8,386 research outputs found
An Efficient Protocol for Negotiation over Combinatorial Domains with Incomplete Information
We study the problem of agent-based negotiation in combinatorial domains. It
is difficult to reach optimal agreements in bilateral or multi-lateral
negotiations when the agents' preferences for the possible alternatives are not
common knowledge. Self-interested agents often end up negotiating inefficient
agreements in such situations. In this paper, we present a protocol for
negotiation in combinatorial domains which can lead rational agents to reach
optimal agreements under incomplete information setting. Our proposed protocol
enables the negotiating agents to identify efficient solutions using
distributed search that visits only a small subspace of the whole outcome
space. Moreover, the proposed protocol is sufficiently general that it is
applicable to most preference representation models in combinatorial domains.
We also present results of experiments that demonstrate the feasibility and
computational efficiency of our approach
Computational Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
Game theory has developed powerful tools for analyzing decision making in systems with multiple autonomous actors. These tools, when tailored to computational settings, provide a foundation for building multiagent software systems. This tailoring gives rise to the field of computational mechanism design, which applies economic principles to computer systems design
Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources
A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous
software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and
social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In
this paper, we study an abstract negotiation framework where agents can agree
on multilateral deals to exchange bundles of indivisible resources. We then
analyse how these deals affect social welfare for different instances of the
basic framework and different interpretations of the concept of social welfare
itself. In particular, we show how certain classes of deals are both sufficient
and necessary to guarantee that a socially optimal allocation of resources will
be reached eventually
A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS
The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing
Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1
This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --Grid Computing
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