2,262 research outputs found
An Evolutionary Learning Approach for Adaptive Negotiation Agents
Developing effective and efficient negotiation mechanisms for real-world applications such as e-Business is challenging since negotiations in such a context are characterised by combinatorially complex negotiation spaces, tough deadlines, very limited information about the opponents, and volatile negotiator preferences. Accordingly, practical negotiation systems should be empowered by effective learning mechanisms to acquire dynamic domain knowledge from the possibly changing negotiation contexts. This paper illustrates our adaptive negotiation agents which are underpinned by robust evolutionary learning mechanisms to deal with complex and dynamic negotiation contexts. Our experimental results show that GA-based adaptive negotiation agents outperform a theoretically optimal negotiation mechanism which guarantees Pareto optimal. Our research work opens the door to the development of practical negotiation systems for real-world applications
Acceptance conditions in automated negotiation
In every negotiation with a deadline, one of the negotiating parties has to accept an offer to avoid a break off. A break off is usually an undesirable outcome for both parties, therefore it is important that a negotiator employs a proficient mechanism to decide under which conditions to accept. When designing such conditions one is faced with the acceptance dilemma: accepting the current offer may be suboptimal, as better offers may still be presented. On the other hand, accepting too late may prevent an agreement from being reached, resulting in a break off with no gain for either party. Motivated by the challenges of bilateral negotiations between automated agents and by the results and insights of the automated negotiating agents competition (ANAC), we classify and compare state-of-the-art generic acceptance conditions. We focus on decoupled acceptance conditions, i.e. conditions that do not depend on the bidding strategy that is used. We performed extensive experiments to compare the performance of acceptance conditions in combination with a broad range of bidding strategies and negotiation domains. Furthermore we propose new acceptance conditions and we demonstrate that they outperform the other conditions that we study. In particular, it is shown that they outperform the standard acceptance condition of comparing the current offer with the offer the agent is ready to send out. We also provide insight in to why some conditions work better than others and investigate correlations between the properties of the negotiation environment and the efficacy of acceptance condition
Consensus-based approach to peer-to-peer electricity markets with product differentiation
With the sustained deployment of distributed generation capacities and the
more proactive role of consumers, power systems and their operation are
drifting away from a conventional top-down hierarchical structure. Electricity
market structures, however, have not yet embraced that evolution. Respecting
the high-dimensional, distributed and dynamic nature of modern power systems
would translate to designing peer-to-peer markets or, at least, to using such
an underlying decentralized structure to enable a bottom-up approach to future
electricity markets. A peer-to-peer market structure based on a Multi-Bilateral
Economic Dispatch (MBED) formulation is introduced, allowing for
multi-bilateral trading with product differentiation, for instance based on
consumer preferences. A Relaxed Consensus+Innovation (RCI) approach is
described to solve the MBED in fully decentralized manner. A set of realistic
case studies and their analysis allow us showing that such peer-to-peer market
structures can effectively yield market outcomes that are different from
centralized market structures and optimal in terms of respecting consumers
preferences while maximizing social welfare. Additionally, the RCI solving
approach allows for a fully decentralized market clearing which converges with
a negligible optimality gap, with a limited amount of information being shared.Comment: Accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Power System
A Secure and Fair Protocol that Addresses Weaknesses of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Nonlinear Negotiation
Negotiation with multiple interdependent issues is an important problem since much of real-world negotiation falls into this category. This paper examines the problem that, in such domains, agent utility functions are nonlinear, and thereby can create nonconvex Pareto frontiers. This in turn implies that the Nash Bargaining Solution, which has been viewed as the gold standard for identifying a unique optimal negotiation outcome, does not serve that role in nonlinear domains. In nonlinear domains, unlike linear ones, there can be multiple Nash Bargaining Solutions, and all can be sub-optimal with respect to social welfare and fairness. In this paper, we propose a novel negotiation protocol called SFMP (the Secure and Fair Mediator Protocol) that addresses this challenge, enabling secure multilateral negotiations with fair and pareto-optimal outcomes in nonlinear domains. The protocol works by (1) using nonlinear optimization, combined with a Multi-Party protocol, to find the Pareto front without revealing agent’s private utility information, and (2) selecting the agreement from the Pareto set that maximizes a fair division criterion we call approximated fairness. We demonstrate that SFMP is able to find agreements that maximize fairness and social welfare in nonlinear domains, and out-performs (in terms of outcomes and scalability) previously developed nonlinear negotiation protocols
Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1
This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --Grid Computing
A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS
The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing
Building a Semantic Tendering System
In the new B2B e-commerce arena, applications such as auctions and data exchange are growing rapidly. However, Web content is currently designed for human consumption rather than computer manipulation. This limits the possibility of Web automation. Fortunately, the new development of the Semantic Web that allows Web pages to provide information not only in terms of their content, but also in terms of the properties of that content, can be used for automation. Electronic tendering systems are among the successfully commercial systems that can tremendously benefit from the availability of Semantic Web. This study proposes an e-tendering system that uses the Semantic Web to investigate the automatic negotiation process. The system is built in a P2P environment to simulate a two-player negotiation. It is found that the ontology of semantic information can be used to locate qualified suppliers and precede negotiation. The bargaining power of each party is then determined by the relative magnitude of the negotiators’ respective costs of haggling and the utility that varies with the degree of risk preference. Our experiments showed that applying automatic negotiation strategies to e-tendering system in semantic web can reflect the risk preference of the participants
Theoretical and Computational Basis for CATNETS - Annual Report Year 3
In this document the developments in defining the computational and theoretical framework for economical resource allocation are described. Accordingly the formal specification of the market mechanisms, bidding strategies of the involved agents and the integration of the market mechanisms into the simulator were refined. --Grid Computing
Theoretical and Computational Basis for CATNETS - Annual Report Year 2
In this work the self-organising potential of the CATNETS allocation mechanism is described to provide a more comprehensive view on the research done in this project. The formal description of either the centralised and decentralised approach is presented. Furthermore the agents' bidding model is described and a comprehensive overview on how the catallactic mechanism is incorporated into the middleware and simulator environments is given. --Decentralized Market Mechanisms,Centralized Market Mechanisms,Catallaxy,Market Engineering,Simulator Integration,Prototype Integration
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