Consensus-based approach to peer-to-peer electricity markets with product differentiation

With the sustained deployment of distributed generation capacities and the more proactive role of consumers, power systems and their operation are drifting away from a conventional top-down hierarchical structure. Electricity market structures, however, have not yet embraced that evolution. Respecting the high-dimensional, distributed and dynamic nature of modern power systems would translate to designing peer-to-peer markets or, at least, to using such an underlying decentralized structure to enable a bottom-up approach to future electricity markets. A peer-to-peer market structure based on a Multi-Bilateral Economic Dispatch (MBED) formulation is introduced, allowing for multi-bilateral trading with product differentiation, for instance based on consumer preferences. A Relaxed Consensus+Innovation (RCI) approach is described to solve the MBED in fully decentralized manner. A set of realistic case studies and their analysis allow us showing that such peer-to-peer market structures can effectively yield market outcomes that are different from centralized market structures and optimal in terms of respecting consumers preferences while maximizing social welfare. Additionally, the RCI solving approach allows for a fully decentralized market clearing which converges with a negligible optimality gap, with a limited amount of information being shared.Comment: Accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Power System

Sorting versus screening: Search frictions and competing mechanisms

In a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms, we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism. Price posting prevails when meetings are rival, i.e., when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer’s meeting probability. Under price posting buyers reveal their type by sorting ex ante. Only if the meeting technology is sufficiently non-rival, price posting is not an equilibrium. Multiple buyer types then visit the same sellers who screen ex post through auctions

The simple analytics of money and credit in a quasi-linear environment

Lagos and Wright (2005) demonstrate how the essential properties of a money-search model are preserved in an environment that is rendered highly tractable with the use of quasi-linear preferences. In this paper, I show that this same innovation can be applied to closely related environments used elsewhere in the literature that study insurance and credit markets under limited commitment and private information. The analysis demonstrates clearly how insurance, credit, and money are interrelated in terms of their basic functions. The analysis also leads to a heretofore neglected result pertaining to the Friedman rule. In particular, I find that the same frictions that render money essential may at the same time operate to render the Friedman rule infeasible. Thus, even if the Friedman rule is a desirable policy, an incentive-induced lower bound on the rate of deflation may nevertheless entail a strictly postive rate of inflation.Money ; Credit

Herding effects in order driven markets: The rise and fall of gurus

We introduce an order driver market model with heterogeneous traders that imitate each other on a dynamic network structure. The communication structure evolves endogenously via a fitness mechanism based on agents performance. We assess under which assumptions imitation, among otherway noise traders, can give rise to the emergence of gurus and their rise and fall in popularity over time. We study the wealth distribution of gurus, followers and non followers and show that traders have an incentive to imitate and to be imitated since herding turns out to be profitable

Compliance and Imperfect Intertemporal Carbon Trading

This paper examines three compliance mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: (i) the restoration rate, (ii) the commitment period reserve rule, and (iii) the suspension mechanism, all potentially constraining greenhouse gas emissions trading across time and space. The joint effect of these mechanisms on prices and costs is studied in a twoperiod model under various assumptions about the competitiveness of the permit market and US participation. The analytical results indicate that the restoration rate can make discounted permit prices decrease over time. With the commitment period reserve, marginal costs may not only be lower, but also higher than the permit prices. The suspension rule will under quite general circumstances not affect prices and costs; only shift non-compliance from future sellers to future buyers. The numerical results suggest that with imperfect permit markets and non-participation of the US in the Kyoto Protocol in 2010, none of the three rules becomes binding.compliance; market power; emissions trading; Kyoto Protocol

On the Economic Value and Price-Responsiveness of Ramp-Constrained Storage

The primary concerns of this paper are twofold: to understand the economic value of storage in the presence of ramp constraints and exogenous electricity prices, and to understand the implications of the associated optimal storage management policy on qualitative and quantitative characteristics of storage response to real-time prices. We present an analytic characterization of the optimal policy, along with the associated finite-horizon time-averaged value of storage. We also derive an analytical upperbound on the infinite-horizon time-averaged value of storage. This bound is valid for any achievable realization of prices when the support of the distribution is fixed, and highlights the dependence of the value of storage on ramp constraints and storage capacity. While the value of storage is a non-decreasing function of price volatility, due to the finite ramp rate, the value of storage saturates quickly as the capacity increases, regardless of volatility. To study the implications of the optimal policy, we first present computational experiments that suggest that optimal utilization of storage can, in expectation, induce a considerable amount of price elasticity near the average price, but little or no elasticity far from it. We then present a computational framework for understanding the behavior of storage as a function of price and the amount of stored energy, and for characterization of the buy/sell phase transition region in the price-state plane. Finally, we study the impact of market-based operation of storage on the required reserves, and show that the reserves may need to be expanded to accommodate market-based storage

Balancing Cost and Emissions Certainty: An Allowance Reserve for Cap-and-Trade

On efficiency grounds, the economics community has to date tended to emphasize price-based policies to address climate change -- such as taxes or a “safety-valve” price ceiling for cap-and-trade -— while environmental advocates have sought a more clear quantitative limit on emissions. This paper presents a simple modification to the idea of a safety valve -- a quantitative limit that we call the allowance reserve. Importantly, this idea may bridge the gap between competing interests and potentially improve efficiency relative to tax or other price-based policies. The last point highlights the deficiencies in several previous studies of price and quantity controls for climate change that do not adequately capture the dynamic opportunities within a cap-and-trade system for allowance banking, borrowing, and intertemporal arbitrage in response to unfolding information.climate change, regulation, uncertainty, welfare, prices, quantities