Bilateral Oligopoly

In intermediate goods markets, both buyers and sellers normally have market power, and sales are based on bilaterally negotiated contracts specifying both price and quantity. In our model, pairs of buyers and sellers meet in bilateral but interdependent Rubinstein-Ståhl negotiations. The outcome has a simple characterization (a Nash equilibrium in Nash bargaining solutions) suitable for applied work. Equilibrium quantities are efficient regardless of concentration and also with few “trading links”. The law of one price does not hold. In addition to relation-specific characteristics, prices depend on both upstream and downstream concentration and on the structure of trading links. The requirements necessary for Walrasian prices are stronger than usually believed.Bilageral Oligopoly; Bargaining; Intermediate Goods; Decentralized Trade; Walrasian Outcome

Formation of Decentralized Manufacturer-Supplier Networked Market

This paper studies trading in a two-sided market where firms strategically form a network. In a networked market, manufacturers and suppliers must be connected by links for trading. We show that if no contingent contract is available, then any pairwise Nash stable network is inefficient. Each supplier under-invests in links (a hold-up problem). If a contract contingent on direct links is available and link cost is low, then the under-investment problem solves. Furthermore, the complete network resulting in the Walrasian outcome is uniquely pairwise Nash stable. However, this outcome is also inefficient. A new hold-up problem, over-investment in links, arises.

Design and Implementation of a Cloud Based Decentralized Cryptocurrency Transaction Platform

Trading in the crypto-currency market has seen rapid growth and adoption, as well as the interest in crypto related technologies like blockchain and smart contracts. Smart contracts have gained popularity in building so called Decentralized Applications (dApps) and Decentralized Finance (DeFi) apps, mainly because they are more secure, trustworthy, and largely distributed (removes centralized control). DeFi applications run on the blockchain technology and are secured by blocks (nodes) connected by cryptographical hash links. DeFi applications have a great potential in the crypto-currency trading domain, providing more secure and reliable means of trading, and performing transactions with crypto-currencies. Only verified transactions are added to the blockchain after being approved by miners through a consensus mechanism and then it is replicated (distributed) among the nodes on the blockchain network. This research paper proposes a DeFi Crypto Exchange by integrating a numerous-signature stamp with a crypto API. A numerous-signature stamp solves the issue of transaction verifiability and authenticity. A crypto API provides the data about each crypto currency with which trades and transactions will be performed. This paper also discusses the technical background of the technology and a few related works. Decentralization of transactions through smart contracts on the blockchain will improve trust, security and reliability of transactions and trades

Performance Evaluation - Annual Report Year 3

This report describes the work done and results obtained in third year of the CATNETS project. Experiments carried out with the different configurations of the prototype are reported and simulation results are evaluated with the CATNETS metrics framework. The applicability of the Catallactic approach as market model for service and resource allocation in application layer networks is assessed based on the results and experience gained both from the prototype development and simulations. --Grid Computing

Endogenous Trading Networks

We investigate the effects of a class of trading protocols on the architecture and efficiency properties of endogenously formed trading networks. In our model, the opportunity to sell valuable objects occurs randomly to different individuals. A sale can only be realized if two individuals are connected, directly or indirectly, but forming and maintaining a trading relation is a costly investment. When the outcome of trading is efficient and provides no intermediation rents, a tension between equilibrium and efficient networks emerges when the cost of forming a link is at an intermediate level. There are two types of inefficiencies. Either all equilibrium networks are under- connected when compared to efficient networks, or a multiplicity of equilibriam may exist and agents may fail to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium network

Decentralization in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Lessons for Global Policy

In 2005, the European Union introduced the largest and most ambitious emissions trading program in the world to meet its Kyoto commitments for the containment of global climate change. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has some distinctive features that differentiate it from the more standard model of emissions trading. In particular, it has a relatively decentralized structure that gives individual member states responsibility for setting targets, allocating permits, determining verification and enforcement, and making some choices about flexibility. It is also a “cap-within-a-cap,” seeking to achieve the Kyoto targets while only covering about half of EU emissions. Finally, it is a program that many hope will link with other greenhouse gas trading programs in the future—something we have not seen among existing trading systems. Examining these features coupled with recent EU ETS experience offers lessons about how cost effectiveness, equity, flexibility, and compliance fare in a multi-jurisdictional trading program, and highlights the challenges facing a global emissions trading regime.emissions trading, Kyoto Protocol, European Union, linking, climate change

Agent-Based Computational Modeling And Macroeconomics

Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) is the computational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents. This essay discusses the potential use of ACE modeling tools for the study of macroeconomic systems. Points are illustrated using an ACE model of a two-sector decentralized market economy. Related work can be accessed here: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/amulmark.htmagent-based computational economics