today, there is a strong trend towards wireless, battery-powered, portable embedded systems which have to operate under stringent energy constraints. Consequently, low power consumption and high energy efficiency have emerged as the two key criteria for embedded microprocessor design. In this thesis we present a range of microarchitectural low-power design techniques which enable the increase of performance for embedded microprocessors and/or the reduction of energy consumption, e.g., through voltage scaling. In the context of cryptographic applications, we explore the effectiveness of instruction set extensions (ISEs) for a range of different cryptographic hash functions (SHA-3 candidates) on a 16-bit microcontroller architecture (PIC24). Specifically, we demonstrate the effectiveness of light-weight ISEs based on lookup table integration and microcoded instructions using finite state machines for operand and address generation. On-node processing in autonomous wireless sensor node devices requires deeply embedded cores with extremely low power consumption. To address this need, we present TamaRISC, a custom-designed ISA with a corresponding ultra-low-power microarchitecture implementation. The TamaRISC architecture is employed in conjunction with an ISE and standard cell memories to design a sub-threshold capable processor system targeted at compressed sensing applications. We furthermore employ TamaRISC in a hybrid SIMD/MIMD multi-core architecture targeted at moderate to high processing requirements (> 1 MOPS). A range of different microarchitectural techniques for efficient memory organization are presented. Specifically, we introduce a configurable data memory mapping technique for private and shared access, as well as instruction broadcast together with synchronized code execution based on checkpointing. We then study an inherent suboptimality due to the worst-case design principle in synchronous circuits, and introduce the concept of dynamic timing margins. We show that dynamic timing margins exist in microprocessor circuits, and that these margins are to a large extent state-dependent and that they are correlated to the sequences of instruction types which are executed within the processor pipeline. To perform this analysis we propose a circuit/processor characterization flow and tool called dynamic timing analysis. Moreover, this flow is employed in order to devise a high-level instruction set simulation environment for impact-evaluation of timing errors on application performance. The presented approach improves the state of the art significantly in terms of simulation accuracy through the use of statistical fault injection. The dynamic timing margins in microprocessors are then systematically exploited for throughput improvements or energy reductions via our proposed instruction-based dynamic clock adjustment (DCA) technique. To this end, we introduce a 6-stage 32-bit microprocessor with cycle-by-cycle DCA. Besides a comprehensive design flow and simulation environment for evaluation of the DCA approach, we additionally present a silicon prototype of a DCA-enabled OpenRISC microarchitecture fabricated in 28 nm FD-SOI CMOS. The test chip includes a suitable clock generation unit which allows for cycle-by-cycle DCA over a wide range with fine granularity at frequencies exceeding 1 GHz. Measurement results of speedups and power reductions are provided

Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems

The chapters in this open access book arise out of the EU Cost Action project Cryptacus, the objective of which was to improve and adapt existent cryptanalysis methodologies and tools to the ubiquitous computing framework. The cryptanalysis implemented lies along four axes: cryptographic models, cryptanalysis of building blocks, hardware and software security engineering, and security assessment of real-world systems. The authors are top-class researchers in security and cryptography, and the contributions are of value to researchers and practitioners in these domains. This book is open access under a CC BY license

EFFICIENT HARDWARE PRIMITIVES FOR SECURING LIGHTWEIGHT SYSTEMS

In the era of IoT and ubiquitous computing, the collection and communication of sensitive data is increasingly being handled by lightweight Integrated Circuits. Efficient hardware implementations of crytographic primitives for resource constrained applications have become critical, especially block ciphers which perform fundamental operations such as encryption, decryption, and even hashing. We study the efficiency of block ciphers under different implementation styles. For low latency applications that use unrolled block cipher implementations, we design a glitch filter to reduce energy consumption. For lightweight applications, we design a novel architecture for the widely used AES cipher. The design eliminates inefficiencies in data movement and clock activity, thereby significantly improving energy efficiency over state-of-the-art architectures. Apart from efficiency, vulnerability to implementation attacks are a concern, which we mitigate by our randomization capable lightweight AES architecture. We fabricate our designs in a commercial 16nm FinFET technology and present measured testchip data on energy consumption and side channel resistance. Finally, we address the problem of supply chain security by using image processing techniques to extract fingerprints from surface texture of plastic IC packages for IC authentication and counterfeit prevention. Collectively these works present efficient and cost effective solutions to secure lightweight systems