84 research outputs found

    T2AR: trust-aware ad-hoc routing protocol for MANET

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    Secure Leader Election for Intrusion Detection in MANET

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    This paper shows the leader election in presence of selfish nodes. To balance the resource consumption among the nodes and prolong the life time of manet. Nodes with highest resource should be elected as a leaders. But there is  obstacles in doing so.  First, node may lie about its available resources. Second, electing multiple  leaders may leads to additional overhead. Considering first, solution is based on Mechanism design. It  provides incentives to the nodes to honestly participate in the election process. The amount of incentives provide to the nodes is based on Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves (VCG) model. Considering second, series of algorithms are there to address optimal leader election

    Reputation-based security protocol for MANETs in highly mobile disconnection-prone environments

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    This paper is concerned with fully distributed reputation-based mechanisms that improve security in MANETS. We introduce a number of optimisations to the current reputation schemes used in MANETs such as selective deviation tests and adaptive expiration timer that aim to deal with congestion and quick reputation convergence. We propose to use two different centrality measures for evaluation of the individual trust claims and resolving the aggregated ones. We design and build our prototype over AODV and test it in NS-2 in the presence of variable active blackhole attacks in highly mobile and sparse networks. Our results show that we achieve increased throughput while delay and jitter decrease and converge to AODV

    A reactive algorithm for deducing nodal forwarding behavior in a multihop ad hoc wireless network in the presence of errors

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    A novel algorithm is presented to deduce individual nodal forwarding behavior from standard end to end acknowledgments. The algorithm is based on a well-established mathematical method and is robust to network related errors and nodal behavior changes. The proposed solution was verified in a network simulation, in which it performed well in a difficult environment and achieved sound results

    Mechanism design and game theoretical models for intrusion detection

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    In this thesis, we study the problems related to intrusion detection systems in Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs). Specifically, we are addressing the leader election in the presence of selfish nodes, the tradeoff between security and IDS's resource consumption, and the multi-fragment intrusion detection via sampling. To balance the resource consumption among all the nodes and prolong the lifetime of a MANET, the nodes with the most remaining resources should be elected as the leaders. Selfishness is one of the main problems facing such a model where nodes can behave selfishly during the election or after. To address this issue, we present a solution based on the theory of mechanism design. More specifically, the solution provides nodes with incentives in the form of reputations to encourage nodes in participating honestly in the election process. The amount of incentives is based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to ensure that truth-telling is the dominant strategy of any node. To catch and punish a misbehaving elected leader, checkers are selected randomly to monitor the behavior of a leader. To reduce the false-positive rate, a cooperative game-theoretic model is proposed to analyze the contribution of each checker on the catch decision. A multi-stage catch mechanism is also introduced to reduce the performance overhead of checkers. Additionally, we propose a series of local election algorithms that lead to globally optimal election results. Note that the leader election model, which is known as moderate model is only suitable when the probability of attacks is low. Once the probability of attacks is high, victims should launch their own IDSs. Such a robust model is, however, costly with respect to energy, which leads nodes to die fast. Clearly, to reduce the resource consumption of IDSs and yet keep its effectiveness, a critical issue is: When should we shift from moderate to robust mode? Here, we formalize this issue as a nonzero-sum non-cooperative game-theoretical model that takes into consideration the tradeoff between security and IDS resource consumption. Last but not least, we consider the problem of detecting multi-fragments intrusions that are launched from a MANET targeting another network. To generalize our solution, we consider the intrusion to be launched from any type of networks. The detection is accomplished by sampling a subset of the transmitted packets over selected network links or router interfaces. Given a sampling budget, our framework aims at developing a network packet sampling strategy to effectively reduce the success chances of an intruder. Non-cooperative game theory is used to express the problem formally. Finally, empirical results are provided to support our solutions

    Mechanism design-based leader election scheme for intrusion detection in MANET

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    We study the leader election in the presence of selfish nodes for intrusion detection systems (IDS) in a mobile ad hoc network (MANET). To balance the resource consumption among all nodes and prolong the lifetime of a MANET, nodes with the most remaining resources should be elected as the leaders. However, without incentives for serving others, a node may behave selfishly by lying about its remaining resource and avoiding being elected. We present a solution based on mechanism design theory. More specifically, we design a scheme for electing cluster leaders that have the following two advantages: First, the collection of elected leaders is the optimal in the sense that the overall resource consumption will be balanced among all nodes in the network overtime. Second, the scheme provides the leaders with incentives in the form of reputation so that nodes are encouraged to honestly participate in the election process. The design of such incentives is based on the Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves (VCG) model by which truth-telling is the dominant strategy for each node. Simulation results show that our scheme can effectively prolong the overall lifetime of IDS in MANET and balance the resource consumptions among all the nodes
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