524 research outputs found
Heterogeneous Air Defense Battery Location: A Game Theoretic Approach
The Unites States and its allies confront a persistent and evolving threat from missile attacks as nations around the world continue to invest and advance their current capabilities. Within the air defense context of a missile-and-interceptor engagement, a challenge for the defender is that surface to air interceptor missile batteries often must be located to protect high-value targets dispersed over a vast area, subject to an attacker observing the disposition of batteries prior to developing and implementing an attack plan. To model this scenario, we formulate a two-player, three-stage, perfect information, sequential move, zero-sum game that accounts for, respectively, a defender\u27s location of batteries, an attacker\u27s launch of missiles against targets, and a defender\u27s assignment of interceptors to incoming missiles. The resulting trilevel math programming formulation cannot be solved via direct optimization and it is not suitable to solve via full enumeration for realistically-sized instances. We instead utilize the game tree search technique Double Oracle, within which we embed alternative heuristics to solve an important subproblem for the attacker. We test and compare these solution methods to solve a designed set of 26 instances of parametric variation, from which we derive insights regarding the nature of the underlying problem. Whereas full enumeration required up to 8.6 hours to solve the largest instance considered, our superlative implementation of Double Oracle terminates in a maximum of 3.39 seconds over the set of instances, with an average termination time of less than one second. Double Oracle also properly identifies the optimal SPNE strategies in 75% of our test instances and, regarding those instances for which Double Oracle failed, we note that the relative deviation is less than 2.5% from optimal, on average, yielding promise as a solution method to solve realistically-sized instances
Foundations, Properties, and Security Applications of Puzzles: A Survey
Cryptographic algorithms have been used not only to create robust ciphertexts
but also to generate cryptograms that, contrary to the classic goal of
cryptography, are meant to be broken. These cryptograms, generally called
puzzles, require the use of a certain amount of resources to be solved, hence
introducing a cost that is often regarded as a time delay---though it could
involve other metrics as well, such as bandwidth. These powerful features have
made puzzles the core of many security protocols, acquiring increasing
importance in the IT security landscape. The concept of a puzzle has
subsequently been extended to other types of schemes that do not use
cryptographic functions, such as CAPTCHAs, which are used to discriminate
humans from machines. Overall, puzzles have experienced a renewed interest with
the advent of Bitcoin, which uses a CPU-intensive puzzle as proof of work. In
this paper, we provide a comprehensive study of the most important puzzle
construction schemes available in the literature, categorizing them according
to several attributes, such as resource type, verification type, and
applications. We have redefined the term puzzle by collecting and integrating
the scattered notions used in different works, to cover all the existing
applications. Moreover, we provide an overview of the possible applications,
identifying key requirements and different design approaches. Finally, we
highlight the features and limitations of each approach, providing a useful
guide for the future development of new puzzle schemes.Comment: This article has been accepted for publication in ACM Computing
Survey
Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges
In recent years, blockchain has gained widespread attention as an emerging
technology for decentralization, transparency, and immutability in advancing
online activities over public networks. As an essential market process,
auctions have been well studied and applied in many business fields due to
their efficiency and contributions to fair trade. Complementary features
between blockchain and auction models trigger a great potential for research
and innovation. On the one hand, the decentralized nature of blockchain can
provide a trustworthy, secure, and cost-effective mechanism to manage the
auction process; on the other hand, auction models can be utilized to design
incentive and consensus protocols in blockchain architectures. These
opportunities have attracted enormous research and innovation activities in
both academia and industry; however, there is a lack of an in-depth review of
existing solutions and achievements. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive
state-of-the-art survey of these two research topics. We review the existing
solutions for integrating blockchain and auction models, with some
application-oriented taxonomies generated. Additionally, we highlight some open
research challenges and future directions towards integrated blockchain-auction
models
Coordinating service composition
The fundamental paradigm shift from traditional value chains to agile service value networks implies new economic and organizational challenges. As coordination mechanisms, auctions have proven to perform quite well in situations where intangible and heterogeneous goods are traded. Nevertheless traditional approaches in the area of multiattribute combinatorial auctions are not quite suitable to enable the trade of composite services. A flawless service execution and therefore the requester\u27s valuation highly depends on the accurate sequence of the functional parts of the composition, meaning that in contrary to service bundles, composite services only generate value through a valid order of their components. We present an abstract model as a formalization of a service value network. The model comprehends a graph-based mechanism design to allocate multiattribute service offers within the network, to impose penalties for non-performance and to determine prices for complex services. The mechanism and the bidding language support various types of QoS attributes and their (semantic) aggregation. We analytically show that this variant is incentive compatible with respect to all dimensions of the service offer (quality and price)
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