Ancestor Worship in The Logic of Games. How foundational were Aristotle\u27s contributions?

Notwithstanding their technical virtuosity and growing presence in mainstream thinking, game theoretic logics have attracted a sceptical question: Granted that logic can be done game theoretically, but what would justify the idea that this is the preferred way to do it?\u27\u27 A recent suggestion is that at least part of the desired support might be found in the Greek dialectical writings. If so, perhaps we could say that those works possess a kind of foundational significance. The relation of being foundational for is interesting in its own right. In this paper, I explore its ancient applicability to relevant, paraconsistent and nonmonotonic logics, before returning to the question of its ancestral tie, or want of one, to the modern logics of games

Interpretative dilemmas

In this paper I claim that the reason we are reluctant to call many informal fallacies fallacies of relevance is because we can interpret them as providing contextual information about how the argument is to be interpreted. This interpretative dilemma is that the logical form is determined in part by whether the analyst wishes to be charitable to the proponent or the opponent. The evaluation of the argument is nonetheless purely logical

A new dialectical theory of explanation

This paper offers a dialogue theory of explanation. A successful explanation is defined as a transfer of understanding in a dialogue system in which a questioner and a respondent take part. The questioner asks a special sort of why-question that asks for understanding of something and the respondent provides a reply that transfers understanding to the questioner. The theory is drawn from recent work on explanation in artificial intelligence (AI), especially in expert systems, but applies to scientific, legal and everyday conversational explanations

Antilogic

This paper is an interim report of joint work begun in (Castelnérac & Marion 2009) on dialectic from Parmenides to Aristotle. In the first part we present rules for dialectical games, understood as a specific form of antilogikê developed by philosophers, and explain some of the key concepts of these dialectical games in terms of ideas from game semantics. In the games we describe, for a thesis A asserted by the answerer, a questioner must elicit the answerer’s assent to further assertions B1, B2,…, Bn, which form a scoreboard from which the questioner seeks to infer an impossibility (adunaton); we explain why the questioner must not insert any of his own assertions in the scoreboard, as well as the crucial role the Law of Non Contradiction, and why the games end with the inference to an impossibility, as opposed to the assertion of ¬A. In the second part we introduce some specific characteristics of Eleatic Antilogic as a method of enquiry. When Antilogic is used as a method of inquiry, then one must play not only the game beginning with a given thesis A, but also the game for ¬A as well as for A & ¬A, while using a peculiar set of opposite predicates to generate the arguments. In our discussion we hark back to Parmenides’ Poem, and illustrate our points with Zeno’s arguments about divisibility, Gorgias’ ontological argument from his treatise On Not-Being, and the second part of Plato’s Parmenides. We also identify numerous links to Aristotle, and conclude with some speculative comments on the origin of logic

Inference and argument in informal logic

We can provisionally distinguish inference as logically drawing some new result out of given information from argument as advancing reasons in support of a challenged claim. Blair and Johnson place inference beyond the scope of informal logic, and Tou lmin considers inference to be the connection of premises with conclusion in a strong argument. Both approaches are inadequate to inference as distinguished here, and partly as a consequence argument analysts tend unwittingly to mark the distinction as t hat between linked and convergent arguments. Here I urge that there are advantages to treating inference as inference

Supposition: A Problem for Bilateralism

In bilateral logic formulas are signed by + and -, indicating the speech acts assertion and denial. I argue that making an assumption is also speech act. Speech acts cannot be embedded within other speech acts. Hence we cannot make sense of the notion of making an assumption in bilateral logic. Some attempts at a solution to this problem are considered and rejected

Questions, Presuppositions and Fallacies

[EN] In this paper I focus on the fallacy known as Complex Question or Many Ques tions. After a brief introduction, in Sect. 2 I highlight its pragmatic dimension, and in Sect. 3 its dialectical dimension. In Sect. 4 I present two accounts of this fallacy developed in argumentation theory, Douglas Walton’s and the Pragma-Dialectics’, which have resources to capture both its pragmatic and its dialectical nature. How ever, these accounts are unsatisfactory for various reasons. In Sect. 5 I focus on the pragmatic dimension of the fallacy and I suggest amendments to the accounts mentioned drawing on the study of the phenomenon of presupposition in theoretical pragmatics. I argue that the central notion in the defnition of the fallacy is that of an informative presupposition. In Sect. 6 I focus on the dialectical dimension of the fallacy. This dimension needs to be explicitly acknowledged in the defnition of the fallacy in order to distinguish it from a diferent, non-dialectical, fallacious argumentative move involving presuppositions.Publicación en abierto financiada por el Consorcio de Bibliotecas Universitarias de Castilla y León (BUCLE), con cargo al Programa Operativo 2014ES16RFOP009 FEDER 2014-2020 DE CASTILLA Y LEÓN, Actuación:20007-CL - Apoyo Consorcio BUCLE