Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey

The Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), also known as the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack in the literature, is one of the key adversaries to the success of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In the past couple of years, the research on the Byzantine attack and defense strategies has gained worldwide increasing attention. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey and tutorial on the recent advances in the Byzantine attack and defense for CSS in CRNs. Specifically, we first briefly present the preliminaries of CSS for general readers, including signal detection techniques, hypothesis testing, and data fusion. Second, we analyze the spear and shield relation between Byzantine attack and defense from three aspects: the vulnerability of CSS to attack, the obstacles in CSS to defense, and the games between attack and defense. Then, we propose a taxonomy of the existing Byzantine attack behaviors and elaborate on the corresponding attack parameters, which determine where, who, how, and when to launch attacks. Next, from the perspectives of homogeneous or heterogeneous scenarios, we classify the existing defense algorithms, and provide an in-depth tutorial on the state-of-the-art Byzantine defense schemes, commonly known as robust or secure CSS in the literature. Furthermore, we highlight the unsolved research challenges and depict the future research directions.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutoiral

Trust-based security for the OLSR routing protocol

International audienceThe trust is always present implicitly in the protocols based on cooperation, in particular, between the entities involved in routing operations in Ad hoc networks. Indeed, as the wireless range of such nodes is limited, the nodes mutually cooperate with their neighbors in order to extend the remote nodes and the entire network. In our work, we are interested by trust as security solution for OLSR protocol. This approach fits particularly with characteristics of ad hoc networks. Moreover, the explicit trust management allows entities to reason with and about trust, and to take decisions regarding other entities. In this paper, we detail the techniques and the contributions in trust-based security in OLSR. We present trust-based analysis of the OLSR protocol using trust specification language, and we show how trust-based reasoning can allow each node to evaluate the behavior of the other nodes. After the detection of misbehaving nodes, we propose solutions of prevention and countermeasures to resolve the situations of inconsistency, and counter the malicious nodes. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our solution taking different simulated attacks scenarios. Our approach brings few modifications and is still compatible with the bare OLSR